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Mao Zedong (December 26, 1893 – September 9, 1976)

Known as Mao Tse Tung, Mao Zedong and Chairman Mao. Founding father of the People's Republic of China, most prominent communist theoreticians, a great poet, not only remembered for his impact on Chinese society and culture but for his global influence, including on political revolutionaries in the United States and the Western world in the 1960s and 1970s, ruling the country from 1949 until 1976.

Notable Quote: "Politics is war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed."

Source: <https://www.thoughtco.com/timeline-of-mao-zedongs-life-195741>

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PAKISTAN-RUSSIA COLLABORATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR AFGHANISTAN AND CENTRAL ASIA

Shabir Ahmad Khan* & Muhammad Khan^Ψ

Abstract

Pakistan and Russia are in close collaboration for the last decade or so due to the changed regional and global geo-political scenarios. However understanding and respecting each other's interests as well as convergence of Pak-Russian interests in Afghanistan and Central Asia is the main driving force behind this development which guarantee a permanent need for each other. Both Pakistan and Russia emphasised on a negotiated settlement for Afghanistan imbroglio addressing concerns of regional states. The Russia-Central Asia-South Asia integration via Afghanistan and Pakistan is in the minds of Russia and Pakistan. Russia controls the northern corridor to the contiguous areas of Afghanistan and Central Asia while Pakistan provides an outlet in the south. The close cooperation between Pakistan and Russia has also encouraged Central Asian Republics for greater interaction with Pakistan. Sino-Russian close cooperation on Central Asia and Pak-China close liaison on Afghanistan also solidifies Pak-Russia collaboration. Thus Russia, China, Pakistan axis will be a symbol of peace and prosperity for Afghanistan and Central Asia. In post US/NATO Afghanistan, maintaining regional peace and stability will be a shared responsibility of regional states.

Key words:

Pakistan, Russia, China, Central Asia, Afghanistan, Taliban

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Introduction

The work is an effort to describe the growing cooperative relations between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Russian Federation particularly in regional and to some extent in global context, to examine the interests, role and policies of Russian Federation in Central Asia and Afghanistan, to look into the interests, role and policies of Pakistan in Central Asia and Afghanistan, to find out fields of mutual interests/convergence of interests between Pakistan and Russia in the context of Central Asia and Afghanistan and finally to ponder upon the impact of Pak-Russia collaboration on the peace and development of Central Asia and Afghanistan. It is obvious that Pak-Russia bilateral relations have witnessed warmth and progress during the last decade or so. In the regional context Russia lost its historical influence in the decision making circles in Delhi, India while America lost the same in the decision making circles in Islamabad, Pakistan. In the changed regional geo-political orientation the American hegemonic behaviour has played role, to some extent, to push Islamabad and Moscow towards each other as is the case with Beijing-Moscow relations in post-Soviet era. Russia's changed policy goals in South Asia¹, renewed interests in Afghanistan and strategic as well as economic significance of Central Asia for Russia played roles in Russia's approach towards Pakistan. It is all about understanding and respecting each other's interests in Afghanistan and Central Asia. In the global context, Russo-American intensified rivalry in post-Crimea period and thereafter Western economic sanctions also compelled Russia to look in the east and south-east direction for new strategic and economic partners.

On the other hand Pakistan became victim of American hegemonic discourse and incurred huge material and human losses in the so called American War on Terror in Afghanistan. However, America did not recognise Pakistan's efforts and sacrifices in war on terror, signed nuclear deal with India thus endangering the balance of power in South Asia and remained adamant to assign leading role to India in Afghanistan on the expense of Pakistan's strategic and security interests. All this added salt to the wounds of Pakistan. Pakistan thus started looking ways and means to forge closer relations with Russia to diversify its foreign relations. China's close strategic partnership with Russia and its time tested friendship with Pakistan might have also played role in Pak-Russia rapprochement. In the changed regional and global configuration of relations, Pakistan and Russia have made progress in strategic, political and diplomatic relations. The trade and economic relations are still fraction of its true potential but the complementarity is there in the field of energy, Eurasian Union-CPEC integration and military-hardware (defence industry). However the most

¹ Shabir Ahmad Khan, "Russia's Changing Policy Towards South Asia: Options for Pakistan" in *Central Asia* No. 79, Winter 2016 (Published in April 2018)

important factor that come into play regarding Pak-Russia collaboration are mutuality of interests in Central Asia and Afghanistan which have been focused upon in this work and analysed in the above mentioned framework.

Russia's Policy, Interests and Goals in Afghanistan

The following factors have mainly shaped Russia's policy towards Afghanistan in recent years.

- i. The declining Western/US/NATO influence and interests in Afghanistan after their failure to stabilise Afghanistan militarily.
- ii. The growing roles of regional/neighbouring countries i.e. Pakistan, China and Iran.
- iii. The ISIS factor, which Russia along with other regional/neighbouring countries assume dangerous for regional security including former Soviet Central Asia Republics (CARs).
- iv. Russia considers the security of Central Asia's border with Afghanistan imperative for its own security while insecurity in Afghanistan endangers the security of Central Asia.
- v. The drug trafficking issue from instable and weak Afghanistan via Central Asia has been getting intolerable for Russia.

After a hand-off approach in post-Soviet period, Russia's diplomatic initiatives regarding Afghanistan include the Moscow format for regional consultation by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since December 2016 and reviving the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation's Contact Group on Afghanistan.² The first consultation took place in December 2016 between Russia, China and Pakistan, the second consultation included six parties i.e. Afghanistan, Iran and India besides the former three Russia, China and Pakistan in February 2017. These consultations led towards Conference on Afghanistan in which ten regional countries including five CARs participated on 14 April 2017.³ Russia emphasised on a negotiated settlement for Afghanistan's imbroglio while at the same time recognised the need for addressing the concerns of regional states. Though Russia's role and influence in Afghanistan is limited, Russia's efforts demonstrate the capability of playing a neutral and positive role while emphasising regional

² Ekaterina Stepanova, "Russia's Afghan Policy in the Regional and Russia-West Context", May 2018, retrieved from https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/rnr_23_stepanova_russia_afpak_2018.pdf and also from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325156987_Russia's_Afghan_Policy_in_the_Regional_and_Russia-West_Contexts accessed 27/05/2019

³ Ibid.

approach. After US/NATO withdrawal and limited Western military presence forced Russia to think that US is no longer the external security provider to Afghanistan and started cooperation with regional states over Afghanistan. Russia prudently foresee that only a regionally inclusive settlement can eventually stabilise Afghanistan.⁴

Narcotics, heroin of Afghan origin trafficking through northern route i.e. Central Asia to Russia is a major concern for Russia and therefore Russia supports the stabilisation of Afghanistan to control and discourage narco-economy and its trafficking. There are around 1 to 2 million drug/heroin addicts in Russia and on average 40000 drug addicts every year. In 2005 Putin accused the coalition forces in Afghanistan for encouraging drug supply to former Soviet states and Europe as the heroin production increased by more than 40 times since the US occupation.⁵ The Islamic State (IS) Vilayat Khorasan, though debilitated to a great extent now, also raised Russia's concerns because several thousand ethnic Russians joined IS while segments in Caucasus and micro-cells across Russia comprised mainly of ethnic Russians threatened Russia's state and society. Russia views IS as an international phenomenon while Taliban as Afghan national movement and logically supported Taliban to extricate the IS in Afghanistan. Russia also acknowledged the fact that Taliban cannot be defeated militarily and therefore started contacts with them since December 2014 or early 2015. Some observers believe that Russia's bonhomie with Taliban played important role in Russia's rapprochement with Pakistan⁶ but to me it appears the other way round i.e. Pakistan's rapprochement with Russia paved the way for increased Russia-Taliban contacts.

In post-Crimea period, Russia undermines USA's interests in Afghanistan. Russia believes that American permanent presence in Afghanistan aims to penetrate Central Asia and ultimately establish its control over Eurasia on the expense and to the detriment of Russia's interests.⁷ Russia supported the stance of Taliban for complete withdrawal of foreign forces during a conference on Afghanistan in Moscow on 27 and 28

⁴ Barnett Rubin, "Its Much Bigger than Afghanistan: US Strategy for A Transformed Region", War on the Rocks, April 25, 2017, retrieved from <https://warontherocks.com/2017/04/its-much-bigger-than-afghanistan-u-s-strategy-for-a-transformed-region/>, accessed 29/03/2019

⁵ Kaneshko Sangar, "Afghanistan's Significance for Russia in the 21st Century: Interests, Perceptions and Perspectives", *Politics in Central Europe*, Vol. 12, No. 1, retrieved from <https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/j/pce.2016.12.issue-1/pce-2016-0004/pce-2016-0004.pdf>, accessed 27/03/2019

⁶ Ekaterina Stepanova, op. cited.

⁷ Kaneshko Sangar, "Afghanistan's Significance for Russia in the 21st Century: Interests, Perceptions and Perspectives", *Politics in Central Europe*, Vol. 12, No. 1, retrieved from <https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/j/pce.2016.12.issue-1/pce-2016-0004/pce-2016-0004.pdf>, accessed 27/03/2019

May, 2019.⁸ Importantly Russia desires to have a strong and effective government in Afghanistan which could control the drug-trafficking as well as could maintain peace for the sake of stable and peaceful Afghan-Central Asian border. Russia also foresees a political role for Afghan Taliban in their country and therefore it becomes imperative for Russia to be in contact with the Taliban to eliminate any chances of US manoeuvring of Taliban against Russia in case of US-Taliban deal. There are reports that Russia has been supplying arms to the Taliban. NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe Curtis Scaparotti at a hearing with the Senate Armed Services Committee revealed that Russian influence in Afghanistan has increased and even supply to Taliban.⁹ However there is no solid evidence of Russia arming the Taliban. The CNN footage of 2017 showed Taliban with Russian arms but there are many channels, means and ways by which Taliban can indirectly access Russian arms and not necessarily supplied by Russia.¹⁰ Nevertheless Russia's support to Taliban can be a decisive factor in either way. It can pressurise Taliban to negotiate while as another patron, Russia can at the same time embolden them to continue fighting.

Historically Russia remained a hegemonic power in Central Asia and Afghanistan. This historical legacy of Russia's domination has left indelible mark on the perceptions and attitude of Russia towards the region.¹¹ So to be a great power in the region is one of the primary identities in its main interests in Central Asia and Afghanistan. Russia's official rhetoric has been that unlike the 1990s when Russia was on its knees, it is now a rising great power and need to encounter any attempt by its rivals to gain influence in a region which traditionally remained Russia's sphere of influence.

In the realm of economic interests, instable Afghanistan can be a threat to Russia's developing Eurasian Union which can be extended only in eastern and south-eastern direction. The Siberian-Central Asian-South Asian integration via Afghanistan is in the minds of Russians and can be instrumental in regional peace and prosperity. Afghanistan also possesses mineral resources worth trillion of dollars and Russia has shown interest to invest in this field as 80 percent of Afghanistan's large-scale industry projects were initiated by Soviet Russia. In this regard the example of Aynak Copper mine can be quoted as it were the Russians who conducted massive

⁸ Dawn, 29 May, 2019

⁹ Nicholas Triket, "Making Sense of Russia's Involvement in Afghanistan", *The Diplomat*, August 2, 2018, retrieved from <https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/making-sense-of-russias-involvement-in-afghanistan/> accessed 27/03/2019

¹⁰ Ibid

¹¹ Maria y. Omelicheva, "Central Asia" in *Routledge Handbook of Russian Foreign Policy*, ed. Andrei P. Tsygankov (Routledge, 2018), pp: 325-327

exploration work resulting in the creation of 1300 maps of the area which contain more \$100 b worth copper.¹²

Pakistan's Interests, Policy and Goals in Afghanistan

Regional security complex makes happenings in some states particularly in neighbouring one more important for a given state than in other countries. Pakistan's security and political interests are inseparably linked to Afghanistan and therefore Pakistan pays special attention to its relations with Afghanistan. However Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan is something more than a bilateral matter. The relations are beyond bilateral issue because policies of both the countries are primarily shaped by the influences and interests of major powers involved in both the countries particularly for the last four decades. Though before 1980 Afghanistan remained hostile and aggressive towards Pakistan, did not vote for Pakistan in the UN (1947), raised the issue of Pukhtoonistan, Pakistan neither requested the Soviet Union to invade Afghanistan nor did invite the US/NATO to occupy Afghanistan. Contrary to that, it was on the appeal of Afghans (Islamists) that Pakistan extended assistance to Afghans. In post 9/11 period, Pakistan supported the coalition forces for the sake of peaceful Afghanistan. However according to the nature of Afghans i.e. struggle against the foreign occupation plus US/NATO's own made mistakes by indiscriminate bombings of wedding and funeral ceremonies, hospitals, civilians, violating sanctity of houses and by not respecting local values and traditions, US/NATO created more enemies than friends and gave impetus to the Afghan resistance in the form of Afghan Taliban.

Pakistan's divergence of interests with US on Afghanistan started since 2005 when US-India nuclear deal talks initiated. US paid little attention to what bothered Pakistan vis-à-vis Afghanistan and India.¹³ One of the main interests of Pakistan is to mitigate the influence and role of India in Afghanistan at the cost of Pakistan's human and material sacrifices in the two wars, Soviet-Afghan and US/NATO war. In the realm of trade and economics, Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan revolves around integration with and access to the energy rich Central Asia. Pakistan always desired a peaceful and stable Afghanistan that can be used as an energy and trade conduit with Central Asia. The materialization of Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline and Central Asia-South Asia (CASA) 1000 electricity import projects are closely linked to the security and stability of Afghanistan. Pakistan's goal is to effectively manage Pak-Afghan border to check the illegal border crossing and flow of goods, as well as to counter terrorist activities. Pakistan believes that

¹² Kaneshko Sangar, op. cited

¹³ Hasan Askari Rizvi, "Pakistan's Afghan Problem" the express TRIBUNE, November 5, 2017, retrieved from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1550078/6-pakistans-afghan-problem/>, accessed 29/03/2019

insurgency in Baluchistan is supported by India from within Afghanistan and effective border management will help stabilizing and developing Baluchistan and ultimately CPEC which India considers detrimental to its geo-political aims in the region.

Pakistan also desires Afghanistan to respect the sovereignty of Pakistan by respecting the Durand Line as a permanent international border. Almost all the states in Central and South Asia including Afghanistan are the products of imperialists. Afghanistan's all borders were determined and demarcated by Tsarist Russia and Britain during the 19th Century. It does not carry any logic for Afghanistan to question only its border with Pakistan which Pakistan inherited from Britain while Britain had captured this area from Sikhs not Afghanistan. As Hafizulla Amin explicitly declared Kabul's aspirations for a greater Afghanistan by stating that the Durand Line tore us apart.¹⁴ In fact Pakhtoons on Pakistan's side of Pak-Afghan border are more developed, educated and disciplined. More than 45 percent residents of Islamabad are Pakhtoons.

US policy and goals in Afghanistan as they stand in 2019 are different from its goals during immediate post 9/11. US is no more interested in nation building or developing Afghanistan as stated by Trump.¹⁵ Afghanistan houses the interests of Pakistan, Russia, China and Iran also. For Pakistan surrendering its interests and security to the US hegemonic discourse and its interests would be tantamount to flow against the regional tide. Pakistan also remembers how America left the region in mess after fulfilling its desires in the aftermath of Soviet withdrawal. Pakistan therefore supports a regionally inclusive political settlement to the Afghan imbroglio and welcomes Russia's initiatives in this regard. It is worth mentioning that Afghan refugees almost 3 million in number remained calm and peaceful during their stay in Pakistan. Most of the Afghans will remain friendly to Pakistan. Even the Afghan government never exploited Pakistan's vulnerabilities during Pak-India wars. It is the competing and conflicting interests of major powers that impede both the countries from becoming allies not only friends.

¹⁴ Umair Jamal and Yaqoob Khan Bangash, "Understanding Pakistan's Strategic Interests in Afghanistan", The News, January 17, 2016, retrieved from <http://tns.thenews.com.pk/understanding-pakistans-strategic-interests-afghanistan/#.XLMBCOgzbcc> accessed 14/04/2019

¹⁵ Yaseen Aftab Ali, "Pakistan's Suggested Afghan Policy", Pakistan Today, January 23, 2018, retrieved from <https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2018/01/23/pakistans-suggested-afghan-policy/> accessed 14/4/019

Russia's Interests, Policy and Goals in Central Asia

Central Asian Republics' (CARs) pivotal geographical location, hydrocarbon resources and Russia's security vulnerabilities are central to Russia's policy and interests in Central Asia.¹⁶ Though during the 1990s, Russia could not pay attention to the region due to her own transitional related issues and economic difficulties. Russia also never expected that the world would be so closely engaged in Central Asia. US/NATO physical presence in Central Asia made the region a priority in the Russian foreign policy realm. Security concerns from the US/NATO presence and Islamic fundamentalists in the Muslim region decisively shapes Russia's policy towards the region. Russia has institutionalised its relations with CARs by establishing Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and a Collective Rapid Deployment Force under the CSTO. It has 7500 Russian military personnel guarding the Tajik-Afghan border.¹⁷ The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation's (SCO's) Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) has been established since 2004. In the defence, military and security sectors, the region remains firmly attached to Russia. Russian is still the lingua franca in Central Asia. Russia is still heavily engaged in the production and transportation of oil and gas in the region though China has recently dented its monopoly in the energy sector of Central Asia.

Russia enjoys soft power in Central Asia because the socio-economic development that CARs achieved during the Soviet era is unprecedented in the history of imperialists and colonised states. Russia's influence in Central Asia will be long lasting as the region is extensively tied to Russia in diverse fields i.e. from security and energy to trade and investment and from geo-political loyalty to identical and common views on governance and development. Russia considers Central Asia vital for furthering its interests in rest of Asia. Currently Eurasianism is the focus of Russia's foreign policy aims while Central Asia has to play important role in Russia's Eurasian Union. It is worth mentioning that the importance of Central Asia for Russia has grown since 2001 and it will keep growing for the next decades and beyond.¹⁸ If America, in a polycentric world, reduced to a Western Power that holds influence in the WEST only and China over EAST, Russia believes to be influential over Eurasia which makes Central Asia Central to Russia. Russia considers the region as her traditional sphere of influence for a privileged role and believes that it has the capacity and also the 'right' to channel and shape others' interaction with CARs.¹⁹

¹⁶ Maria Y. Omelicheva, op. cited

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Bobo Lo, "Frontiers New and Old: Russia's Policy in Central Asia", Russia/NIS Centre, Russie.Nei.Visions No. 82, Paris 2015, retrieved from https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ifri_rnv_82_central_asia_bobolo_eng_january_2015_0.pdf accessed 13/04/2019

¹⁹ Ibid

Pakistan's Interests, Policy and Goals in Central Asia

Pakistan realises the geographical and economic significance of Central Asian, region's location vis-à-vis Pakistan and therefore has been trying to forge closer economic and political relations with CARs since 1991. Pakistan's interests in Central Asia ranges from having access to the energy as well consumer markets while serving as an outlet for the region to South Asia, Indian Ocean and beyond. Pakistan also aims to counter Indian influence in the region. Pakistan initially tried to revive the historical cultural links while also using the religious card and ideological bonds for having close relations with CARs. Pakistan successfully lobbied for CARs' membership in Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) in 1992. Pakistan also extended credit of \$10 million to each of the republic and institutionalised its relations through the establishment of inter-governmental commissions with these republics. In 1995 quadrilateral transit trade agreement was signed between Pakistan, China, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan to utilise Karakoram Highway for trade with Central Asia.²⁰ However, economic and political relations with CARs are still limited due to a number of reasons. The shortest route for Pakistan to Central Asia is via instable Afghanistan. During the 1990s there was clash of interests in Afghanistan amongst the regional states while Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan was mainly a struggle for a stable government there so that Afghanistan can serve as trade conduit with Central Asia.²¹ Trade with CARs is just a fraction of its true potential and the energy projects like TAPI and CASA 1000 are still far from materialisation due to instability in Afghanistan. On the other hand CARs were also looking towards West for transfer of capital and technology during their economic transition. Pakistan's limited resources could not offer a kind of investment and trade CARs needed. ECO suffered due to internal competition amongst the founding members Pakistan, Iran and Turkey for influence in the region. Pakistan at the same time could not formulate a coherent policy towards the region due to internal political and economic instability as a number of governments changed in Pakistan during 1990s.

Nevertheless Pakistan always sustained hope that it will become a gateway to landlocked Central Asia and Xinjiang one day. A positive change has occurred recently in the relations between Pakistan and CARs in lieu of integrations projects initiated by major powers particularly China's Belt and

²⁰ Shabir Ahmad Khan, "Pakistan's Policy Towards Central Asia since 1991: An Evaluation" pp: 111-126 in Central Asia No. 65, Winter 2009 (Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar) : 117

²¹ Shabir Ahmad Khan, "Pak-Uzbek Relations: Hopes and Hurdles", pp: 121-134 in Central Asia No. 53 (Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, Winter 2003) p: 25

Road Initiative (BRI) and Russia's Eurasian Union. For Pakistan, CPEC, a flagship project of BRI, bypasses the instable Afghanistan for access to Central Asia. The warming up ties between Pakistan and Russia have also encouraged CARs to increase interaction with Pakistan. Hopefully CPEC will be supplemented by Pakistan-Afghanistan-Central Asia corridor. Pakistan, in the contending discourses of either to adhere to the principle of uni-polarity and subordinate its interests and security to that of USA's hegemonic discourse of which Pakistan already became a victim or to follow and pursue a course of multipolarity and diversify its foreign policy by developing close relations with Russia, has chosen the later. Since 2005, Pakistan's image has improved in Central Asia particularly due to the America's policy of regime change in former Soviet space through colour revolutions and America's blaming of Pakistan for its policy failure in Afghanistan. Pakistan, Russia and CARs are now on same page regarding the peace process and a negotiated political settlement for Afghanistan.

Pakistan-Russia Collaboration: Implications for Afghanistan and Central Asia

In rapidly changing regional and global geo-political scenarios, allies have become aliens while aliens became partners. Changing regional orientation compels both Pakistan and Russia to develop closer strategic and economic collaboration which will have far reaching implications on the peace and economic development of a contiguous area comprising Afghanistan and Central Asia. Russia controls northern corridor to this contiguous area while Pakistan provides an outlet to this landlocked contiguous area in the south. In other words Afghanistan and Central Asia links Russia and Pakistan. All this means Russia, Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan are natural partners. Both Russia and Pakistan have convergence of interests as well as security concerns in the region.²² Both the countries have common stance of regional approach to address Afghanistan's problem. Importantly Sino-Pak close strategic and economic alliance also enforces and solidifies Pak-Russia collaboration particularly regarding Afghanistan and Central Asia. Pakistan, Russia and China are the real stake holders in peace and development of Afghanistan and Central Asia. All the three countries can decisively shape the outcome of Afghan conundrum if effectively coordinate their policies.

Russia's desire to have control over the Central Asian-South Asian integration via Afghanistan and Pakistan is in line with the interests of Pakistan i.e. to provide an outlet to the landlocked region. Many Russian analysts value Pakistan's geographical location vis-à-vis Afghanistan and

²² Faiza Bashir and Noreen Naseer, "New Cold War: Rebuilding Pakistan and Russia Relations" pp: 89-112 in *Central Asia* No. 82, Summer 2018 (Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, January 2019), 91

Central Asia. According to Andrew Korybko, a Russian analyst, Pakistan is a natural gateway of Eurasian Union to South Asia, Indian Ocean and beyond.²³ Similarly according to Vladimir Moskalenko and Petr Topychkanov “Pakistan’s natural resource is its advantageous strategic location which makes it an important link between Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia”.²⁴ In post America Afghanistan, no regional country will be in a position to bring and maintain peace in Afghanistan unilaterally. Bringing peace to Afghanistan will be shared responsibility of all regional states importantly through accommodating each other’s’ views, interests and concerns. Therefore Pak-Russia cooperation along with other regional states i.e. CARs, Iran and China, as real stakeholders in peace of Afghanistan will be instrumental and conclusive in bringing peace to Afghanistan. CARs would welcome Pak-Russia collaboration as they will be the ultimate beneficiary of such collaboration. Unfortunately the phenomenon of ‘layover’ has limited the roles of regional states in regional security politics for the last many decades. Layover occurs when extra regional power or powers directly enter into a regional security complex effectively suppressing the regional dynamics and thus regional politics are absorbed by politics at global level.

There is an unprecedented Pak-Russia convergence on Afghanistan which earlier was a hallmark of Soviet–India relations. The Kremlin has already given credibility to the counter terrorism efforts of Pakistan and has declared Pakistan a close counter terrorism partner.²⁵ Russia is also satisfied with the Pak-China close involvement on Afghanistan. It is also possible that if regional security is jeopardised by coalition forces in Afghanistan, Russia can intervene with the support from Pakistan. Currently the Russia, China Pakistan axis seems a symbol and guarantee of security and prosperity for Afghanistan and Central Asia. According to Buzan’s regional security complex theory, regional security is closely linked to a grouping of regional states due to security interdependence. In this case the grouping of Russia, China, Iran and Pakistan can be instrumental in bringing peace and prosperity to Afghanistan and to entire region at large. Instability in

²³ Andrew Korybko, “Pakistan Is The “Zipper” Of Pan-Eurasian Integration”, Russian Institute of Strategic Studies, Moscow, 15/09/2015, retrieved from <https://en.riss.ru/analysis/18882/> accessed 30/05/2019

²⁴ Vladimir Moskalenko and Petr Topychkanov, “Pakistan and Russia: Shared Challenges and Common Opportunities”, Carnegie Centre Moscow, May 2014, retrieved from https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Brief-Russia_Pakistan2014.pdf accessed 23/04/2019

²⁵ Samuel Ramani, “What Driving Russia-Pakistan Cooperation on Afghanistan”, The Diplomat, May 09, 2017, retrieved from <https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/whats-driving-russia-pakistan-cooperation-on-afghanistan/> accessed 30/05/2019

Afghanistan is damaging the peace and development process of regional/neighbouring countries the most. So peace in Afghanistan will definitely benefit the regional/neighbouring the most.

Thus the economic development and security of Central Asia and Afghanistan, the drug-trafficking issue, the ongoing conflict and future integration of Siberia, Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan to South Asia, Indian Ocean and beyond all guarantee long term engagement between Pakistan and Russia. Pakistan's close relations with Russia must not be as response to the US-India proximity or otherwise, rather it must be based on a conscious realisation of mutual interests independent of their relationship with other countries. The same rule applies to Russia as India has been trying its most to halt this Pak-Russia growing partnership and offset Pakistan's position.

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CHINA'S RISE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR ASEAN REGION: A CASE STUDY OF SOUTH CHINA SEA

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Abstract

During the last four decades, China has achieved a status of a powerful state with a huge soft power, integration in the international economy, growing middle class along with increasing participation in international institutions and stock exchanges. Not only it has participated into international institutions but has also set new economic regimes like Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and Belt & Road Initiative (BRI). China's growing thrust for developments, energy and resources, has enabled it for huge claims within South China Sea. Its recent steps of creating artificial islands in South China Sea and future air bases on them along with other developments are quite notable and have been perceived as China's shift from a soft power to hard power. South China Sea is extremely significant Sea with its geostrategic importance being the second busiest trade routes. Approximately 60 percent of Japanese and Taiwanese energy resources raw material is supplied through the South China Sea. At the same time the Sea is highly rich in energy resources and different analysis have been made to give an estimate of gas and oil reserves in South China Sea. Due to geostrategic significance of the Sea neighboring countries have asserted their claims on its various Islands however; mainly conflict is over islands of Sparty and Paracel. The ongoing territorial conflict and resulting tension is creating troubles for the regional peace by making regional as well as global powers to be concerned over China's activities. The study will be investigated under the Sea Power theory of Mahan that how the balance of power is taking shift within region in wake of rise of China, and how it will breed implications for region.

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Key words: South China Sea, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), United Nations Convention on Law of Sea.

Introduction

Since the last four decades, China has grown with its tremendous economic growth which has placed it into the list of one of the powerful states with a huge economic progress at domestic level along with establishment of new international institutions at global level. South China Sea has always been very significant to China and now it is evolving in China's foreign policy as an important pillar. China as a rising power with prominent indicators of power is highly involved in South China Sea. China is making huge claims approximately on 80 percent of the Sea. It claims the mainstream area of the Sea in form of 'nine dash line' which appears in dotted form, stretching from Hainan province to onwards covering few parts of Philippine and Vietnam. To strengthen its claims, China is making various developments on Sea including the artificial islands.

Earlier there were doubts that China was developing artificial islands for military purposes or future air bases, currently it has been testified through satellite images which have shown the presence of military equipment on these contentious islands and mainly the air base and installation of military equipment.

1. Objective and Research Questions

South China Sea is extremely significant area with its geostrategic importance. It is one of the crucial routes of trade as more than one quarter of the world trade passes every year through this sea. Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) passing by the Sea are not only significant for South East Asian coastal states but also for the whole world because of being a major supply line. Further it has a vast deposit of oil and gas some of which are tapped while others are untapped. It is also significant for military movement between the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. Upon getting the significance, the main objective of the research is to understand the changing power dynamics within South East Asia and mainly within South China Sea. Also to analyze the ongoing developments, made by China along with its implications for the neighboring states.

There are key questions which are needed to be addressed in order to take the original gist of the argument,

- What is the importance of South China Sea for China?
- How The Theory of Sea power is relevant to China's rise to a great power?

- How the ASEAN region is responding to the developments of China?
- How the South China dispute is effecting the ASEAN states?

In order to conduct the research, qualitative, descriptive approach has been adopted and data collection has been made through various means including the books, newspapers, journal articles and newspaper article on daily basis.

2. Literature Review

An extensive literature review has been done upon considering the nature of issue however few of the significant literature is enlisted here. According to Hayton, China's growing power has made the world upset. Since many decades this region was smooth and making adjustments with their domestic as well as other bilateral issues. But now the rise of China especially its policies towards South China Sea are making its neighbors worrisome. Hayton makes more focus on its historical claims and recent significance of South China Sea that the one that control this Sea controls the access between Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, and the Pacific. As a journalist of BBC, though he has done a good work but still there is lack of neutrality in making assumptions about the other aspects of the Sea besides its significance from the security point of view.¹

Kaplan, a strategist explained the dynamics of global power change which is taking its shift from Europe to Asia. South China Sea is also emerging as a focal point with several billion barrels, an estimated nine hundred trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Kaplan interprets America's interests in Asia in the context of an increasingly assertive China. He explains how the region's unique geography fosters the growth of navies but also hinders aggression. And he draws a striking parallel between China's quest for hegemony in the South China Sea and the United States' imperial adventure in the Caribbean more than a century ago. Despite of a good thesis, there is needed to look into other things like economy and other geographic factors of the region because to have the Sea and to control the Sea is not the sole indicator to be powerful.²

Mark J. Valencia has investigated in a very realistic way and has provided the most informed analysis of the political context for South China Sea issues. He has done a lot of work on South China Sea and on its different

¹Bill Hayton, *The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014).

²Robert D Kaplan, "The Geography of Chinese Power: How Far Can Beijing Reach on Land and at Sea?", *Foreign Affairs* 89, no.3(May/June 2010): 22-41.

Robert D Kaplan, *Asia's Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific* (New York: Random House Publishing Group, 2014).

dimensions. According to him, most of the security concerns against the China's huge claims in the Sea are taking its shapes in form of different vulnerabilities to neighboring ASEAN states in terms of their growing urge to make defense agreements with other major powers. According to him, these territorial disputes, competing maritime claims, rising military spending are leading towards a new debate of transition of global power. US is entering into the region by its engagements with different countries. His analysis of ASEAN's political and other conditions is excellent that how these countries are political too weak to resolve the issue. However, he has ignored the level of US reengagement with sound grounds, besides this he didn't mention that how China is deeply economically engaged with these countries and what will be the future repercussions for these states in case of tough stand against China.³

Shee Poon Kim has made an excellent description of China's stance towards growing global concerns and writer has fully justified the territorial rights of China over South China Sea as part of natural sovereignty as maritime power. She has claimed that the urge for recent position on South China Sea has been taken as a safe side due to domestic reasons. According to her, under the hegemonic designs China's recent policy has different meaning so there is need to analyses the intentions working under present foreign policy and it's different role taken place within region and outside.⁴

3. Theoretical Framework

The Theory of Sea Power has been used to analyze the ongoing Chinese development within the South China Sea and the overall. Theory of Sea Power was introduced in 1890 by Alfred Thayer Mahan with so much emphasis on Power of Sea, its relation with wealth and strength for a country it brings. He enlightened the objectives, purposes and the impact of the Sea Power along with the economic interests achieved through, which ultimately lead to naval supremacy. He investigated a dynamic relation between Sea commerce, wealth generation and national strength. According to him, "Some nations more than others, but all maritime nations more or less, depend for their prosperity upon maritime commerce, and probably upon it more than upon any other single factor".⁵ According to him, "economic

³Mark Valencia J.; Van Dyke, Jon M.; Ludwig, Noel A., *Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea* (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1999).

⁴Kim Poon Shee, "The South China Sea in China's Strategic Thinking", *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 19 no. 4: 369-387.

⁵ Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Problem of Asia and Its Effect upon International Policies* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1900), 90-198.

Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future*, Boston: Little, Brown and company, 1898) 10-210.

<http://www.archive.org/stream/theinterestofame15749gut/15749.txt>

growth, potential for trade and the consequent power are very much correlated”.

The Sea Power Theory has undertaken the Sea through all its dimensions; either is geostrategic, political, economic or the social. Mahan acknowledged the Sea as a great ‘highway’, ‘a thoroughfare’ with woven paths which lead them to be a maritime choice and the reasons to have the naval supremacy. Mahan explicitly declared the thoroughfare as a ‘common ground’ and by that ‘common ground’ he meant maritime routes, ‘harbors for all’ to get benefit. He emphasized the “Control of the Sea, by maritime commerce and naval supremacy, means predominant influences in the world; because, great the wealth product of the land, nothing facilitates the necessary exchanges as does the Sea”. According to Mahan, “The purpose of navies is to exert control over common lines of Sea communications. Sea communications, or trade routes, represented the arteries of the world economic system. Trade represented the life blood that fed the component parts of the body, i.e. the various nation-states. Those parts which were well supplied with the ‘blood of trade’ prospered, while those parts which were starved, atrophied”.⁶

States work on similar basis, especially the states which are highly dependent upon the Sea communications and the maritime trade. For such states, ‘arterial blockage’ can be perilous for them. To avoid such dilemmas, The Sea Power Theory is considered significant to serve the both, economic and geostrategic purposes. Thus, it is justified on the same grounds that The Sea Power Theory is not offensive but the defensive one, to safeguard the Sea lanes of communications, to get an easy access to the Sea and to ensure the ‘global maritime trading system’. Thus, according to Mahan, ‘the global maritime trading system’ would work as a ‘wealth-generating machine’ to generate the power. Mahan predicted that maritime trade would be more important in future with the increasing dependence on Seas for being the cheap source of communications, consequently the global trading system would ascertain to more vulnerability for disruption which require naval supremacy.

Though Mahan was convinced of the view that ‘globalized world economy’ is working well as a ‘dynamic system’ however still he forecasted for the interruption of ‘dynamic economic system’. Mahan’s main concern was for blockade of US Sea ports. His main concentration was on the interconnectedness and on the happiness of the national economy, by connecting all the beneficial dots. Besides of interconnecting of all

⁶Ibid.

beneficial dots, he suggested that in future wars, the Sea power will be the sufficient power to achieve the vital strategic interests.

For the above mentioned purpose, Mahan has discoursed many features of the Sea, Sea as a power and largely his concern was about Sea as a strategic object. As a strategist and historian he was fully aware of China's power and for the same reasons, he forecasted many things in this regard, he predicted a time when US will be concerned over China and its rise. In 1893 in a letter 'Hawaii and our future Sea Power to New York Times editor that Hawaiian Islands are important for US security in the North Pacific because vacuum could be filled by China.'⁷

He mentioned 'Many military men' 'look with the apprehension towards the day when the vast mass of China may yield to one of those impulses which have in past ages buried civilization under a wave of barbaric invasion'. Should China "burst her barriers eastward," he wrote, "it would be impossible to exaggerate the momentous issues dependent upon a firm hold of the Hawaiian Islands by a great civilized maritime power".⁸

4. Chinese Augmentation

Chinese growth at multiple platforms is not the 'bubble in air' as is claimed by many western writers, rather it is a matter of solids facts working as underlying forces to shape the global order which are beyond the measure. Hence, there is need to explore those apparatuses and forces to be fully be aware of the China's rise.

5. Economic Growth of China

China's economic growth has become a full moon sighted by the globe. To establish and run the global institutions has always been critical in creation of new world order. Creation of new international institutions means setting up new rule to run the political, economic and social affairs of the world. In this regard, China has made a tremendous progress as it has not only been participated into already existed international institutions but also started to set new institutions and regimes like Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and Belt and Road (B&R) initiatives. Before going into other details of South China Sea, there is need to understand mega initiatives like Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and Belt and Road (B&R). Understanding of these mega initiatives will pave a path for significance of South China Sea for China.

5.1. Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)

Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is multilateral investment bank established by China to meet the needs of 21st century in terms of

⁷ Mahan, *The Interest of America in Sea Power*, p.10

⁸ Ibid.

infrastructure with 57 members. The bank has started working with an initial capital of £65 billion, China is providing £20 billion while other capital is provided by other members. Basic purpose of this bank is to promote infrastructure, energy, power, transportation, and telecommunication, rural and agricultural development with efficient management, services and skills by focusing on preserving clean environment. The main tenet of this institution is not the competition instead cooperation with the existing institutions like World Bank and Asian development bank.⁹ This bank is an important mile stone in growth of China in economic terms. Besides this bank, China has also initiated a mega infrastructure project, Belt and Road Initiative (B&RI), with a focus on interconnectivity and transportation of goods and people.¹⁰

5.2. The Belt and Road Initiative (B&RI)

The Belt and Road Initiative (B&RI) is one of the great economic initiatives of China which has a diverse impact on different countries at different levels. For some countries, it is a medium of communication to provide the transport facilities for transportation of goods and people while for others it is an economic accelerator and a great source of social mobility. This creative plan was announced in 2013 by President Xi Jinping's during his visit to central and Southeast Asia. It is a continuation or a revival of ancient trading routes which used to link China's merchants with those of Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Europe in seventh century which became inoperative because of many reasons, so this initiative can be said a looking back into the golden era of China when China enjoyed 400 years of prosperity during the Han dynasty. And in revival of the ancient trade, camels and caravans are replaced with cranes and constructions crews. The Belt and Road Initiative (B&RI) is an intelligent plan to connect China from one end of the world to other end of the world by connecting different points which are mainly the countries all the way to this path. This initiative has six corridors:¹¹

1. New Eurasian Land Bridge
2. China - Mongolia - Russia Corridor
3. China - Central Asia - West Asia Corridor
4. China - Indochina Peninsula Corridor

⁹ Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, <https://www.aiib.org/en/index.html>.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ David Dollar, "China's rise as a regional and global power: The AIIB and the 'one belt, one road'", July 15, 2015. <https://www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-rise-as-a-regional-and-global-power-the-aiib-and-the-one-belt-one-road/>

5. China - Pakistan Corridor
6. Bangladesh - China - India - Myanmar Corridor



Source: Brookings Institute

In this regard, Piraeus port (Greece) is China's main targeted infrastructure project at the Western end of Silk route from East coast of China. Between these two ends, there are two most important strategic passages, the Strait of Malacca and the Suez Canal.

6.3. The Need for Mega projects?

There are many reasons to take such creative initiative like growing energy needs, access to markets and find out alternative routes, less dependence on Strait of Malacca. It can also be analyzed that this initiative is taken for economic as well as geostrategic reasons.¹² Besides that, for China, South China Sea is significant for its Lines of Communications as the second busiest maritime traffic route which supplies raw material to all power engines and transports their finished goods to other parts of the world. For China, South China Sea is significant to operationalize the AIIB and Belt and Road (B&R) initiatives. Because out of six, two of corridors are passing through the South China Sea consisted of China - Indochina Peninsula Corridor, China -Pakistan Corridor. In addition, China is heavily dependent on Yellow Sea, East China Sea and the South China Sea for its trade to the rest of the world. South China Sea is significant for China because of significant of First Island Chain for China. This island chain is considered the area of influence and defense for China. Like in case of any conflict, it would be the main theater of war between China and any other state away from the mainland and thus South China Sea would work as a Great wall within water to defend the Chinese borders from foreigners as

¹² "The Belt and Road Initiative", China-British Business Council

<http://www.cbbc.org/resources/belt-and-road-reports>

http://www.cbbc.org/cbbc/media/cbbc_media/One-Belt-One-Road-main-body.pdf

the part of their traditional defense wall strategy in ancient times and onwards. Now it becomes complementary to describe the details of South China Sea to find out its significance in general and particular for China.

7. South China Sea as a Core of Dispute

South China Sea is considered a heaven for Sea resources; it is the largest home of marine biodiversity. South China Sea is fulfilling the 8% of the world's fishing output at commercial level and is liable for millions of people across the world including 249 million people in Pakistan to the 1.3 billion of Chinese. It is home of around 40% of world's tuna fish which accounts 22% of Asian diet. It is a major source of livelihood for all the South East Asian states particularly significant for the maritime states. Various activities by different states to solidify their claims are putting the biodiversity into danger.¹³

Besides, being the rich in biological resources, it is world's second busiest shipping route passing through China, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea for transporting raw materials and energy resources including crude oil, liquefied natural gas, coal and iron not only to South East Asian states but to the whole world from power engines like Koreas, China and Japan. Approximately 60 % of Japanese and Taiwanese energy resources raw material is supplied through the South China Sea passage. The amount of these energy resources is almost three times greater than the amount travelling via Suez Canal besides that this quantity is nearly fifteen times greater passing via Panama Canal from Persian Gulf to Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.¹⁴ Furthermore, world's two largest coal exporters Australia and Indonesia also use the Sea for exporting coal. In fact, most of maritime traffic among East Asia, Europe, Africa, Middle East and South Asia passes through the South China Sea.¹⁵

South China Sea is also significant militarily, especially for those states who want to enhance their military capabilities amongst the surrounding Oceans, particularly in Pacific and Indian Ocean.¹⁶ Robert Kaplan has predicted the South China Sea as the "the 21st century's defining battleground" the "throat of global Sea routes".¹⁷ The Sea is not only important for its geographical

¹³ Johnny Langenheim, "Preventing Ecocide in South China Sea", The Guardian, <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/the-coral-triangle/2015/jul/15/preventing-ecocide-insouth-china-sea>, July 15, 2015.

¹⁴ "South China Sea", Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2013. Retrieved by <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/sChina.html>.

¹⁵ Ibid

¹⁶ Ibid

¹⁷ Kaplan, Robert. *Asia's Cauldron*, p.15.

point of view but also for abundance of its energy resources including oil and gas reserves. It is very difficult to estimate the accurate volume of oil and gas reserves however some estimates have been made to figure out the vast reserves of oil and natural gas in continental shelves around the Sea.¹⁸ Different analysis have been made to give an estimate of gas and oil reserves in South China Sea. American based energy institute Energy Information Administration (EIA) has analyzed around 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic natural deposits in South China Sea. In addition there are also hydrocarbon reserves in unexplored areas. According to US geological Survey (USGS) in 1993-94 “total discovered and undiscovered resources in the offshore basins of the South China Sea”¹⁹ were about 28 billion in both island chains of Spratly and Paracel²⁰. While in 2010 more potential of oil and gas was analyzed with some undiscovered rich resource ranging from 5 to 22 billion barrels oil and 70 to 290 trillion cubic feet of gas. The Chinese National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) in November 2012 has estimated that area holds around 125 billion barrels oil and 500 trillion cubic feet of natural gas as undiscovered resources. According to China’s estimate, oil reserves can be 105 billion barrels in these both islands of Spratly and Paracel while entire South China Sea can have around 213 billion.²¹

7.1. Claims on South China Sea



¹⁸“The South China Sea is an important world energy trade route”, APRIL 4, 2013.

<https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=10671#>

¹⁹Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power”, Policy Brief, no.47(2006)

http://carnegieendowment.org/files/PB_47_FINAL.pdf

²⁰Ibid.,

Retrieved from <http://carnegieendowment.org/2006/06/05/China-s-charm-implications-of-chinese-soft-power>

²¹“South China Sea”, (EIA) 2013,

Source: UNCLOS and CIA

Regarding South China Sea, China claims the largest portion of the Sea in form of 'nine dash line' stretching from its province Hainan to hundred miles ahead towards south and east as its integral part. Other claimants are Philippine, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei. Philippine and Vietnam are most central as both of them are engaged in conflict with China over naval drilling, fishing and exercise while claiming Islands. Scarborough Shoal is main concern of Philippine which is 100 miles away from Philippine and 500 miles away from China.²² While Vietnam has built up its claims over the islands of Paracels.

All of these countries have encountered many times with each other. In order to strengthen the claims, China has seized the Paracels in 1974 from Vietnam and killed more than 70 Vietnamese troops. In 1988 it clashed over Spratly with Philippine which killed about 60 sailors. In 2012 China clashed over interfering each other's maritime boundary in the Scarborough Shoal. In same year China ragged Vietnam and Philippine by creating its administrative body 'Shansa City' with its headquarters in Paracels.²³

In late 2012, China faced a wave of protests by Vietnam over interruptions of its exploration operations. In 2013, Philippine decided to take its case to International Court of Justice under UN convention on the Law to challenge China's claims which was ruled in favor of Philippine and against China however decision was not accepted by China. Drilling activities in 2014 by Beijing led to collisions again with Vietnam. In April 2015, satellite images showed China is building airstrips to solidify its claims over Spratly.²⁴ In July 2016 International Court of Arbitration gave decision in favor of Philippines and gave a verdict about 'Nine Dash Line' as an illegal claim under the international law. Besides that, tribunal also added that there is no island which could fall in category of island and further to extend the

²²“Q&A: South China Sea dispute”, BBC news (2015, April, 17).

Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13748349>

²³Pham Nga, “Vietnam's anger over China maritime moves”, BBC News (2011, June 6)

Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13664408>

²⁴“China Building Airstrip in Spratly Islands, Satellite Images Show”, Wall Street Journal, April 16, 2015.

<https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-building-airstrip-in-spratly-islands-satellite-images-show-1429188914>

Isaac Stone Fish, Keith Johnson. *China's New Airstrip in the South China Sea Is Almost Completed*, Foreign Policy, APRIL 16, 2015.

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/16/chinas-new-airstrip-in-the-south-china-sea-is-almost-completed/>

Exclusive Economic Zone by any nation.²⁵ However China didn't show any compliance to it and responded that China would not accept by saying that the tribunal's award has no binding force.²⁶

7.2. Chinese Position on Claims

China makes its claims on discovery and historical basis, like on basis of empires that it was historical part of Chinese old empires especially it had been China's the part since Han dynasty (2nd century BC). Most of Chinese authorities used ancient texts and maps while describing the sovereignty of these islands. However currently, these claims are not taken valid, as empires in old times were based on unprotected, undefined and changing boundaries. Contrasting to nation-states, Chinese Empires boundaries were not drawn but were based on circles and zones stretching from center of Empire to peripheries of alien barbarians. Specifically, its land boundaries with Vietnam, Burma, and India were neither defined nor limited while, currently China's claims otherwise.

It can be analyzed that on one hand, China claims, its boundaries were not defined, while on other hand in case of its maritime boundaries with South China Sea were defined, drawn in form of 'Nine Dash Line'. Modern history of China also confirmed the presence of Chinese artifacts and graves in these islands as a proof of China's belonging to these islands.

7.3. Claims in light of Law of Sea

The Third Law of the Sea Conference has manifested the demands of developing countries which were originally proposed that 10 nautical miles (nm) from baseline which later were extended from 10 to 80 nm in informal negotiations on Law of the Sea Conference. So far, 200 nm to 350 nm, has been extended from baselines depending on special conditions.²⁷ While the facility of Innocent passages, was granted in section 3, along with the port facility to foreign ships which also includes the stopping and anchoring of foreign ships. Passage to a foreign ship is considered as innocent as long as it is not a threat to security of coastal states. In addition it gives a right to

²⁵ Shane Vrabel, "*The Hague Ruling and Disputed Claims in the, South China Sea*", Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies, 28 July 2016.

http://cgsrs.org/files/files/publications_73.pdf

Jane Perlez, "*Tribunal Rejects Beijing's Claims in South China Sea*", New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/world/asia/south-china-sea-hague-ruling-philippines.html?_r=0, July 12th 2016.

²⁶ *The South China Sea Arbitration Award* (Pca Registry: Permanent Court of Arbitration, 12 July 2016).

<https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/175/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Award.pdf>


²⁷ "UN Convention on Law of Sea",

http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf

"*Law of the Sea Conference*", Vol. IV, p. 168, Art. 118

http://legal.un.org/diplomaticconferences/1958_los/

coastal states to suspend temporarily the innocent passage for foreign ships for protection of its security.²⁸



However, it is not the same case with straits which are used for international navigation. The third session of the Law of the Sea Conference, was widely accepted by the developing nations particularly with reference to straits and more than 200 nm while some of states like Peru, Ecuador, Brazil backed by China while US opposed this. Earlier in 1963 China declared, in a letter to the delegation of the Japan-China Fishery Council, that China has three security zones beyond the 12 mile territorial limit in which foreign ships are either totally banned or required a permission or advised to avoid. According to this letter China has established two zones within 12 miles, one zone in which all type of navigation is prohibited while in other zone navigation is prohibited by Chinese government.²⁹ Along with these zones China has also established a zone in South of 27 degrees and East of the coast of mainland to not enter the Japanese fishing boats because of being an area for military operations.

In the letter, China made its position that a state is sovereign over its territorial waters and it depends on state to permit or prohibit the innocent

²⁸Ibid., p. 155, Art. 16, 1; p. 155, Art. 16, Sec. 2a, 2b, 2c, 2i, and 21; p. 156, Art. 22, Sec. 3.

²⁹ Jerome Alan Cohen and Hung Dah Chiu, *People's China and International Law*, Vol. 1, p. 548. Letter between delegation of China Fishery Association and the delegate of Japan. China Fishery Council, 1963.

Jerome Alan Cohen, *People's China and International Law*, Volume 2: A Documentary Study (Maryland:Princeton University Press,2017).

passage or even the passage through international strait especially in case of foreign warships.

Same position was maintained in 1973 Third Law of the Sea Conference, with an insistence upon the nations to determine their own sea limit, it also mentioned to replace the 200 nm to 200 miles and described it, not the territorial Sea but the economic zone. Thus China, raised its position whether it will accept 200 mile as a territorial Sea or an economic zone. If it is considered that China really want to have 200 miles as a territorial Sea this position also has advantages on coasts of South China Sea and East China Sea on 200 nm as territorial sea or 200 miles as an economic zone.³⁰

Further as for as Maritime sovereignty is concerned, as many scholars have pointed it out that “it is a very recent notion dating from 1945 when the United States declared that it intended to exercise sovereignty over its territorial waters”. According to UN, law of Sea agreements represents all the conditions required for land based sovereignty, in other words, requirements for the land based sovereignty are same to maritime sovereignty however the right of historical jurisdiction was rejected. According to professor Jia Qingguo, at Beijing University’s School of International Studies has expressed her views to AFP that China’s claims around 80 percent area of the South China Sea as its ‘historic waters’ are similar “The United States has Guam in Asia which is very far away from the US and the French have islands in the South Pacific, so it is nothing new”.³¹

Keeping in view the above principle it can easily be said that to restrict movement in Malacca strait, will be considered illegal while it will be legal to suspend navigation in Spratly islands. So it can be said that after the application of this law, China will be in position to suspend free navigation in its greater interests which can put this region into trouble. Besides this, China’s claims have historical basis which are rejected in UN law of Sea.

8. Sea Power Theory and Chinese Claims

Apparently it seems that China’s activities are in greater economic interests of China. However through a deep analysis of China’s claims and developments within South China Sea it can be identified that China is working beyond the limits of economic reasons. China’s firm policies and

³⁰ Martin H. Katchen, “*The Spratly Islands and the Law of the Sea: "Dangerous Ground" for Asian Peace*”, Asian Survey 17, no. 12 (Dec., 1977), pp.1167-1181.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643419> Accessed: 20-01-2016 08:43 UT(p.1177)

Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 1973-1982 Concluded at Montego Bay, Jamaica on 10 December 1982 Document:- A/CONF.62/SR.187 187th Plenary meeting

³¹Mohan Malik, “*Historical Fiction: China's South China Sea Claims*” World Affairs 176, no. 1 (MAY / JUNE 2013), pp. 83-90.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/43554768> Accessed: 20-01-2016 08:35 UTC

development can be analyzed in the light of Mahan's Theory of Sea Power. It is significant for many reasons but mainly it points out the Chinese ambitions particularly South China Sea ambitions.

By keeping in view the significance of Sea Power, and elements of Sea Power, China's geostrategic location in East-Central Asia with a lengthy coast, with huge population, emergent economy, rising military and naval power. Chinese recent initiatives about economic corridors are taking a shape towards renaissance of Chinese maritime integrating with Mahan's approach of Sea Power. Apart from that, these initiatives have been taken to replace US as predominant power in Asia-Pacific region³²

Initially there was an impression that a peaceful negotiated settlement of the South China Sea dispute was not possible and for the same reasons Philippine's government filed a case for Arbitration Tribunal in early 2013 against the China that 'over the past 17 years of such exchanges of views, all possibilities of a negotiated settlement have been explored and exhausted'.³³

Earlier, Philippine was not supported from ASEAN countries however later it was supported. Secretary General Le Luong Minh said that 'the nine-dash line is 'not binding on any claimant ... and that ASEAN supports the Philippine's efforts to bring about a peaceful resolution in its own territorial dispute with China'. He said that "The South China Sea issue is not just about competing claims; it's about peace and stability in the region."³⁴

Issue of South China Sea is attracting other regional and global powers like India, Japan and United States to be concerned for the regional stability. Southeast Asia is significant globally because of many reasons:

- Geostrategic due to Strait of Malacca
- Coalitions in war against terrorism
- Economic interests
- pirate-prone region
- Energy resources

US is much concerned about the situation, China's claims, its firm policies in South China Sea and has responded in form of 'Pivot to Asia' which is also termed as 'act of rebalancing'. This strategy is for deeper engagement in region because deeper involvement in Southeast Asia in general is the best

³²Simi Mehta, *Rebalancing: Part of its Grand Strategy?, US IN ASIA PACIFIC*, (New Delhi: The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies IPCS, 2014, May , 16).

³³ Agus Rustandi, "The South China Sea Dispute: Opportunities for ASEAN to enhance its policies in order to achieve resolution", Australian Defense College, Centre for Defense and Strategic Studies, APRIL 2016, P.2-15.

³⁴"ASEAN to enter South China Sea talks with China as a group", (April 25, 2013).
<http://www.philstar.com/world/2013/04/25/934898/sec-gen-ASEAN-enter-south-China-Sea-talks-China-group>

policy for balancing China in the region and protecting American interests. Deeper involvement can be made by following;

- Support economic integration in Southeast Asia by accelerating trade policies in the region.
- Support Southeast Asia in developing stronger financial infrastructure
- Shore up bilateral ties with Southeast Asia's poorer countries,
- to help them avoid becoming overly dependent upon a single power
- Consider triangular cooperation—among Southeast Asia, the United States, and China
- A triangular effort can also help reduce tensions between the United States and China on competing military exercises in the region.
- By Playing more active role in sub regional projects in Southeast Asia, such as the Greater Mekong Sub-region development program
- By making the most of US administration and diplomatic visits to the region

US president Barak Obama had shown his concerns over the situation “this is the future we seek in the Asia-Pacific—security, prosperity and dignity for all ... let there be no doubt: In the Asia-Pacific in the twenty-first century, the United States of America is all in”.³⁵ Currently Trump has various tones to address the issue however the region is still area of critical concern for US because of its ongoing policies and future strategies.

Concerned statement made by the US officials can be taken as reassurance to its allies and partners against China's growing influence in the region. Especially US defense treaties with Japan, South Korea. In pursuance of US interests Malaysia and Philippines can provide a role of balancer to China by US. Such concern can also be taken as a commitment that US has not exhausted after a decade war and other domestic issues that can divert its attention from Asia Pacific region.³⁶

9. Implications for the Region

Although economically, ASEAN is a growing region but it is weak in political governance which is not in favor to adopt a strong stance over South China Sea. Meanwhile China is working closely with these countries by making heavy investments and trade. ASEAN is part of two corridors of Belt and Road Initiative out of six. Initially Philippine was excluded however negotiations are going to make Philippine the part of Belt and Road Initiative.

³⁵“China's Maritime Disputes”, Council on Foreign Relations online, (2013).

Retrieved from <http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/Chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#/>

³⁶Francis P Sempa, “The Geopolitical Vision of Alfred Thayer Mahan, One hundred years later, the insights of the American strategist continue to have extraordinary relevance today”, The Diplomat, 2014.

As for as ASEAN's moral responsibility is concerned, it is prime responsibility of ASEAN to secure the South China Sea as every year 5 trillion dollars in trade passing through the South China Sea. China is ASEAN's number one trade partner so it is technically tough for ASEAN to go against China; few members have complete silence over the issue like Cambodia and Laos because of fully dependence on China. Besides that, there other many issue for ASEAN to deal it efficiently:

- a lack of cohesion among its members
- a slow ASEAN decision-making mechanism
- And limitations on the implementation of its code of conduct.

The first on these is reflected in the disunity of ASEAN view on the South China Sea dispute. As Mark Valencia argues, 'ASEAN has no official position on the South China Sea dispute'.³⁷ Besides of incapability of ASEAN, China is also using different tactics to engage itself with ASEAN countries. One of those core tactics is to negotiate at bilateral level, there are two reasons of China to go for that one is China's superior status from size to capabilities which can have a better edge over any of ASEAN country, secondly to involve countries at bilateral level means to delimit the chances of US to get involved into the issue. For the above reason ASEAN countries are not in position to take a strong stance over the dispute however despite of various weaknesses all countries are working closely with other regional and global powers to mute the China's assertiveness. Engagement at diplomatic, economic and military level with other regional and global powers is giving rise multiple trends are emerging in face of this dispute which be beneficial as well as harmful in the long run .These trends are as follows;

- Increased Economic activity
- Economic alliances or economic activity at multilateral level
- Militarization
- In terms of increase in budgets and agreements with other countries

10. Conclusion

The South China Sea is significant as a maritime route as well as for its resources and it has been evolved in China's national policy as a historical part of China which has been remained a part of Guangdong administrations since the ancient empires. China makes claims on historical basis which are not acceptable for currently working UNCLOS (United Nations Convention of Law of Sea) while other states make their claims on basis of UNCLOS

³⁷Mark, *Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea*.

which are not acceptable for China. In the prevalent situation, China is in stronger position to solidify its claims in presence of weak opponents. While other claimant countries either individually or collectively at ASEAN's platform are not in position to prove their claims. Besides that, all the claimant countries have deep economic relations, so they are not in position to offend China. At the same time China is the only country which has most negative image in South East Asia for the same issue. Meanwhile, the rising status of China will not be in a situation to afford any controversy to its status from its neighborhood as within South East Asia region, three types of developments have been identified which China is pursuing within region for the implementation of its short term and long term foreign policies:

1. Solidifying its claims in South China Sea
2. Growing economic integration
3. Different activities to delimit the US influence and in fact all these are interlinked.

Hence, there is an immediate need to adopt a peaceful code of conduct either by adopting the UNCLOS or by making the all parties agree on the similar solution, feasible for the all states.

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http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf

DYNAMICS OF SINO-AFGHAN RELATIONS IN THE POST-WITHDRAWAL OF COMBAT TROOPS

Imrana Begum*

Abstract

China shares shortest but significant border with Afghanistan to the south-western flank of the Chinese autonomous province of Xinjiang. This border has been creating high-security risks for China owing to the Uyghur separatist activities. To secure this edgy border China has to rely on Afghanistan and Pakistan

After the withdrawal of combat troops, Afghanistan became liable for its own security. In order to make Afghanistan secure and stable the Afghan government called the non-state actors to initiate peace talks. For the first time China was involved along with the US and Pakistan in the peace process. The Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) became dysfunctional within a year but China did not avert efforts for peace in Afghanistan. It setup a Trilateral Coordination Group (TCG) as Beijing was determined to continue mediation efforts between the Afghan state and non-state actors by taking Pakistan on board. After initiating huge economic projects i.e CPEC and OBOR, China's concerns looms high due to militancy which can cause main hurdle in achieving economic and development goals in the region. Since reducing role in Afghanistan the United States also needs to take China on board owing to its acceptability among various segments of Afghan society. China has an image of benign power that pursue towards constructive collaboration rather than competition.

The article deals with the following questions:

- *Why do militancy and anti-state activities in Afghanistan affect China?*

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- *How did China emerge as a neutral and acceptable power in Afghanistan?*
- *How would militancy distract China's mega projects i.e. CPEC and OBOR?*
- *Can China be successful in bringing sustainable peace in Afghanistan and in the region at large?*

To answer these questions analytical, qualitative and deductive research methodologies would be adopted. Furthermore, the paper also suggests recommendations for lasting peace and stability in Afghanistan.

Key words: Uyghur, combat troops, non-state actors, peace talks

An Overview of Sino-Afghan Relation 1949-2001

On October 1, 1949 at Tiananmen Square in Beijing Mao Zedong the chairman of the Central People's Government proclaimed the founding of the People's Republic of China. On the eve of the founding of the PRC, the Chinese "People's Political Consultative Conference" passed the mutual program and defined the core principles of the PRC. Mao was not eager to establish diplomatic relations with foreign countries in haste. He believed in cleaning house before inviting any guest. China had been a home of world oldest civilization. In the beginning years China pursued modernity and strength on both domestic and international fronts.

The PRC's initial diplomatic partners were mainly the Soviet bloc countries and the neighbouring states of China. Soviet Union was the first that recognized PRC after two days of its formation and by 1955, 22 countries had established diplomatic relations with China. Mao Zedong's foreign policy goals were focusing on defending China's security and creating a peaceful international environment for domestic economic advancement.¹

The Sino-Soviet co-operation was the main feature of Beijing's foreign policy till the decade of 1950. The series of Soviet Union "extra ordinary demands" in the end of 1950s, deepened Chinese concern that eventually led to a great transformation of China's internal and foreign policy. The situation eventually gave rise to the economic strategy of self-reliance and an anti-Soviet foreign policy.²

¹Liu, Guoli., 2017, "China Rising: Chinese Foreign Policy in a Changing World", London: Macmillan Education Palgrave, p. 9.

² The China Review, (Fall 2001), Vol. 1, No.1, p.9.

Afghanistan turned toward the Soviet Union in 1954 and the latter's military aid program extended to Kabul in 1955. In the same year Beijing opened an embassy at Kabul. With the signs of Sino-Soviet rift in the late 1950s, the Soviet Union embarked an expanded economic activity to friendly countries including Afghanistan which turned China relations with Afghanistan with the tide of events in the region.³ China perceived Afghanistan as a potential threat for her security if the latter turned towards the Soviet Union. Sino-Afghan border dispute was settled in 1963 when a 47 miles border agreement was signed known as Wakhan Corridor.⁴ Afghanistan did not become a specific trading partner of China till 1979.

The Soviet occupation raised apprehension in China due to Soviets strategic predicament. China condemned Soviet military interference in the internal matters of Afghanistan. China considered the Afghan-Soviet war a great threat for peace and security of the region and the world at large. It did not recognize the Soviet backed Babrak Karmal regime in Kabul and joined the US to support Afghan resistant groups called Mujahideen. The Soviet presence in Afghanistan posed a threat to the security of China, it cut off relations with Kabul and the same policy was continued after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan as the latter fell into factional fighting and civil war.

The surge of Taliban in Afghanistan in the mid of 1990s, raised security concerns in the Xinjiang autonomous region which had border with Afghanistan. The Uyghur militants in Xinjiang were reportedly trained by, and fought alongside Afghan Mujahideen during their war against the Soviets. Chinese officials alleged that the arms and explosives used against the Chinese in Xinjiang were originated from Afghanistan.

Although China largely ignored the civil war in Afghanistan and the Taliban took over in September 1996, however, from 1998 Beijing began to show signs of accommodation with the Taliban. On December 10, 1998 China signed a military accord for the training of Afghan pilots. The Taliban also sent a delegation to China to open economic and security relations. In February 1999, China and the Taliban signed an agreement on economic cooperation and for training of military forces in Afghanistan. The Chinese diplomats sought assurance that the Taliban would not train Xinjiang

³ Khalid, Zulfikar, 1987, "Pakistan in the pamiir knot: geostrategic imperatives", Vanguard: p.79.

⁴ Meher, Jagmohan, 2008, "Afghanistan Dynamics of survival", Gyan Publishing House, p. 19.

Uyghurs, whereas the Afghan leaders wanted China to block United Nations sanctions against Afghanistan.

China condemned the September 11, 2001 incident in the US but it urged the US to discuss anti-terrorist proposals at the United Nations Security Council. China also insisted that any action against the act of terrorism should be based on international law and the UN Charter. China further emphasised on concrete evidences before any military strike against suspected terrorist groups. However, China attempted to develop good ties with the post-Taliban government in Afghanistan installed in December 2001. Though China did not send troops in Afghanistan to be a part of International Security Assistant Force (ISAF) but took an early action in pledging aid for eventual Afghan reconstruction efforts and focused on developing economic ties with Afghanistan. In 2007 President Hamid Karzai opened Afghanistan's energy, mineral and raw materials sectors for foreign investors. China's Metallurgical Construction Corporation (MCC), a multinational enterprise under direct control of the central government, won the right to develop the world's second largest copper deposit in Afghanistan. MCC agreed to invest \$3.5 billion to develop Afghanistan's Aynak copper field in Logar Province, located in the south of Kabul. The agreement included a construction of a coal-fired electrical power plant and a freight railway. The MCC also agreed to construct schools, clinics, markets, and mosques in exchange for a deal in the project.⁵

In December 2011 China and Afghanistan signed a 25 year deal that allowed China's state owned National Petroleum Corporation to become the first foreign company to develop oil and natural gas reserves in this war torn country.

Xinjiang, Uyghurs and Afghanistan

In the north western border of China there is Xinjiang province. It is the largest province in China having full name "Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Urumqi is the capital city of the XUAR. The Sino-Afghan 76 kilometres border⁶ located at the eastern end of the Wakhan Corridor⁷ and stretches from the tri-junction of the two countries with Pakistan-

⁵ Begum, Imrana, 2011, Chinese Growing Diplomatic, strategic and economic interest in Afghanistan," Pakistan Perspectives journal, Vols. 16, Nos. 2, July-December 2011, p: 142

⁶ Lawrence R. Sullivan and Robert L. Paarlberg, Historical Dictionary of Chinese Foreign Affairs, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham: 2018, p.10.

⁷ Michael F. Clarke, Xinjiang and China's Rise in Central , New York: 2011, Routledge, p.76.

controlled Gilgit-Baltistan at one end to the tri-junction on the other with Tajikistan. The joint counter-terrorism operations take place near this border.

Xinjiang is culturally a part of Central Asia. The Uyghurs, are the largest single ethnic group who are Turkic speaking Muslims strongly connected with the Muslim communities of Central Asia mainly the Uzbeks.⁸ Xinjiang covers about one-sixth of China's land. The province covers territory of over 1,600,000 square kilometres. It borders Tibet Autonomous Region and India's Leh District to the South, and Qinghai and Gansu provinces to the southeast. The region shares a 5000 km land border with eight countries including Mongolia to the northeast, Russia to the north, and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India to the west.⁹

Since the founding of PRC, Xinjiang turned into a hotbed of open military conflict with India in 1962 and with the Soviet Union in 1969. Xinjiang again turned into a base for Chinese operations against the USSR throughout the Afghan-Soviet war in 1980s. That involvement became the onset of radical Islamic fundamentalism into the Xinjiang region. Xinjiang had the potential to become a locus for armed conflict.¹⁰ Until mid-1980s, most of the Chinese training centres of Afghan resistance groups were located in Peshawar along its border with Pakistan. China trained several thousand Mujahideen in camps near Kashgar and Khotan inside Xinjiang,

The international community had no political strategy for Afghanistan from 1992-1994. At that time, Taliban were at the stage of emergence. China broke off diplomatic relations with Afghanistan in 1993 as latter fell into factional fighting and civil war. China adopted diplomacy of engagement with the Taliban in order to ensure the safety of its borders and engaged in low-level economic and technical cooperation. Taliban surge in Afghanistan effected the internal security of Xinjiang. Uyghur militant in Xinjiang had been trained by, and fought alongside Afghan Mujahideen.

Beijing improved relations with the Taliban to be ensured that the latter would cut off support for the Uyghur rebels and control drug trafficking. Although China largely ignored the civil war in Afghanistan and the Taliban

⁸Dillon, Michael, 2014, "Xinjiang and the Expansion of Chinese Communist Power: Kashgar in the early twentieth century", London: Routledge, p. xvii.

⁹ Guo. Rongxing; Gui, Hao; Guo, Luc Changlei, 2015, "Multiregional Economic Development in China", New York: Springer Heidelberg, p. 156.

¹⁰ Klimes, Ondrej, 2015, "Struggle by the Pen: The Uyghur Discourse of Nation and National Interest, c. 1900-1949", Leiden: Publisher Brill, p.4.

took over in September 1996, however, from 1998 Beijing began to show signs of accommodation with the Taliban. On 10 December 1998, China adopted diplomacy of engagement with the Taliban regime and engaged in low level economic and technical cooperation. China condemned the 9/11 incident but urged the US to discuss anti-terrorist proposals at the United Nations Security Council. After the Bonn Agreement in December 2001 China attempted to develop good ties with post-Taliban Afghanistan. Beijing promised US \$150 million in aid to President Hamid Karzai's government during his visit to China in January 2002. China also moved promptly to reopen its embassy in Kabul and Chinese foreign minister paid a visit to the Afghan capital in 2002.

Besides economic links, the two countries also expanded cooperation in other areas including the fight against the three evil forces of terrorism, extremism and separatism. After more than ten years when the Taliban regime was toppled by the US-led forces, China gradually emerged as a key player in maintaining peace and stability in Afghanistan, particularly in the future when the US troops would be pulled out.

Withdrawal of Combat Troops

After the September 11, 2001 incident the US sent its troops in Afghanistan with three main objectives:

1. To oust Taliban who did not hand over the head of Al-Qaeda to the US;
2. to capture the main culprit given refugee by the Taliban in Afghanistan and
3. to train Afghan army.¹¹

The first objective was achieved within a month, the second was on May 2, 2011. However, when Hamid Karzai was installed as a result of Bonn agreement, the foreign forces began working over the third objective. The completion of the second objective raised demand to give a withdrawal plan to combat troops from Afghanistan the NATO member states also called the same. In May 2012, NATO reached an agreement with Obama administration to phase out the US lead in the Afghan war by the middle of 2013 and completed by the end of 2014.¹² NATO combat operations ended

¹¹ Imrana Begum, The War on Terrorism and NATO's role in Afghanistan, in *Journal of European Studies* Vol.24 & 25, Nos. 2 & 1, July 2008 & January 2009, Area Study Centre for Europe, University of Karachi, p. 53.

¹² Dave Boyer, May 21, 2012, "NATO finalizes Afghan withdrawal Plans", *The Washington Times* newspaper,

officially in Afghanistan on December 28, 2014.¹³ The Afghan army and police became responsible for the security of their own people. The mission conceived the flag in 2001 was lowered by the military leaders and a new flag was hoisted with changed responsibilities restricted to training, advising, assisting the local army and police. Resolute Support became a new name of NATO mission in Afghanistan.¹⁴

The situation in Afghanistan remained far from stability and it was a question that how Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) would control insurgency after the withdrawal of foreign forces in Afghanistan. Foreign powers have played unusual role to decrease or intensify war in Afghanistan. The US competition with Russia and China as well as Iran, rivalries with Gulf countries and Pakistan's interference, have changed Afghanistan into a dangerous place.¹⁵

Quadrilateral Coordination Group

The thirteen years presence of Western troops did not bring peace and stability in Afghanistan. At the withdrawal of combat troops there was a grave need to involve non state or anti-state personnel in meaningful dialogues in Afghanistan. To initiate such process the role of Pakistan could not be ignored but this time the Afghan government specifically the former president Hamid Karzai initiated efforts to get China involved in matters of the war and peace in Afghanistan. Kabul have long been trying to engage Beijing for resolving the conflict in Afghanistan but the latter avoided her involvement in such process in the presence of the US-led coalition troops fighting against non-state actors. The gradual withdrawal of the Western coalition in 2014, motivated China to bring the opposite poles of Afghan politics close to each other as the US had failed to do so. Thus, China emerged as a new stakeholder in Afghan politics although it was not its arena.¹⁶

In the beginning of May 2015 Pakistan and China conveyed the non-state actors who had been labelled since 1990s as Taliban that a conducive environment would be necessary for negotiations. And Taliban delegation

¹³ Pamela Constable, NATO flag lowered in Afghanistan as combat mission ends, In The Washington Post, December 28, 2014.

¹⁴ Rasmussen, Sune. Engel, December 28, 2014, "Nato ends combat operations in Afghanistan", The Guardian newspaper.

¹⁵ Efforts. Rivalries for peace in Afghanistan, in The Kabul Times, October 8, 2018

¹⁶ Bahrami, Abdul. Ahad, February 4, 2016, "China's engagement in Afghanistan's peace efforts", The Daily Outlook Afghanistan newspaper.

had to agree on ceding violence inside Afghanistan. Apart from the engagement with the largest militant group, in the mid of May 2015 Kabul was also busy to finalize a peace deal with the second largest militant insurgent group that remained inactive for years known as Hizb-e-Islami Afghanistan headed by a former warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.¹⁷

There have been informal preliminary contacts between Taliban representatives and Afghan figures from January to July 2015. In due course Pakistan hosted the first official peace talks meeting in a tentative step towards ending more than 13 years of war between the Afghan Taliban and the government in Kabul during July 7-9, 2015 in Murree, a hill station on the border between Punjab and Azakd Kashmir in Pakistan. The meeting was concluded with an agreement to meet again. In these talks the US and China maintained their presence as an observer state. On July 29, one day before the second round of talks, the Afghan government announced the death of Mullah Omar and it was confirmed by the Taliban.¹⁸ The revelation exposed the leadership crisis in Taliban and sabotaged the peace process.¹⁹

It was during an international climate change conference in Paris held on November 30, 2015 when a trilateral meeting headed by the British prime minister David Cameron, Pakistan's PM and the president of Afghanistan took place on the side-lines of the conference. All three agreed to work with those who would entre in a peace process as legitimate political actor.²⁰ In that meeting the PM of Pakistan suggested a quadrilateral meeting for the peace process. After one week on December 8-9, 2015 the fifth Ministerial Conference of the Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process held in Islamabad and during the conference a trilateral and quadrilateral meetings were held on the side-lines of HIA-IP. All four parties agreed together to create a conducive atmosphere that encourages Taliban groups to engage in meaningful and sustainable negotiations. China and the US were determined to eliminate mistrust prevailed between Kabul and Islamabad.

The peace talks adopted the term of Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) of Pakistan, Afghanistan, China and the US. The QCG first meeting was held in Islamabad on January 11, 2016 to facilitate an Afghan-led and Afghan owned peace and reconciliation process with a view to achieve

¹⁷ http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2016-05/16/content_25291456.htm

¹⁸ Europa Regional Survey of the World, South Asia: 2016 (13th Edition), 2015, London: Routledge, p. xvii.

¹⁹ Dawn newspaper 24, 2016.

²⁰ Khan, Tahir, Manan, Abdul, November 30, 2015, "Afghan peace process: Nawaz, Ghani agree to take 'legitimate' stakeholders on board" The Express Tribune, Pakistan newspaper.

lasting peace and stability in Afghanistan and the region at large.²¹ The meeting was not attended by non-state actors or Taliban. They argued that they control more territory in Afghanistan than they did at any time since they were ousted from power in 2001. They were consistent on their demand of the complete withdrawal of foreign troops from their country. The US and NATO have 13,000 troops stationed in Afghanistan, mainly in training capacity. They include 9, 800 US and three thousand and two hundred NATO troops.²² The QCG countries underlined the importance of bringing an end to the conflict in Afghanistan that continues to wreak futile violence on the Afghan people and also breeds insecurity throughout the region. The four participants emphasized the immediate action for direct talks between representatives of the Afghan government and representatives' of anti-state groups in a peace process that aims to preserve Afghanistan's unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Within two month the QCG members met four times and there was a hope that the meetings would breed positive results for peace in Afghanistan.

The last and fifth meeting was held in May 18, 2016 at Islamabad and after three days of the meeting the head of Taliban was targeted by a US drone strike on May 21, 2016 in Baluchistan.²³ The killing of the head who was participating in peace talks gave impression that the US agreed with the demands of the Afghan president, that "irreconcilable" insurgents based in Pakistan should be targeted. His death brought a serious blow to the peace talks from various aspects. For the US as a pentagon official justified the killing of Taliban's head as he was creating obstacles to peace and reconciliation process between the government of Afghanistan and Taliban and prohibiting the latter from participating in such talks with Afghan government.²⁴ On the other hand the then Pakistan's Army Chief General expressed anger on the strike and said that the US did not take Pakistan in confidence before the strike and such unilateral actions would undermine trust of anti-state actors and affect counter terrorism cooperation.²⁵ He

²¹ Javed Hamim Kakar, 4-nation meeting stresses immediate need for direct talks, in Pajhwok Afghan News Reflecting the truth, January 11, 2016. <https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2016/01/11/4-nation-meeting-stresses-immediate-need-direct-talks>

²² Tanzeem, Ayesha, January 16, 2016, "Differences Plague Afghanistan Peace Talks", <https://www.voanews.com/a/talks-on-afghan-peace-process-open-in-pakistan/3139601.html>

²³ Helene Cooper, U.S. Drone Strike Targets Taliban Leader in The New York Times, May 21, 2016.

²⁴ The guardian newspaper, May 22, 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/22/death-of-mullah-akhtar-mansoor-likely-to-enrage-pakistan>

²⁵ Dawn, newspaper, May 26, 2016.

further said that “Pakistan’s efforts, successes and sacrifices in the fight against terrorism are unparalleled.”²⁶ The war against terrorism is a common war of the US and Pakistan. The one-sided US action also cause frustration in Pakistan that the US does not acknowledge the sacrifices of Pakistan in the war against terrorism.

Trilateral Coordination Group

The killing of Taliban’s head in Pakistan created tension in relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan and the credibility of the US was ruined in Taliban circles. It also derailed the dialogue process and halted the security and progress of the two countries. At this time of despair Pakistan and Afghanistan looked towards China, being capable to remove suspension between these two neighbours. The gesture indicated high level faith both countries placed in China. Both countries found China ready to play a constructive role for the improvement of relations based totally on equal consultations with the two parties.²⁷ Beijing found an opportunity in the 6th summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) held on June 8-9, 2017. In the side-lines of the summit it was emphasised by China to revive the Afghan peace process and counter-terrorism cooperation which had been terminated since a year.²⁸ For peace & reconciliation in Afghanistan the Chinese Foreign Minister proposed a trilateral mechanism for cooperation including China, Afghanistan and Pakistan.²⁹

The trilateral talks were held in China and the participants called on the Taliban to join the process. In such quest the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s reached Kabul on June 24, 2017 with his “shuttle diplomacy” aimed at mediating between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The three parties agreed on China-Afghanistan-Pakistan Foreign Ministers’ dialogue mechanism to cooperate on issues of mutual interest. The three parties also believed that the Quadrilateral Coordination Group should be revived and a conducive environment must be created to bring the non-state actors on dialogue table.³⁰ As per official statement, “The trilateral mechanism mainly

²⁶ Gen Raheel’ seriously concerned over violation of sovereignty by US, in Dawn May 25, 2016.

²⁷ Khan, Tahir, June 25, 2017, “China Launches shuttle diplomacy to help Pak-Afghan ties improve”, Daily Times newspaper.

²⁸ Dawn newspaper, June 25, 2017.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ China, Afghanistan, Pakistan agree to maintain regional peace, stability, 26. 6. 2017, Source Xinhua.

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-06/26/c_136393932.htm

focuses on three key areas – strategic and security issues, counter-terrorism and security and economic development and connectivity.”³¹

When the trilateral Group was struggling for peace in Afghanistan, in the meantime after the break of 16 months the 6th QCG meeting was organized at Muscat, Oman on October 16, 2017.³² At this time the non-state group denied its presence in the talks which signals the fruitless discussion and there was no issuance of any official statement after the talks.³³ On the other hand the Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi’s reconciliation process remained fruitful as it met after six months hard efforts in December 26, 2017. The foreign ministers of the trilateral group met in Beijing to strengthen counter-terrorism coordination and cooperation.³⁴ The Chinese FM said that our dialogue process is not targeted at any other party nor would it be subject to influence from other countries or forces rather complement other existing mechanisms and contribute to peace and stability in Afghanistan and in the region.

China took another move in her efforts to bring peace in Afghanistan. Beijing was not hesitant to dialogue with Delhi over Afghanistan’s peace and continued covert diplomacy with Taliban too. Despite of the trilateral group efforts, in April 27-28, 2018, there was a two days informal summit between China and India held in Chinese city Wuhan. Indian PM and Chinese President agreed to carry out a joint India-China economic project in war-torn Afghanistan. It would be the first such project in the war-ravaged country by India and China.³⁵ Another move was a joint India-China project for peace in Afghanistan that would enable India to play a larger part in Afghanistan ultimately reduces Beijing’s reliance on Pakistan.³⁶

As per Chinese diplomacy, the second trilateral meeting was held on May 28 in Beijing³⁷ followed by the 18th Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

³¹ Tahir Khan, Pakistan, Afghanistan and China gold strategic dialogue in Beijing, in Dailu Times, May 29, 2018.

³² Dagia, Niha, October 16, 2017, “Quadrilateral meeting begins in Oman with hope for peace in Afghanistan”, The Express Tribune newspaper,

³³ Dawn newspaper, October 17, 2017.

³⁴ December 16, 2017, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1592949/1-pak-china-afghan-trilateral-meeting-stresses-talks-taliban/>

³⁵ The News, April 29, 2018.

³⁶ <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-stays-out-of-move-to-support-chinas-bri-at-sco-meet/articleshow/64533390.cms>

³⁷ Times of Islamabad, May 29, 2018.

<https://timesofislamabad.com/29-May-2018/pakistan-china-and-afghanistan-hold-trilateral-strategic-dialogues-in-beijing>

Summit held on June 9 to 10, 2018 in Qingdao, a coastal city in east China's Shandong Province. It was the first SCO summit since its expansion, India and Pakistan attended the summit as full members.³⁸ The Afghanistan's president Mr. Ashraf Ghani also attended the summit as an observer state. The Chinese president Xi Jinping reaffirmed China's will in "seeking peaceful coexistence, common prosperity, shared aspiration, and win-win cooperation."³⁹

China an Acceptable Power for All Parties in Afghanistan

China formed a comprehensive strategy for Afghanistan six months before the withdrawal of foreign troops from there. In July 2014, China appointed a former ambassador of China in Afghanistan and India Mr. Sun Yuxi, as a special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan.⁴⁰ In his youth, Sun in 1981 had provided Chinese arms to the Afghan Mujahideens. Sun Yuri said that China had established multiple forums for negotiations and discussions in order to bring in the neighbouring countries and others to facilitate the reconciliation in Afghanistan.

Mr. Sun stated that "We support a peace process because we are also a victim of terrorism." But such process must be Afghan state owned China established their own contacts with Taliban.⁴¹ China provided a neutral venue to all stakeholders in Afghanistan.

Beijing was waiting for a peace plan from Kabul and Islamabad as both greatly suffered in the war against terrorism. When a QCG was formed China became its focal member. Although it never played a role of mediator beyond its borders but gained initial success where Afghanistan's neighbour Pakistan, NATO and the US had failed. Among all four China enjoys a unique status having close and trust worthy relations with Pakistan and Afghanistan as well as the Taliban. When a deadlock occurred in QCG after May 2016 incident and the US lost credibility, it was China which resumed the process of peace talks by reducing the acceptable member for the Afghan state and non-state actors in June 2017. In the TCG China has been continuously engaged in dialogues. China supports all Afghan parties in persevering to realise a political reconciliation process as early as possible and to continue playing a constructive function.⁴²

³⁸ China focus: What to expect from SCO summit in Qingdao, Xinhua, 11. 6. 2018.

³⁹ China Daily, June 11, 2018.

⁴⁰ Dawn newspaper, July 19, 2014.

⁴¹ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-30273431>

⁴² China courted Afghan Taliban in secret meetings, Financial Times, August 6, 2018.

An unprecedented event took place in Afghanistan in the first week of June 2018 when the Afghan president announced eight days unilateral ceasefire with the Taliban to celebrate Eid ul-Fitr after the holiest month of Ramadan. That was a trust-building gesture to encourage militants to negotiate with the state.⁴³ The non-state actors replied in a same manner and announced three-days ceasefire with the Afghan government. It was first time in the past 17 years war history that the militants declared a cessation of violence, even though a limited one, since they were ousted by US in 2001.⁴⁴ The ceasefire was a result of China and Pakistan's quiet diplomacy. Both countries played a decisive role in persuading both to lay down arms against each other.⁴⁵

However, the Taliban declined the same request of Afghanistan government in August 2018, and ignored the efforts of the US for three months ceasefire on Eid-ul Azha as they believed that such ceasefire would only assist the US troops, who the Taliban are trying to drive out of the country.⁴⁶ The Wakhan corridor which is at the north-eastern edge of Afghanistan, barely populated, the Chinese were found distributing blankets and food stuff among the people. Such gestures are sufficient to win the hearts of people.

After the withdrawal of combat troops from Afghanistan, China has been a part of every peace process. It earned the trust of all parties as they agreed on Sino role as a mediator. From 2015 to the recent Russian effort to organize a Moscow meeting on September 4, 2018 (although it postponed at eleventh hour),⁴⁷ China remained a part of all efforts which could bring peace, prosperity and tranquillity in Afghanistan.

CPEC and OBOR: Connecting China with South Asia

China entered in 2014 with comprehensive strategic, economic and diplomatic approaches. As it was a year of withdrawal of foreign combat troops after 13 years of engagement in Afghanistan. China heralded game changer mega programs i.e. CPEC and OBOR. Militancy in Afghanistan would be a setback in these projects. Both projects would help China to extend its influence to fight for regional poverty and developing the basic

⁴³ Mashal, Mujib, June 7, 2018, "Afghan Leader Declares Brief, Unilateral Cease-Fire in Taliban Fight", The New York Times newspaper.

⁴⁴ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/09/taliban-ceasefire-eid-afghanistan>

⁴⁵ Kamran Yousaf, Afghan Eid truce 'backed by Pakistan, China', The Express Tribune, June 11, 2018.

⁴⁶ Taliban reject Afghan ceasefire offer, The Nation, August 21, 2018.

⁴⁷ Russia, Afghanistan to agree on new date for Moscow meeting-----foreign ministry, August 27, 2018, Tass Russian News Agency.

infrastructure. The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has been a \$ 47 billion Chinese investment in Pakistan and OBOR is an estimated \$4 trillion project through which China could establish itself as a world-leading economy and to spread its power, specifically in the South Asia region.⁴⁸ China has initiated transport and energy projects, power plants, roads, railways, bridges, gas pipelines and ports. The projects would benefit Afghanistan in building infrastructure, creating employment, maintaining social stability that would ultimately lead to peace and prosperity. An unstable Afghanistan can derail the economic ambitions of China. It also played a key role in forming and escalating regional platforms i.e. “the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), setting up the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS Development Bank.”

Beijing have been discussing the issue of Muslim Uyghurs with the Taliban fleeing China’s Xinjiang province and planning resistance to Beijing’s rule from Afghan territory. China has intensified a series of clampdowns on the Uyghurs who have agitated for independence.⁴⁹

China’s direct talks to the Taliban rather than simply helping mediate Afghan-led talks indicates that the country has been increasingly involved in south and central Asia but not establishing military bases.⁵⁰ Chinese Defence Ministry denied reports about deploying troops to Afghanistan and rumours for its military base in Afghanistan. However, According to the ambassador of Afghanistan to China, Beijing is helping Afghanistan set up a mountain bridge to bolster counterterrorism operations,⁵¹ China believes that instability in Afghanistan would be a main obstacle in its economic plans for the 21st century.

Conclusion

After the withdrawal of foreign troops, China reorganized her role in Afghanistan as it remained a challenge for regional and global powers to bring peace, stability and harmony among various Afghan groups. All stakeholders in Afghanistan have realized that without negotiations and dialogues with non-state actors peace would not prevail over there. In peace talks whether it was through QCG or TCG China possessed a significant position. China declared her policy regarding Afghanistan firmly that such process must be “Afghan-owned and Afghan-led.” China provides a neutral

⁴⁸http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2017beltandroad/2017-06/02/content_29598716.htm

⁴⁹ China courted Afghan Taliban in secret meetings, Financial Times, August 6, 2018.

⁵⁰ China courted Afghan Taliban in secret meeting, in Financial Times, August 6, 2018.<https://www.ft.com/content/66b0906a-993d-11e8-9702-5946bae86e6d>

⁵¹ Christopher Bodeen, China says no plans to deploy troops to Afghanistan, In Military Times, August 30, 2018.

venue to all groups to negotiate with each other and understand the significance of peace for their people who have been in turmoil since past thirty seven years. It is further important that the government of Afghanistan and Taliban both trust China and the recent ceasefire between them is an example of such reliance. After the failure of Western powers China is a ray of hope regarding peace, stability and prosperity in Afghanistan.

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INDO-AFGHAN RELATIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN

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Abstract

Afghanistan is located at the convergence of Central, Middle and South Asian regions, one of the most world prime geographical locations. Its strategic location and abundant mineral resources have always attracted international community including India. Hence Indian objectives to develop relations with Afghanistan are manifold and decades old. Indian foreign policy is devised by many factors like its bitter relations with Pakistan and its desire of access route to Central Asian Republics by limiting Pakistan's reach that has serious implications for Pakistan. In view of its past experience, Pakistan perceives Indian extended desire to engage in Afghanistan as a deliberate strategy of using the later as a battleground to show its power and use influence against Pakistan. Terrorist incidents in Balochistan provide evidence and links with Indian RAW activities organized in Afghan areas. So, Indian intention to invest in Afghanistan for infrastructure rebuilding is not as simple as it is often claimed. India has covert objectives of troubling Pakistan. In hostile lunacy, India increased, dramatically, its involvement in Afghanistan when the Taliban era came to an end. India's interference in Afghanistan is a clear reflection of its desire to execute Afghan land against Pakistan. India sees Afghan war an opportunity to encounter Pakistan's influence in the region. This research paper will analyze Indian involvement in Afghanistan and its implications for Pakistan. The study is designed to unveil the hidden objectives of fast growing Indo-Afghan relations and evaluates Indian strategies in regional context.

Key Words: India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Restructuring Afghanistan.

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Introduction

Previously, Pakistan had to give attention for defending only the eastern boundary, but as India is strengthening its presence in Afghanistan, on the Western front, therefore Pakistan is compelled to revise its military strategy to cope the emanating security threat caused by India. Antagonistic India on Eastern, Indian protagonist Afghanistan on the Western boundary and proactive Indian intelligence agency The Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) in Afghanistan are posturing great defense menace for Pakistan. India is playing the role of a spoiler and is pursuing strategies aiming at destabilizing Pakistan.¹ Indo-Afghan proximity will be a hindrance for Pakistan's access to Central Asian Republics (CARs) which will in turn benefit India. Indo-Iran-Afghan nexus, India's economic agreements with China and financial and strategic aid to Afghanistan is a way of encompassing Pakistan diplomatically. Indian foreign policy during the 2005-2015 unveils its desire of exerting covert as well as overt hard power pressure and using soft power as a foreign policy tool for expanding her influence in the region.²

On one hand, India is involved in curtailing Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan whereas, on the other, she is advancing her domestic and regional interests. India wants to contain Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan to get leading role in Afghanistan and the region. To this end, India has opened more than 13 consulates in the vicinity of the Pak-Afghan border and increased its diplomatic presence to an extraordinary level in Afghanistan which is far more than any other country.³ Pakistan is uneasy over Indian consulates over and above its embassy in Kabul.⁴

India is advancing anti-Pakistan agenda in Afghanistan covertly on the pretext of restructuring and rebuilding the country. From Pakistan's perspective, India's objectives in Afghanistan stem from the calculated assessment, to establish itself firmly by obstructing adversary and expending its military footprints in Afghanistan.⁵

Alongside anti-Pakistan activities, India is playing its card effectively to propagate Pakistan as the center of militant activities. India has not

¹ Yousaf, Kamran. "Pakistan calls India 'spoiler' in Afghanistan." *Tribune*, (September 29, 2017).

² Kiran, Afifa. "Indian Quest for Strategic Ingress in Afghanistan and Its Implications for Pakistan. (Institute for Strategic Studies, Research & Analysis, 2009).

³ Khalid, Iram. "The New Great Game in Afghanistan: Role of India (A Pakistani Perspective)." *South Asian Studies* 26, no. 2 (2011): 241-257.

⁴ Dalrymple, William. *A Deadly Triangle: Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India*. (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2013).

⁵ Lal, Avatika. "Indian Footprints in Afghanistan. *Scholar Warrior*. "Autumn: 68-73. http://www.claws.in/images/journals_doc/12-Indian Footprints In Afghanistan.pdf.

succeeded to prove Pathankot, Uri and Mumbai attacks at international level.⁶

This research paper aims to explain Indo-Afghan relations and its implications for Pakistan. Although a large amount of data is available yet it is misleading and ignoring the facts of Indian engagement in Afghanistan. Indian hidden objectives have not been brought into light.

In the over-augmented involvement of India in Afghanistan and issues of security, state behaviors, and internal conflicts, realist theory provides a befitting and practicable framework for this study. However, implications for Pakistan are the case of Kautilian philosophy and will be seen in this purview. From the very start India does not has good and amicable relations with its neighbouring countries. According to Kautilian philosophy "All neighbours must be treated as the enemies and neighbour of such enemies must be considered as friends".⁷ India has always adopted these guidelines and principles in her foreign policy towards the region. Pakistan is an immediate neighbour of India whereas Afghanistan is an immediate neighbour of Pakistan. Therefore following Kautilian principles Indian foreign policy mentors considers Pakistan as their enemy in the light of geographical link. That is why India always tried to destabilize Pakistan. India has imposed three full fledged conventional wars in 1948, 1965 and 1971 and wide range/severe clash in Kargil.⁸

Research Questions

- Whether or not India has succeeded to develop differences between Pakistan and Afghanistan?
- Why India is giving so much importance to Afghanistan and what are the objectives to invest in Afghanistan?

The present research paper is undertaken by adopting, a mix method of qualitative and historical analysis. A flexible research methodology is applied to explore the genesis of fast-growing Indo-Afghan relations in inter-regional and intra-regional contexts. Politico-economic and strategic dynamics of the region are critically studied to answer the designated research questions. Available and existing literature in forms of books, journals' articles, reports, editorials, electronic and print media is critically evaluated to make the study more representative and purposeful. In addition, I have conducted interviews with the notable economists, politicians, non-

⁶ Khan, Riaz Mohammad. "Conflict Resolution and Crisis Management: Challenges in Pakistan-India Relations." In *Investigating Crises: South Asia's Lessons, Evolving Dynamics, and Trajectories*, by Riaz Mohammad Khan, 75-95. Stimson Center, 2018.

⁷ Kautilya. *The Arthashastra*. USA: Jaico Publishing House, 2009.

⁸ Ali, Lubna Abid, Syed Ali Raza Zaidi, Ahmed Ali Naqvi, Mohammad Ayub Jan, Syed Sami Raza, and Ambrin Fatima. "War Making and State Making in Pakistan." *A Research Journal of South Asian Studies* 29, no. 2 (July-December 2014): 379-394.

governmental organizations' representatives, media persons, and defense and strategic analysts, personally and electronically. I also arranged focused group discussions looping the universities academia and researchers.

Indo-Afghan Relations: Historical perspective

Afghanistan has been famous for its itinerant society and belligerency. It became the pivot of Great Game due to its geographical location. Afghanistan had been the reason for hostility between USSR and UK. In the 19th century, both world powers tried to hold their supremacy in the Central Asian Region.⁹ British took India as the jewel of Crown, therefore, they thought Russian expansionism a danger while expanding their influence in CARs and Afghanistan. In this scenario wars were fought, known as Anglo-Afghan wars. Right after independence, India and Afghanistan founded and strengthened their bilateral relations which culminated in the Friendship Treaty, 1950.¹⁰ In accordance with this agreement both the countries opened trade agencies in their respective capitals to enhance trade and strengthen bilateral relations. Later, a number of state visits from both sides were paid to further strengthen mutual ties. Anglo-Indian interventions in Afghanistan were to get access to India. All routes to India geographically pass through Afghanistan. Before invading Afghanistan, Russia first established a pro-Russian regime in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, India had developed its bilateral relations with Moscow. India's interests in the region created convergence of Indo-Russian stakes in the state of Afghanistan.

During the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) occupation 1979-1989, India fully co-operated with Afghanistan and made a huge investment in development projects including humanitarian aid. Afghanistan proved a Vietnam for USSR while fighting a guerilla war with Mujahideen fully backed by the United States and its allies.¹¹ This war had deep effects on the Soviet Union which caused its disintegration. This provided the Mujahideen an opportunity to overthrow Najibullah's pro-Soviet government in 1992. This advancement of Mujahideen was not good for Indian motives. Coming into power of Burhanuddin Rabbani provided relief to New Delhi because Rabbani was non-Pashtoon who ended up India's

⁹ Karim, Muhammad. "World Powers Rivalry in Afghanistan and Its Effects on Pakistan." *The Dialogue* XII, no. 3 (2017)

¹⁰ Fair, C. Christina. *Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War*. (Oxford University Press, 2014)

¹¹ Blum, William. *Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II*. (Common Courage Press, 2003)

diplomatic isolation.¹²

Afghan war period was not good for Indians to wage their covert activities in Afghanistan, particularly because of the trajectory of US-Pak-Afghan alliance.¹³ However shrewd Indians exploited this opportunity to make deep and strong economic relations with Afghanistan. At the same time, they continued their support towards the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and augmented rebuilding activities/development projects in the country. When India saw that Pakistan was not engaged regarding prospects of regional solutions, even it received valuable American military and economic package, it did not make any censure of Soviet invasion/occupation. It preferred to keep quiet and chose to strengthen economic ties with successive Soviet puppet governments in Afghanistan.¹⁴ It had no respect and regard for the Islamist Afghan Mujahideen groups whom Pakistan supported on the backing of USA. During the period of Soviet occupation, India involved itself, having investments in development projects, especially, in the fields of industry, irrigation, hydro-electricity and communication.¹⁵

Post demise of USSR, history shows that India tried to involve itself with the pro-Soviet and anti-Pakistan groups in Afghanistan to protect its vested interests. However, Indian influence in Afghanistan was lessened due to the Afghan Mujahideen uprising against Soviets supporters, the drawdown of Soviet forces and disintegration of the Soviet Union and formation of Mujahideen government in the country. Emphatically, Pakistan's influence over Mujahideen government was unbearable for Indians.

The basic reason behind, Indian support for Northern Alliance and its leader Ahmed Shah Massoud, was its enmity with Taliban, who were backed by Pakistan and Taliban were disliked by Indians.¹⁶ Another reason for Indian aloofness from Taliban government was their staunch support of Kashmiri freedom fighters. India had sidelined itself after the end of

¹² Khalil, Ahmad Bilal. "Features: The Tangled History of the Afghanistan-India-Pakistan Triangle." *The Diplomat*. December 16, 2016. <https://thediplomat.com/> (accessed July 23, 2017)

¹³ Jabeen, Mussarat, Muhammad Saleem Mazhar, and Naheed S. Goraya. "US Afghan Relations: A Historical Perspective of Events of 9/11." *South Asian Studies* 25, no. 1 (January-June 2010): 43-173

¹⁴ Hauner, Milan. "The Soviet Threat to Afghanistan and India 1938-1940." *Modern Asian Studies* Vol. 15, No. 2 (1981), pp. 287-309

¹⁵ Paliwal, Avinash. "New Alignments, Old Battlefield: Revisiting India's Role in Afghanistan." *Carnegie India*, (June 2017).

¹⁶ Howenstein, Nicholas, and Summit Ganguly. "India-Pakistan Rivalry in Afghanistan." *Journal of International Affairs*, (2010)

Rabbani Government and rise of the Taliban in 1996.¹⁷ It not only kept itself aloof from developmental works but also shun diplomatic relations by closing its embassy in Kabul. All these Indian's moves showed their frustration with the Taliban's government unconditional bent towards Pakistan.

The rise of Taliban gave a serious setback to Indian interests in Afghanistan. In this period Indian presence in Afghanistan curtailed to the bare minimum level.¹⁸ The biggest and largest beneficiary of Post 9/11 events, without making any significant sacrifice, is India. This incident provided India an opportunity to plunge in the affairs of Afghanistan. 9/11 terrorist attacks and its subsequent campaign of global war against terrorism, has given India an opportunity to advance objectives of its foreign policy to gain and manifest the status of regional as well as a world power.¹⁹

Indo-Afghan Relations (2005-2017)

In the pretext of reconstruction of war-ravaged Afghanistan, India involved itself in many projects spending billions of dollars.²⁰ India always had been looking for advancing multidimensional designs in Afghanistan. It was the best time for India to implement its hegemonic agenda, as there was a pro-Indian government in Afghanistan. Thinking it greater time to go further, India signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement in 2011.²¹ Both the countries agreed to devise a mechanism and to support each other on internal platforms. That is why Kabul fully supported New Delhi claim of a permanent seat in UNO Security Council. So far as regional peace is concerned, both the countries adopted collective measures against terrorists. New Delhi started providing military training and aid to Afghan security forces.²²

The Salma Dam Project

Salma Dam is situated on the right bank of Hari Rud River. To meet the energy requirement of Afghanistan, India undertook this project and invested billions of dollars. Water and Power Consultancy Services (India) Limited (WAPCOS) was assigned to design the project on behalf of

¹⁷ Rahman, Saeed ur. "Indian presence in afghanistan: Dynamics of Regional Security." Institute for strategic studies, research & analysis (issra), (2010).

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Howenstein, Nicholas, and Summit Ganguly. "India-Pakistan Rivalry in Afghanistan." *Journal of International Affairs*, (2010).

²⁰ Hussain, Rizwan. *Pakistan and the emergence of Islamic militancy in Afghanistan*. Ashgate Publishing Ltd, (2005).

²¹ Gupta, Arvind. *Strategic Partnership with Afghanistan: India Showcases its Soft Power*. October 10, 2011. <https://idsa.in> (accessed March 23, 2016).

²² Javaid, Umbreen, and Rameesha Javaid. "Indian Influence in Afghanistan and its Implications for Pakistan." *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*, (2016): 12.

Ministry of External Affairs. The project is successfully generating 42 megawatt (MW) electricity and fulfilling the Afghans energy requirements.²³

Roads and Telecommunication

A network of roads is being constructed by India in Afghanistan. An estimated, more than 700 KM length of road has been completed.²⁴ There is a large strategic as well as economic interest in building highways. Although Indian projects in Afghanistan aim reconstruction and development of infrastructure, yet it has multidimensional designs. Zaranj-Delaram is one of these projects. It is also called route 606. India completed this project with the US \$-110 million in three years (Keck 2013).²⁵ The highway was handed over to Afghanistan in 2009. Over and above this highway India also completed small roads in the vicinity. For India, Zaranj-Delaram project has greater economic importance. Through this project, India will be able to transport its goods via Chahbahar to Afghanistan and CARs. India also constructed Gardez-Khost road by investing 88 million US dollars.²⁶ Kabul-Kandahar road was reconstructed which was debilitated in war. India built this road as a gift to Afghan people. India is also laying down railway link of Afghanistan with Iran. This will connect the mineral rich Hajigak and Iran's Chahbahar port. Country's largest iron ore reserves are in this area. India wants to construct this railway link to undermine Pakistan's Gawadar port.²⁷

Cooperation in Social Sectors

In almost all the big cities of Afghanistan, Indian medical missions are working. India constructed the largest children hospital for Afghan peoples. In 2005 Indira Gandhi Children Hospital was completed with 150 beds, equipped with the latest medical and surgical equipments.²⁸ With the financial help of India first cerebral palsy started providing artificial limbs to the effectees of war. More than 1000 Afghan cripples used to get artificial limbs in a year. According to an estimate, India through its medical centers provides medical assistance to more than 350,000 Afghans annually.²⁹

²³ Swami, Praveen. "At Afghan dam inauguration, PM promises: India will not forget you." *The Indian Express*, (2016)

²⁴ Thottam, Jyoti, and Gurgaon. *Magzine*. April 11, 2011. <http://content.time.com> (accessed May 13, 2017)

²⁵ Keck, Zachary. "India's Afghan Power Play, Via Iran." *The Diplomat*, (2013)

²⁶ Johar, GS. *e-paper: Mining The Minefield*. June 30, 2010. per.timesofindia.com (accessed August 6, 2017)

²⁷ Fazil, Muhammad Daim. *Magzine*. June 9, 2016. <https://thedi diplomat.com> (accessed July 17, 2017)

²⁸ Sendhilkumar, D. "The importance of India Assistance to Afghanistan: A critical analysis." *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, (2015)

²⁹ Ibid.

Literacy rate in Afghanistan is alarmingly low. Improvement in literacy rate is essential for the overall progress of the nation. Bringing children to schools is a very tough task. Milk and biscuits are given in schools to children with the help of the World Food Program actively. India is also providing Afghanistan with millions of tons of wheat.³⁰ Afghans in large numbers are being provided educational scholarships in Indian universities. Training and capacity building of Afghan nationals has also been undertaken by India. Further, India is also providing cooperation in human resources development of Afghanistan. Short-term trainings to Afghan students in Vocational courses are being provided in India.³¹ To influence every person and win every heart, India has planned to go in every home of Afghanistan. Owing to this, Indian culture is being spread in Afghanistan through Indian movies and plays.³² In this way, India wages the media war against its rival Pakistan. India took following steps in this connection:-

- i. Installation of transmitters.
- ii. Provision of TV satellite.
- iii. Devices of radio broadcasting.
- iv. Access to Indian communication satellite.

For reconstruction of Afghanistan, a reconstruction fund was set up in which donor countries gave their donations for financial help. India donates more than US \$- 200, 000 in the fund annually.³³ India has undertaken following societal development projects in Afghanistan:-

- i. Free medicines and treatment for masses across Afghanistan.³⁴
- ii. With the assistance of World Food Program, India is providing 100gm biscuit to each school going children every day.³⁵
- iii. Enabling Afghanistan to overcome food shortage, India bestowed gift of 250,000 tons of wheat.³⁶

³⁰ Pant, Harsh V. *India's Changing Afghanistan Policy: Regional And Global Implications*. Strategic Studies Institute, (2010)

³¹ D'Souza, Shanthie Mariet. "India's Aid to Afghanistan: Challenges and Prospects." *Strategic Analysis* 31, no. 5 (2007)

³² Yar, Irfan. "India's influential soft power in Afghanistan: Giving edge over Pakistan." (*Observer Research Foundation*, 2017)

³³ Gandhi, Vishal. *India in Afghanistan*. (External Policy Division Ministry of External Affairs India, 2005).

³⁴ Javaid, Umbreen, and Tehmina Aslam. "Growing Geo-economic and Geo-strategic Interests of India in Afghanistan: Implications for Pakistan." *Journal of Political Studies* 23, no. 2 (2016).

³⁵ Kumar, Pankaj. "India's Interests and Strategies in Afghanistan." *The International Journal Of Humanities & Social Studies* 2, no. 5 (May 2014).

³⁶ Sendhilkumar, D. "The importance of India Assistance to Afghanistan: A critical analysis." *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, 2015.

iv. For community development, India has launched a series of projects of short span aiming to improve the socio-economic conditions of war-affected communities.

v. India is providing university scholarships to Afghan students for educational and institutional development. In this regard, India is providing more than 200 scholarships to Indian students in different universities of India.³⁷

vi. In five major cities of Afghanistan, Indian medical missions are busy in providing medical consultation and assistance to Afghan people.³⁸

vii. With the help of UNDP, dozens of Indian civil servants are working as coaches for capacity building of Afghan public administration.³⁹

viii. For vocational training of Afghan youth, Indian Confederation of industry started Indo-Afghan Vocational Training Centre.

ix. For vocational training of women, Indian NGO Self Employed Women's Association (SEWA) started women vocational training center in the capital city of Kabul.⁴⁰

x. To expand Afghan National TV transmission, India is providing infrastructural and technical assistance to Afghanistan. In this regard numbers of medium and long-range transmitters were installed in hilly and remote areas of Afghanistan.⁴¹

xi. Under a deliberate strategy, India is steadily growing its films and culture in Afghanistan cities.⁴²

xii. India is engaged in building power plants and hydroelectric power projects.

xiii. Afghanistan is abundant in mineral resources. According to an estimate, more than US \$-3 trillion worth mineral resources are in Afghanistan including copper, iron, ore and coal reserves.⁴³ India is avarice of Afghan mineral wealth. It seems that only this sector can solve all economic issues of Afghanistan and boost Indian economy.

³⁷ Price, Gareth. "India's Policy towards." *Catham House*, 2013.

³⁸ Kumar, Pankaj. "India's Interests and Strategies in Afghanistan." *The International Journal Of Humanities & Social Studies* 2, no. 5 (May 2014).

³⁹ D'Souza, Shanthie Mariet. "India's Aid to Afghanistan: Challenges and Prospects." *Strategic Analysis* 31, no. 5 (2007).

⁴⁰ Price, Gareth. "India's Policy towards." *Catham House*, 2013.

⁴¹ Javaid, Umbreen, and Tehmina Aslam. "Growing Geo-economic and Geo-strategic Interests of India in Afghanistan: Implications for Pakistan." *Journal of Political Studies* 23, no. 2 (2016).

⁴² Kumar, Pankaj. "India's Interests and Strategies in Afghanistan." *The International Journal Of Humanities & Social Studies* 2, no. 5 (May 2014).

⁴³ Amini, Mariam. *News*. August 19, 2017. <https://www.cnbc.com> (accessed May 17, 2017).

That is why India is actively constructing and building roads and highways in Afghanistan. Construction of port and railway projects has the aims of linking the region for transportation of these resources.⁴⁴ Besides mega national projects, India has also been undertaking small projects in all provinces of Afghanistan for ensuring and legitimating its presence in Afghanistan for a long time.⁴⁵ Through this strategy, India has been putting ointment to Afghan wounds to heal them up but also creating circumstances ensuring the security of its investments and interests.

Security/Political Cooperation

Both India and Afghanistan entered into strategic partnership treaty in 2011 and believed to be the continuation of their Friendship Treaty of 1950 which said that there would be friendship and peace between the two countries which would strengthen friendly relations among the people of both sides.⁴⁶

Through signing this agreement India became able to get numerous benefits locally and internationally. It was able to get Afghan political support in security councils of UNO and to attain permanent seat therein. India got firm support and stand of Kabul for playing a pro-active role both at regional and global level.⁴⁷ It succeeded in winning an opportunity of training Afghan forces which will serve India's security objectives in the longer run for India. To meet its economic ends, India got access to Afghan natural and precious mineral resources. This agreement also gave India opportunities to penetrate freely in all spheres for protection and security of its strategic interests in Afghanistan.

On October 4, 2011 when India and Afghanistan signed Strategic Partnership Agreement two more agreements were signed which are:-⁴⁸

- i. MoU for extending cooperation in the development of Hydrocarbons.
- ii. MoU to give support and cooperation in the sector of mineral development.

In the shape of the signing of both these agreements, long-awaited Indian desires were fulfilled. Afghanistan is considered rich in Hydrocarbons and to meet its requirement, India direly needs to explore them.

⁴⁴ Fair, C. Christine. *Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War*. (Oxford University Press, 2014)

⁴⁵ Kiran, Afifa. "Indian Quest for Strategic Ingress in Afghanistan and Its Implications for Pakistan." *Institute for Strategic Studies, Research and Analysis (ISSRA)* (Institute for Strategic Studies, Research & Analysis, 2009).

⁴⁶ Ministry of External Affairs India. *Treaties*. January 4, 1950. <http://www.commonlii.org> (accessed August 22, 2017).

⁴⁷ Kapila, Dr Subhash. "Afghanistan-India Strategic Partnership: A Perspective Analysis." (South Asia Analysis Group, 2011).

⁴⁸ Raiphea, Yow Peter. "India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership: An Analysis of India, Afghanistan and Pakistan Perspective." *International Journal of Scientific and Research Publication* 3, no. 4 (2013): 1-4.

India aspires to safeguard the strategic interests of both the countries through Farkhor airbase which is located in Tajikistan 130 KM from its capital. Indian force made it functional on deep desire from Tajikistan. This was the first ever base which India had developed outside its territory. The development made Taliban led government of Kabul (1996-2001) more conscious towards the adventurous steps of India in the region. Then India had a soft corner for anti-Taliban Northern Alliance whom she was also providing war weapons and equipment through this base. A squadron of MiG 29 aircraft was stationed at this base. India used to extend helicopters to Northern Alliance for intelligence and information purposes through its spy agencies. India also opened a military hospital in Kabul to provide medical facilities to injured soldiers of Northern Alliance. Actually, it was functioning as a substation of war against Taliban regime. In this hospital, NA's leader Ahmed Shah Massoud on September 9, 2001 was also brought injured after the suicidal attack where despite of all efforts he could not survive. At first, New Delhi was hiding this place and her presence till 2005 when she admitted its control with help of Tajik military. India spent the US \$-10 million to develop the "strategic" airbase.

Indian Influence in Afghanistan: A Genesis of Indo-Afghan Relations

In spite of no proximity and border sharing India gives over-augmented importance to Afghanistan, which should not have been given such significance being not immediate neighbor. Such extraordinary engagement of India in Afghanistan is the pursuit of Kautilian theory that an "enemy's enemy is a friend. India wants to create trouble for Pakistan on its Western borders just to destabilize it and keeps its regional hegemony. India has not accepted the making of Pakistan even today. Therefore, she is using every strategy to weaken and break Pakistan by pursuing realism. Hence she has an inimical mindset towards Pakistan and with no reason takes Pakistan as its enemy. Following Kautilian theory India takes Afghanistan as its friend.

Why India Gives Much Importance to Afghanistan?

India thinks Afghanistan is very important for her economic pursuits in the region. She thinks Afghanistan would open new avenues for access to energy reserves of Central Asia.⁴⁹ Due to the geographical location of Afghanistan, India plans to develop a strategic partnership with Afghanistan and counter the increasing influence of China in the region. Now India has to depend on Pakistan for trade to Afghanistan and CARs. To bypass Pakistan and reduce its importance, India is building an alternate route to

⁴⁹ Das, Pranab Kr. "Central Asia: A New Avenue to India's Future Energy Needs & Geo." *International Journal of Innovation Research & Development* 3, no. 11 (November 2014).

access CARs through Chahbahar in Iran via Afghanistan for trade and transportation. Afghanistan has become a huge market for Indian goods.⁵⁰ Both the countries have already bilateral trade volume of which is increasing day by day. India-Afghanistan bilateral trade value increased from \$-80 million to \$-280 million since 2001-2010.⁵¹ Afghanistan is also important to India to show her presence in the energy-rich region and influence in any gas/oil pipeline, which must pass across the territory of Afghanistan to go to Pakistan.

Indian Afghan Policy: Pakistan Factor

India, from the very outset, had tried to develop its meaningful relations with Afghanistan taking into new Afghanistan-Pakistan differences. The anti-Pakistan strategy is the main focus of India's Afghan policy.⁵² India's early involvement with post-Taliban regimes was also taken by other regional and world powers as a strategy of undermining Pakistan.

For many reasons, India has consistently improved its relations with Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban.⁵³ She, in a planned way, strengthened its relations with the Northern Alliance who are anti-Pakistan. Since the fall of the Taliban, many members of the Northern Alliance were holding the positions in Kabul, which showed their meaningful bent towards India ignoring Pakistan.

Indian security establishment relishes their apprehension that pro-Pakistan groups would take over Afghanistan's control in the power vacuum after the drawdown of United States (US) and International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF).⁵⁴ The announcement of delay in withdrawal from US authorities is warmly welcomed by New Delhi. In presence of US and ISAF, India knows that pro-Pakistan groups would find no space. Resultantly India can flaunt her muscles freely in Afghanistan.

Indian Afghan Policy: Pakistan factor

India is carrying out covert operations of ethnic violence, creating militancy, committing suicidal attacks, exploding bombs, target killings and sectarian strife.⁵⁵ All these are systematic series of operations rather than random incidents. Factually, Pakistan is a victim of much planned

⁵⁰ Khan, Mubarak Zeb. "Losing ground in Afghanistan." *Dawn*, (Karachi:2017).

⁵¹ Price, Gareth. "*India's Policy towards*." (Catham House, 2013).

⁵² Hanauer, Larry, and Peter Chalk. *India's and Pakistan's Strategies in Afghanistan: Implications for the United States and the Region*. (Arlington: RAND Corporation, 2012), 1-90.

⁵³ Kumar, Pankaj. "India's Interests and Strategies in Afghanistan." *The International Journal Of Humanities & Social Studies* 2, no. 5 (May 2014).

⁵⁴ Khan, Raja Muhammad. "*Margalla Papers* 2012: challenges and opportunities." (Institute for strategic studies, research & analysis, 2012)

⁵⁵ Marri, Jarrar Hazrat. "India's covert war on Pakistan is no longer a secret." *Times of Islamabad*, (2018).

methodically and professionally implanted covert war. Since coming into power of Northern Alliance, Indian RAW with the help of intelligence Agencies of USA, Israel, and Afghanistan is helping resurgence in Balochistan and other urban areas of the country.⁵⁶

Research and Analysis Wing and Riyast-i-Amoor-o-Amanat-i-Milliyah (RAW-RAAM) Collaboration

Under the close and keen technical guidance of RAW, Afghan intelligence agency has been reorganized and renamed as RAAM after the name of Hindu god.⁵⁷ Numerous RAW agents and personnel are in close contact and cooperation of Afghan intelligence.

India is using its embassy and consulates in Afghanistan to organize its covert operations to harm Pakistan. In collaboration with significant political figures, RAW is giving weapons to Baloch nationalists in different areas of the province. Afghan agencies used to host and accommodate Indian delegations to meet with the Baloch tribal leaders.

For Salma Dam construction in Herat, huge explosives were transported from Tajikistan to Afghanistan. From these explosives, a considerable amount was transported to Pakistan's tribal areas by RAW and RAAM for using in terrorist activities.

Indian intelligence agency in collaboration with Northern Alliance has set up many training camps for insurgents in different border areas of Afghanistan. Ferraris and anti-Pakistan elements are assembled and trained there.

Indian Goals and Objectives in Afghanistan

Indian goals in Afghanistan can be traced back to Kautilya's writing, a scholar of the realist school of thought. He is famous as Indian Machiavelli. Kautilya in his book *Arthashastra* an English version published in 2016 asserted that:-

"Every neighboring state is an enemy and enemy's enemy is a friend".⁵⁸

Afghanistan has always a pivotal place in India's regional policy owing to its geographical and geo-strategic location, its hostile bent towards Pakistan and mineral reserves richness.⁵⁹ Indian's objectives in Afghanistan are multi-lateral; some of these aims are to limit the Taliban for neutralizing and

⁵⁶ Raja, Asif Haroon. "Forum:Indias ambitions to encircle Pakistan." *Pakistan Defence*. (November 19, 2012). <https://defence.pk> (accessed May 11, 2017).

⁵⁷ Khan, Sanaullah. "Indian, Afghan Agencies Supporting Terror in Pakistan." *The Daily Dawn*, (Karachi: 2016)

⁵⁸ Kautilya. *The Arthashastra*. USA: Jaico Publishing House, 2009.

⁵⁹ Javaid, Umbreen, and Tehmina Aslam. "Growing Geo-economic and Geo-strategic Interests of India inAfghanistan: Implications for Pakistan." *Journal of Political Studies* 23, no. 2 (2016).

resurrecting Pakistan's support to Kashmir jihad. She is helping the democratization process and installing a pro-India government in Afghanistan. The success of Pakistan's Independence Movement, in turn, undercut Indian social fabric by boosting a vent to suppress minority groups like Sikhs and Kashmiri Muslims.

Countering Pakistan's influence in the region to hold and capture leading role in Afghanistan and the Central Asian States, India increasing her diplomatic presence by opening consulates over the Pak-Afghan border areas.⁶⁰ Pakistan is highly concerned about Indian consulates in Afghanistan because there are 3,000-4,000 Indians working across Afghanistan.⁶¹ That is why establishing consulates in Kandahar by India are a setback to Pakistan. Furthermore, some circles in Pakistan took it as deliberate effort, under US patronage, of suppressing Pashtoons and depriving them of their share in authority and promoting the interest of other minority groups including Uzbeks, Panjshiris, Tajiks, and Hazaras. Pakistan believes, from inside Afghanistan some elements both local and foreign are ostentatiously supporting terrorists and miscreants in KP and Balochistan province. In the context, Pakistan provided proofs of hosting Braham Dagh Bugti by Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS) in Kabul, supported by photographs of his frequent visits to Delhi annexed with some instructions, which proves his connections with Balochistan unrest.⁶²

Balochistan is an auspicious sole diamond of Pakistan which makes it pivotal to the heartland and Central Asia.⁶³ It includes Arabian Sea coastland with Gawadar an important port, where from a Southern route to Central Asian states makes it immensely critical for India. Thus India is fomenting trouble and insurgency in Balochistan province aiming at delinking it from Pakistan so as to contain Pakistan's economic and strategic potential as the future of its coming generations lies in Balochistan.⁶⁴ Pakistan blames India and Afghanistan for supporting Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) which is provoking insurgency in Balochistan and trying to attract attention towards their separatist movement.

Moreover, exploitation of Central Asian Republic's energy resources is another and very important aim of Indian influence in Afghanistan. India wants to tap CARs energy resources and for this purpose developing Afghan

⁶⁰ Jabeen, Mussarat, Muhammad Saleem Mazhar, and Naheed S. Goraya. "US Afghan Relations: A Historical Perspective of Events of 9/11." *South Asian Studies* 25, no. 1 (January-June 2010): 43-173.

⁶¹ Kiran, Afifa. "Indian Quest for Strategic Ingress in Afghanistan and Its Implications for Pakistan." *Institute for Strategic Studies, Research and Analysis (ISSRA)* (Institute for Strategic Studies, Research & Analysis), 2009.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ali, Yasmeen Aftab. "Understanding Balochistan's importance." *Pakistan Today*, 2015.

⁶⁴ Shahid, Usman. "Balochistan: The Troubled Heart of the CPEC." *The Diplomat*, 2016.

land as a bridge between itself and Central Asia.⁶⁵ Fast growing Indian economy demands energy resources pressingly. To meet it out, CARs reserves make India to develop a relationship with Afghanistan. In this quest, India is making large investments for roads annexing Afghanistan and CARs.

Countering Pakistan's Strategic Interests in Afghan State

Pakistan and Afghanistan have a common border equal to 2430 Km. Both of the countries have many common characteristics of lingual, cultural, social and religious nature which made them a natural ally. Therefore Pakistan is giving its committed and sincere technical, economic and political assistance to the state of Afghanistan and that is the thing India does not like.⁶⁶

After the 9/11 incident, Indian interests in Afghanistan are evolving on three wide and main objectives.

- i. Security apprehensions
- ii. Economic interests
- iii. Global and regional objectives

To achieve these objectives India is adopting a soft power strategy in Afghanistan.⁶⁷ Soft power as explained by Joseph Nye "is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of the others, our power is enhanced".⁶⁸ By pursuing soft power strategy India is focusing on building and improving physical infrastructure, capacity building of human resources, improving security and assistance in agriculture and industrial sectors.

India takes Pakistan as its archrival because it does not accept Indian hegemony in the region and challenges its supremacy. This refusal and its aspirations of relations on an equal basis were never liked by India. In consequence, India wants to punish Pakistan by isolating and ousting it from the regional scenario. India's so-called help of building Afghanistan is nothing but her strive for becoming a regional hegemon and countering the influence of Pakistan.⁶⁹

⁶⁵ Adnan, Mubeen, and Bushra Fatima. "Strategic and Economic Interests of Pakistan and India in Central Asia." *South Asian Studies* 30, no. 2 (July-December 2015).

⁶⁶ Dabas, Maninder. *News*. October 13, 2016. <https://www.indiatimes.com> (accessed May 25, 2017).

⁶⁷ Kiran, Afifa. "Indian Quest for Strategic Ingress in Afghanistan and Its Implications for Pakistan." *Institute for Strategic Studies, Research and Analysis (ISSRA)*, 2009.

⁶⁸ Nye, Joseph. "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power." *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616 (1) (March 1, 2008): 94–109. doi:10.1177/0002716207311699. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002716207311699>.

⁶⁹ Javaid, Umbreen, and Rameesha Javaid. "Indian Influence in Afghanistan and its Implications for Pakistan." *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*, 2016: 12.

India considers Afghanistan necessary to gain access to Central Asian Republics for trade and import of energy. For this purpose, India is seeking better relations and cooperation with these states. In this pursuit, she extended \$17 million assistance/grant for up-gradation of a hydropower generation plant in Tajikistan and signed memorandum of understanding (MoU) for Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline.⁷⁰

Occupying two-thirds Kashmir, India partially encircled Pakistan. Along with this encirclement, she is virtually increasing its forces and installation, in the Arabian Sea to turn it into its exclusive domain for limiting Pakistan. Large assistance of Iran towards constructing Chahbahar Port and construction of roads, linking the port to Afghanistan is the encirclement in strategic meaning. India is making its utmost efforts to dominate and influence Afghanistan in all fields i.e. social, cultural, political and economic.⁷¹

Indian Terrorism Activities and its Propaganda against Pakistan

Since partition, India is inimical towards Pakistan. She loses no opportunity of deforming Pakistan. Through false operation, India tries to portray Pakistan a center of terrorist activities. Pathankot and Mumbai attacks are examples in this queue. India, through these activities, showing itself as the victim of Pakistan backed terrorist activities.⁷² Under the influence of India, Afghanistan is muttering the words of India and raising baseless allegations against Pakistan for advancing unrest in the country. In contradiction, many hidden networks of India have been traced and disclosed by Pakistan's intelligence agency ISI in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran which were working with militants to promote terrorism in the region.⁷³

In Afghanistan, along with soft power India is using hard power to encircle Pakistan. Ernest Wilson describes hard power "the capacity to coerce". Indian hard power strategies are counterproductive to the world's determination to exterminate terrorism from the globe. There are reports about RAW's involvement in terrorist activities and its role as a spoiler in the war against terrorism. Kalbushan Jadhav's arrest and his confessions as a RAW agent, who is a serving Indian Navy officer, is a clear proof of sponsoring terrorism in Balochistan and South Asian region.⁷⁴ The world must urge the Indian government to shun its nefarious actions against

⁷⁰ Yuldoshev, Avaz. *News: Modernization-Varzob-1-hpp-completed*. January 11, 2013. <http://news.tj/en/> (accessed June 2, 2017).

⁷¹ Raja, Asif Haroon. "Forum:Indias ambitions to encircle Pakistan." *Pakistan Defence*. November 19, 2012. <https://defence.pk> (accessed May 11, 2017).

⁷² Hali, Sultan M. "Another Indian false flag operation." *Pakistan Observer*, 2017.

⁷³ Khan, Sanaullah. "Indian, Afghan Agencies Supporting Terror in Pakistan." *DAWN*, 2016.

⁷⁴ Khan, Sanaullah. "Indian, Afghan Agencies Supporting Terror in Pakistan." *DAWN*, 2016.

Pakistan as the extermination and curbing terrorist activities is a common international objective.

Pakistan government had already raised the issue of Indian terrorism and its role as financier of terrorism before international community quite before Jadhav's arrest. Pakistan also shared a cautiously prepared document containing proofs of terrorist activities by India with the UN General Secretary and US President.⁷⁵ Pakistan as well as international media often exposed Indian involvement in terrorist activities in Pakistan undertaken by Indian RAW. The issue of opening numerous consulates in Afghanistan and their involvement in the training of terrorist element has been discussed in international media. James Dobbin, former US special envoy to AF-Pak stated in media that:-

*"Pakistan's concerns over Indian consulates involvement in anti-Pakistan and terrorist activities are based on realities and facts".*⁷⁶

Christine Fair, American scholar states that:-

*"India is airing unrest and militancy in Afghanistan".*⁷⁷

These statements by neutral persons are sufficient enough to prove Pakistan's stance and apprehension in the context.

Indo-Afghan Nexus: Implications for Pakistan

Afghanistan's ever increasing military ties and connections with India are a source of serious concern for Pakistan. India is making extraordinary efforts towards increasing its influence in Afghanistan including augmented training and equipment of its armed forces, the involvement of Indian consulates in anti-Pakistan activities is widening the already existing mistrust between Afghanistan and Pakistan.⁷⁸ Pro-Pakistan Pashtoons are systematically excluded from government in Kabul. Pakistan is wary that India's intelligence agency RAW is involved in fashioning clandestine plans to overpower Pakistan by using proxies within the Northern Alliance and NA's government in Kabul. Although tripartite commission of USA, Pak, and Afghan is an effective forum to dispose-off the complaints yet dubious Indian action is growing suspicion between the

⁷⁵ Haider, Mateen, and Irfan Haider. *Pakistan:Dossiers of Indian hand in terrorism handed over to UN chief: Aziz*. October 2, 2015. <https://www.dawn.com> (accessed May 11, 2017).

⁷⁶ Armitage, Richard L., Samuel R. Berger, and Daniel S. Markey. *U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan: Independent Task Force Report*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2010.

⁷⁷ Fair, C. Christine. *Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War*. Oxford University Press, 2014.

⁷⁸ Javaid, Umbreen, and Rameesha Javaid. "Indian Influence in Afghanistan and its Implications for Pakistan." *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*, 2016: 12.

two countries.⁷⁹ India thinks Afghanistan is very important to strategically encircle Pakistan and contains it economically so that it might not be able to challenge India's supremacy in the region. These are the reasons due to which India provides support to Afghan institutions. India's assistance to Afghanistan is symbolic; it has some other objectives different from those on the ground.

Previously Pakistan has to pay attention to activities of defending boundaries on her Eastern borders but now due to the increased presence of India in Afghanistan Pakistan has to revise and redesign its military strategy. India poses threats to Pakistan security from two sides of the borders. Pakistan is facing serious challenges and competition from Afghanistan because of the presence of International players there, including India. India's strategy in Afghanistan is to limit Pakistan's influence and to further contain it at the time of conflict. Indian intention is to spoil friendly relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. New Delhi is going to every limit to this end. Resultantly, Pakistan is compelled to compete against every nefarious design of opening a hostile front on its Western borders.

The situation of Afghanistan after 9/11 has largely been serving the aims of Indian policymakers and legitimizing her presence in Afghanistan but at the same time, it has put the policy makers of Pakistan on their toes. Geographically, Afghanistan is situated in the backyard of Pakistan. This location gives her strategic depth for Pakistan. That is the reason for which New Delhi is taking deep interest and trying to take hold in Afghanistan. Indian approach towards Afghanistan is need-based for meddling in Pakistan's influence. To Pakistan, all these efforts of India are to attain a dominant role in the region. Indian presence in Afghanistan, its policies, and dubious activities concern Pakistani policymakers. Genuine reasons for this fear are:-

- i. At the time of war and conflict, Pakistan will lose its strategic depth which it now has in the form of Afghanistan.
- ii. Being marginalized, Pakistan will not be able to use Afghanistan for transit trade.
- iii. Gradual decreasing of pro-Pakistan elements in Afghanistan will result in the rivalry between neighboring countries.
- iv. Military training to Afghan forces by India will become militancy threat for Pakistan.

Following Kautilian philosophy India is using the USA and Afghan governments to slander Pakistan whereas India and USA have harmonious interests in present-day Afghanistan. In the scenario after the drawdown, USA believes India to play a considerable role and fill the power

⁷⁹ Kiran, Afifa. "Indian Quest for Strategic Ingress in Afghanistan and Its Implications for Pakistan." *Institute for Strategic Studies, Research and Analysis (ISSRA)* (Institute for Strategic Studies, Research & Analysis), 2009.

vacuum in case Afghan forces cannot alone be effective. Hence New Delhi is now enjoying the full backing of USA.⁸⁰ Because of the convergence in relations, both the countries are increasing pressure on Pakistan diplomatically and through media. To slander and defame Pakistan, the media of both the countries leave no opportunity of making false propaganda. Treading Indian footpath, the Afghan government also started blaming Pakistan for meddling in affairs of Afghanistan, just for pleasing India. Northern Alliance's government is playing in the hands of India which irritates Pakistan.⁸¹ To achieve its goals and vested interests India has opened generously its treasure's mouth and lavishly expending money. Afghan communication infrastructure including TV and radio networks have been completely rebuilt and recovered with full Indian technical and financial assistance.⁸² Establishing communication networks and systems at optimum levels, India installed different capacity transmitters along with access to its satellite INSAT 3-A.⁸³ Indian cultural films have ultra effective and liking in Afghanistan. Exploiting this aspect, India is making vigorous propaganda against Pakistan which is culminating in hatred in Afghan people against Pakistan. India is advocating that Pakistan is responsible for all ills in Afghanistan whereas realizing itself their true, sincere and altruist friend. India aims and involves itself in power game not only in Afghanistan but also in the entire region; therefore Pakistan's worries are not baseless.⁸⁴

Indian Water Aggression against Pakistan

Pursuing Pakistan's animosity, India is undertaking aggression on waterfronts. Persistently following Kautilya philosophy, India has started undeclared water war against Pakistan and virtually making efforts to dry/barren its lands. Practically water flow of three rivers Chenab, Jhelum, and Sindh minimized due to numerous small and large dams in complete violation of Indus Water Treaty, whereas the second phase includes construction many such dams on Afghanistan's Kabul River. Constructions of dams on Kabul River will stop the flow of Water to Pakistan equal to 5 million Acre-feet.⁸⁵

⁸⁰ Hanauer, Larry, and Peter Chalk. *India's and Pakistan's Strategies in Afghanistan: Implications for the United States and the Region*. Arlington: RAND Corporation, 2012, 1-90.

⁸¹ Javaid, Umbreen, and Rameesha Javaid. "Indian Influence in Afghanistan and its Implications for Pakistan." *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*, 2016: 12.

⁸² Sendhilkumar, D. "The importance of India Assistance to Afghanistan: A critical analysis." *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, 2015.

⁸³ Javaid, Umbreen, and Tehmina Aslam. "Growing Geo-economic and Geo-strategic Interests of India in Afghanistan: Implications for Pakistan." *Journal of Political Studies* 23, no. 2 (2016).

⁸⁴ Akram, Munir. "India's Great Power game." *Dawn*, September 28, 2014.

⁸⁵ Chaturvedi, A K. *Conflicts, Water: A Source for Future*. Vij Books India, 2015.

Conceiving the idea, New Delhi further apprised Afghan government for involving international agencies for construction of these dams. That plan amounts to complete destruction of Pakistan-Afghanistan and Pakistan share the water of nine rivers with approximate 18.3 million acre-foot (MAF) of water.⁸⁶ Kunhar (Chitral) river originates from Pakistan after passing through Afghan land again flows in Pakistan. Consequently, Afghanistan has no legitimacy of using water of this river. Pakistan has reservations over the construction of these dams. Non-availability of requisite demands and reservoir in Pakistan makes it possible that Pakistan would have to depend on Afghanistan for its energy requirements. India is giving Kabul concrete and secret help and emphasizing to construct this dam at the earliest. Such projects would worsen Pakistan's energy crisis. This plan is of Pakistan's complete destruction as its industrial sector is near to collapse and their imports are lowest. Unfortunately, both the countries i.e. India and Afghanistan are making deep cooperation in this regard.

Indian Activities in Balochistan

Besides their political, strategic and economic ties, India and Afghanistan also have harmonious views and strategies about Pakistan's deep sea, Gawadar Port, constructed by China. Gawadar is a kind of guarantee towards Pakistan's progress and prosperity. This port has the potential of becoming awfully lucrative trade route for Arabian, Central Asian and South Asian countries. China will also have the access to CARs and Northern Europe through this port.⁸⁷ This will be the most viable route for trade among the world's richest regions. New Delhi has much worried on completion of this project. Pakistan's viability and strong economic footing are unbearable for India. Under this agony, India started countering the project in shape of working on Chahbahar port which will ensure multifarious benefits to India.⁸⁸

- i. Counter benefits of Pakistan's Gawadar port.
- ii. Building new trade rout eliminating Delhi's rivals i.e. China and Pakistan.
- iii. Developing strong economic relations with Tehran.
- iv. Winning goodwill and sympathies of Afghans providing them alternative land route.
- v. Bringing New Delhi closer to Pakistan's two neighbors.

Pakistan is witnessing a toughest time of its history with regards to internal stability. Balochistan is less inhabited but abundant with mineral resources.

⁸⁶ Kiani, Khaleeq. *Pakistan*. August 26, 2013. <https://www.dawn.com> (accessed April 6, 2017).

⁸⁷ Anwar, Zahid. "Gwadar Deep Sea Port's Emergence as Regional Trade and." *Journal of Political Studies* 1, no. 2 (2010): 97-112.

⁸⁸ Ali, Shoukat. "Importance and Implications of CPEC in South Asia: The Indian Factor." *Journal of Indian Studies* 1, no. 1 (January-June 2015).

It is facing unrest because of interference from Afghanistan, Iran, and India.⁸⁹ This factor with many other factors gives momentum to separatist movement in the shape of BLA. Such groups started undertaking activities against the Federation of Pakistan. Killings of unarmed and innocent people in Balochistan are the reality of the day.⁹⁰

India's Power Manifestations and Implications for Pakistan

According to some observers, what makes the issue of Indian involvement so thorny is that all the three countries have overlapping national interests. India is trying to make an impression of regional and global power and aiming at the exploitation of valuable resources. New Delhi thinks that its efforts are in harmony of the needs and necessities of Kabul. The pro-Indian Afghans think that Indian support is essential for their country and Pakistan cannot hinder the bilateral relationship. But this is not as simple as is often described by Indians and Afghanistan, Barnett Rubin validates Pakistan's concerns over Indian involvement and says it as a legitimate interest.⁹¹ Without regard to the point whether Pakistan's desires for its own strategic involvement in Afghanistan are outdated, Islamabad anyhow thinks itself surrounded by belligerent and inimical forces, viewing only China as a friendly neighbor. In many ways, Pakistan seems to apply same intensity and importance to Indian involvement as it gives to Kashmir issue. India's increasing presence and growing influence in Afghanistan undermines the quest of Pakistan's' strategic depth.⁹² The quest will not be abandoned easily by Pakistan. Resultantly, working relentlessly it will go to considerable lengths, to undermine a cordial Indo-Afghan relationship and threaten Indian officials and personals within Afghanistan.

Pakistan has seen India's rapid insertion of material support into Afghanistan as a strategic loss and rolling back decade's long efforts to establish an Islamic alliance between Islamabad and Kabul. This assumed alliance had for years kept India away from Pakistan's Western border but now Pakistan asserts that Delhi's consulates close to the Durand line serve as hubs for aiding the Baloch insurgency. Pakistan believes that any Indian

⁸⁹ Kiran, Afifa. "Indian Quest for Strategic Ingress in Afghanistan and Its Implications for Pakistan." *Institute for Strategic Studies, Research and Analysis (ISSRA)* (Institute for Strategic Studies, Research & Analysis), 2009.

⁹⁰ Siddique, Qandeel. *Pakistan's Future Policy Towards Afghanistan: A Look at Strategic Depth, Militant Movements, and the Role of India and the US*. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2011.

⁹¹ Rubin, Barnett R., and Abubakar Siddique. "Resolving the Pakistan- Afghanistan Stalemate." *United States InsInstitute of Peace*, no. 176 (2006): 1-20.

⁹² Javaid, Umbreen, and Tehmina Aslam. "Growing Geo-economic and Geo-strategic Interests of India inAfghanistan: Implications for Pakistan." *Journal of Political Studies* 23, no. 2 (2016).

involvement in Afghanistan is pernicious.⁹³ This is especially true amid the calls for secession in some circles of Baloch nationalists and the alliance of Northern Balochis with tribes in FATA in an effort to form an ethnically Pashtun province in Pakistan.

Afghanistan has a history of aiding Baloch nationalists as part and parcel of the tit-for-tat support that each country supplies to the enemies of the other. The Afghan government extended aid to some 30,000 Baloch tribesmen.⁹⁴ Pakistan is now worried about similar and from an Afghan-allied India to this end Pakistani claims are legitimate.

Conclusion

Abetting subverting activities, facilitating infiltrators, sponsoring disgruntled factions and supporting dissident groups throughout Pakistan are main elements of Indian strategy in Afghanistan. Indian spy's capture, his subsequent confessions have confirmed Indian RAW's support and sponsorship to Baloch Liberation Army and waging terrorism in Balochistan/Sindh provinces. Disaffected factions of KP, rural Sindh and Karachi city have been sponsored and encouraged for years which expanded disturbance, insecurity, and uneasiness. India's growing influence in Afghanistan through soft power tactics has some hidden impacts on Pakistan. Through this strategy, India wants to contain Pakistan and halt its economy to improve. India wants to control energy resources of Central Asia solely for its economic needs, ultimately to grasp the role of world's major power.

Pakistan should play its productive role to stabilize Afghanistan and help her to come out from the prevailing critical situation. Stable Afghanistan will be more beneficial for Pakistan. Pakistan and Afghanistan should devise a comprehensive strategy to resolve all their issues including trade, border infiltrations, and cross-border firing. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan should make it mandatory that their land will never be used against each other. Pakistan should concentrate on her internal issues and maintain law and order and peace in the country. Pakistan should operate her foreign policy "pro-actively" rather than "reactively" to counter the Indian nefarious designs and propaganda. All diplomatic channels should be utilized in effective ways to highlight the RAW destabilizing activities in Pakistan, specifically in Balochistan.

⁹³ Javaid, Umbreen, and Tehmina Aslam. "Growing Geo-economic and Geo-strategic Interests of India in Afghanistan: Implications for Pakistan." *Journal of Political Studies* 23, no. 2 (2016).

⁹⁴ Rubin, Barnett R., and Abubakar Siddique. "Resolving the Pakistan- Afghanistan Stalemate." *United States Institute of Peace*, no. 176 (2006): 1-20.

In sum, intensive peace efforts are required for regional stability and peace. In this regard, both Pakistan and India should actively play their positive roles in Afghanistan by putting aside their mutual concerns and clashes. The trilateral engagement will help out the regional peaceful environment. For the long-term cooperation in Afghanistan's reconstruction and building up her economy, transparency and confidence-building measures are required among India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

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DEMOGRAPHIC BONUS IN AFGHANISTAN

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Abstract

Among Central Asian countries Afghanistan reserves an important position because it has been under the war conflict and political instability during the past five decades and a limited research is available on different dimensions of population and economic development. Being involved in war conflict situation, Afghanistan age structure is changing. This paper empirically explores the demographic bonus timings and durations for Afghanistan. The study results revealed that Afghanistan demographic bonus may remained for forty five years long starting from year 2000 and seem to be shut between year 2040 and 2045. For the proper encashment of demographic bonus the key challenge for the Government of Afghanistan is to create the policy environment on labour, savings and human capital. Which policies need to be incorporated to extend the demographic bonus is an added dimension to be considered in Afghanistan.

Keywords: Age structure, Demographic bonus, Afghanistan,

Brief Theoretical Perspective

It is empirically observed that economic development of a country is dependent on its population growth. Globally, the relation between population change and economic growth took importance in recent times. Three main theories are in vogue for population growth effects on economic growth. These theories are termed as 'pessimistic', 'optimistic', and 'neutralist' approach. The researchers having pessimistic view believe that population growth would serve as the 'break' for economic development—excessive population growth would lead to starvation by quickly consuming

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food supplies and natural resources. The pessimistic view seemed stem from the Malthus theory of starvation. Globally, the pessimistic views were famous during 1940-1970s.

From early 1980s the optimistic theorists argued that ‘famines’ occurred but millions of people are not starved. Indeed a new dimension started to emerge with empiric support that large societies fasten the economic growth—growing developed economies need advanced technologies. The optimistic theory refutes the pessimistic theory of population growth. Turning our discussion, say for example a questionnaire is a tool designed in survey research to sought opinions of respondents, while drafting the questions, an option of ‘don’t know’ or ‘DK’ response is provided to respondents to report their opinion in a neutralist way. The ‘neutralist’ theory of population growth is much similar to DK response among researchers. This theory is more adopted fashion in recent times. The neutralist theory was perhaps an answer to an historic question asked by Adam Smith (1776): ‘why some countries richer than other?’. However over the past two decades the United Nations and United States limit to support population programme of different countries seemed to be supporting neutralist view of population growth.

Population Age Structure

Demographers well established the fact that population growth is dependent on its structure or simply called age distribution while the above mentioned theories have ignored population distribution in formulating the propositions. The ‘demographic bonus’ also known as ‘demographic dividend’¹ or ‘demographic gift’ while laid by the changing age structure resulting from the demographic transition, is realized through the productivity of the labour force and human capital. The demographic dividend refers to changes in age dependency ratios during demographic transition results in a window that first opens and then closes. More explicitly, demographic dividend during the rapid fertility decline increases the size of the labor force when compared to dependent population. Among Central Asian countries Afghanistan reserves an important position because it has been under the war conflict and political instability during the past five decades and a limited research is available on different dimensions of population and economic development. In this paper we use the results of population projection to explore the demographic bonus implications in Afghanistan.

¹ From onward in the article the abbreviation DD is used in place of demographic dividend

Data

Data play an essential part for significant research. Census, surveys and vital registration are the main sources of data. Unfortunately no census activity held in Afghanistan during the past four decades². Central Statistics Organization (CSO) in Afghanistan is the main data producing office of the country. Since 1990s CSO coordinated many surveys. Through these surveys the estimates of the population are provided. By keeping in view the political instability, continuous war conflict, and substantial international migration make to have a less believe on the estimates. The data collected from Afghanistan possess a lot of data quality issues. Keeping these constraints in view the main data source used in this article was: “Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat (2004), World Population Prospects New York: United Nations (United Nations Population Division 2004)”. Age wise estimates of population with age specific fertility rates are calculated. In addition, the net international migration rates are taken from this data base. By this time point four revisions of the data base have been prepared: 2008 Revision, 2015 Revision, 2017 Revision. Keeping the base population of year 2000 in view, only 2004 data based is used for the present work. However, by selecting a different base population, the other data bases could be used. The latest 2017 data base is also used but the results are not shown here keeping the study objective in view (the results could be handed from first author).

Population Projection Technique

Two main types of approaches are in vogue for population projection: deterministic and probabilistic projection. This study uses the classic traditional approach namely the cohort component method CCM). The computational details of CCM are available in major texts on demographic methods. Mathematical formula details are avoided by keeping the journal standards, however, these details if required can be handed from the authors. Five year interval projections are computed. For each projection interval CCM consist of three main steps. The first step projects forward the number of persons in each age subgroup that will still alive 5-year later by multiplying the base population with survivorship ratio provided no migration. Gender specific projections are made in the second step of CCM (sex ratio at birth is assumed as 1.05). In the final step of CCM age specific fertility rates are used. Fertility rates of year 2000 are assumed as the standard variant for projection. In addition to the standard variant, the fertility rates are decreased by 30 per cent point and these rates are termed as

² Last census was held in 1979.



‘low fertility variant’ and fertility rates are increased by 30 per cent point and these rates are referred as ‘high fertility variant’.

Results

The results are based on population projection from 2005 to 2050 by employing the year 2000 population as the base population. Population projections are made on the basis of three fertility variants: standard or medium fertility, low fertility and high fertility assumption. In low fertility assumption the birth rates are assumed to be decreased by 30 per cent of actual or medium variant and an increase of 30 percentage points in birth rates are assumed for high fertility regime. Figure 1 is the display of population projection under three variants up to year 2050. All three variants confirm that Afghan population is growing in nature.

Subtraction between growth rates of working population to the total population is defined as the demographic bonus. This subtraction could be positive or negative. The positive differences³ offered a onetime window of opportunity for Afghanistan. Figure 2 presents the behaviour of demographic bonus over time from year 2000 to 2050 in Afghanistan which ultimately leads to the overall duration of demographic opportunity under three different variants. Figure 2 also shows that Afghanistan ‘window of opportunity’ opened in year 2000 and is looked to be shut by year between 2040 and 2045. Forty or forty five year long bonus is observed to be closed in year 2045. An interesting finding is that the demographic bonus is observed to be negative between year 2015 and 2020. The key reason behind this negative value is that during 2015, 201400 Afghan refugees returned to Afghanistan.

³ Positive differences means the working age populations outnumber the non-working age populations.



Discussion And Concluding Remarks

For any country three factors namely *labour supply*, *savings* and *human capital* are most important for population and economic development. Labour supply or labour force consists on the working age individuals of the society or country. Savings are the monetary rewards of the labour. Higher life expectancy is the outcome of human capital. According to a latest World Bank report human capital accounts for 70 per cent of wealth in high-income countries. During 1940s-1970s many studies provided the space to pessimistic theory of population growth. Afghanistan population is growing this provide the empirics that fertility will not be lower in next three to four decades. If more children born in Afghanistan they would ultimately become the part of labour force. When there are more working people in Afghanistan it will ultimately reduce the burden of dependent people. Here the important policy dimension is the gender based labour force of Afghanistan. If opportunity of working environment is given to Afghan girls it will increase the development of Afghanistan in two ways: first, engaging the Afghan girls in work will suppress the fertility level for short duration, second the monetary outputs of these young workers benefits the country's economic growth. This dimension will strengthen the national savings of Afghanistan. Afghanistan is a country faces a challenge of high maternal mortality. Low fertility of Afghani women will result in less number of children. This lead to the improved health of Afghan woman would further strengthen the human capital of Afghanistan.

Substantial policy on labour supply, savings and human capital are mandatory of a country like Afghanistan where the local population is stanchd with the religious beliefs and they would really be want to become the part of industry if installed by foreigners or they may find the other ways of their day to day living. We foresee the Government of Afghanistan need to be fully functional equally in all parts of the country and the providing the opportunities. This seems a key challenge for the Government of Afghanistan to adopt such strategies which will real time provide opportunities so that the demographic bonus is reaped in true spirit. One of the limitations of the study is that the findings of this paper should be viewed with close to migration assumption; a separate analysis is required while incorporating the net international migration with the population projection estimates.

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CONTEXTUALIZING MILITARY OPERATIONS IN PAK-AFGHAN BORDERLAND & DISTRICT SWAT TO CONTAIN FOMENTING INSURGENCIES

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Abstract

Pakistan's engagement in the global war on terrorism and its role as a frontline ally of the USA compelled strategic elites of the state to develop strategies to curb the militant groups that migrated to Pakistan and took shelter in the borderland areas after the U.S. military offensive Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) on Afghanistan. The aim of OEF was to hunt down the Al-Qaeda and other affiliated conglomerates enjoying patronage under the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The real challenge before the law enforcement agencies of Pakistan was to get support from the public for military operations against these Islamist militant groups, which were the constant source of threat to the security of the state. The majority of the people in Pakistan were generally not in favor of full-fledged military operations because they saw the militants as holy warriors fighting against the infidels and believed that if Pakistan launched any brand of operation in erstwhile FATA it would be under the diktat of the Americans. This is the reason why, from 2001 to 2004, Pakistan's security forces opened the door for negotiations and did not participate in hard-strikes against the militant outfits. But after the formal formation of Threek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in 2007 and its nexus with Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) in Swat started a series of brutal suicide and targeted attacks on the population, it was necessary for the military to begin operations. This timely study of important military operations initiated against the insurgents in the Pak-Afghan borderland will broaden the horizon of security managers about their strategic and tactical flaws in the ground offensive and thorough

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analysis will help to provide a better understanding for future military offensives in any part of the country. This paper focuses on important military operations with a cost and benefit analysis of those conducted after 2001 in the adjacent areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and district Swat.

Key Words: Insurgency, Af-Pak Borderland, TNSM, USA, TTP, Al-Qaeda.

Introduction

Jihadists' attack on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon on September 11, 2001 entirely reshaped not only the world politics but changed the nature of engagements and alliances among the states. After inking a formal alliance General Pervez Musharraf and his team started to hunt down Al-Qaeda members and other affiliated conglomerates. Moreover, under the broader terms of engagement, Pakistan provided air, land and seaport facilities to America and NATO troops. When the combat operations intensified in Afghanistan by the US and NATO troops, the number of local insurgencies abruptly increased in the Pak-Afghan borderland. Therefore, Islamabad was compelled to intercept the militants' proliferation and dismantle their networks. However, it was not an easy task for Pakistani forces, as various local militant groups started to gather under the banner of Therek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in 2007 and built strong bases in various parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. A series of violent and brutal attacks were initiated by the militant groups with new techniques and strategies. Particularly, the 'Fadaeen' unite (Suiciders) created havoc inside Pakistan.¹

Rising terrorism, related activities and mass pressure compelled security vanguards to satiate their thrust of revenge. Therefore, several military operations were launched in FATA to wipe out the menace of insurgency and regain the control of the area from the militants. Formally, the military operations started in 2001 in different parts of the country but this paper focuses those operations that were launched in Pak-Afghan borderland. The following are the operations that were solely conducted by Pakistan army with their code names:

- Operation Al-Meezan (2002-2006)
- Operation Zalzala (2008)
- Operation SherDil, Rah-e-Haq, and Rah-e-Rast (2007-2009)
- Operation Rah-e-Nijat (2009-2010).
- Operation Zarb-e-Azab (15 June 2015)

¹C. Christine Fair and Seth G. Jones, "Pakistan's War Within," *Survival* 51, no. 6 (December 1, 2009): 161-188.

The factual analyses of these operations reveal that no remarkable objectives were achieved by security forces, no doubt, with the active support and pressure by the US in the borderland area and its adjoining parts by June 2015. But the operations were successful in persuading the militants to sit at the negotiating table. It is important to highlight that in many cases security forces compromised on the humiliating terms and conditions, and faced hard criticism from public and media. Yet it was justified and associated with the peace process. Nevertheless, many agreements were ended in smoke because of the lack of trust between the two parties².



²“Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy. Edited by Paul Gordon Lauren. The Free Press (Macmillan, New York). £16.25,” *International Relations* 6, no. 5 (May 1, 1980): 854–855.

Operation Al-Mizan (Trial Balance)

Operation Al-Mizan was started in 2002 in South Waziristan when militants brazenly attacked a military camp called Azam Warsak in Wana. In this strike nearly thirty soldiers were killed, which severely infuriated military establishment³. Moreover, during the tenure of Musharraf as Chief of Army Staff (COAS), the Al-Qaeda deputy head issued a religious decree (Fatwa) for the killing of Musharraf. Here the conflicts of interests appeared and a formal military campaign was started in the area. Musharraf was attacked several times by the Taliban and Al-Qaida when he had a narrow escape in suicide attacks⁴. US financial assistance continued to Pakistan to convince the security vanguards to be involved on a massive scale to fight against miscreants in the borderland. This persuasion gave the US an edge to curb anti-American figures in Pakistan. America's financial support was allocated largely to the influential security agencies and the prominent central intelligence agency ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence), including police and Frontier Corps (FC) which was approximately \$2 billion per annum⁵. Pakistan deployed its eight thousand military personnel during the campaign of operation Al-Mizan.

It is clear from the historical and operational point of view that all the national forces cannot conduct any operations in the region without the coordination among all divisions to counter the nefarious designs of the enemies. Pakistan's infantry unit needed the support of Pakistan Aviation to meet the challenges in the rocky terrain of FATA. The Air Force played a significant role in air-strike attacks on militants. Moreover, it also provided logistics support, and medium transportations specifically in the year 2002. Waziristan and Tochi scouts were involved in operational exercises in the Pak-Afghan borderland. For the regular operational activities, the Special Services Group (SSG) and other regular troops were used to control the situation. On actual ground, some of the military check posts were placed in Waziristan. Moreover, the task was given to political agents and other civil high ups authorities to identify the supporters who provide the assistance to the militants in Waziristan. The traditionally chosen heads of the village (Malaks) were taken in confidence to identify the indigent militants who were in cooperation with the foreigners in their localities. An estimated

³M. Ilyas Khan, "Descent into Anarchy," *The Herald*, March 2004, 62.

⁴Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia*, First Edition edition. (New York: Viking, 2008), 270.

⁵Craig Cohen and Derek Chollet, "When \$10 Billion Is Not Enough: Rethinking U.S. Strategy Toward Pakistan," *Washington Quarterly* 30, no. 2 (Spring 2007): 7–19.

seventy militants were identified by the natives who were from the renowned tribe of Ahmadzai⁶.

In March 2004, in the military siege of West Wana, where the army was facing the real challenge of the militants, one Army officer and fifteen FC soldiers were killed. Further, irreparable losses related to finance and transportation occurred in the military conveyances in the area of the Ahmad Zai tribe. In the areas of Kari Kot, Shin Warsak and DzhaGundai, forces faced severe resistance. The tribal's tug of war with the militants compelled the military to spread their forces by a further 50 kms. First, the surgical operations required seven hundred soldiers, then the number exceeded to the maximum strength of seven thousand soldiers to encircle the insurgents. This operation included the air-strike support from the Pakistan Air Force in which they used choppers and other jets against the militants. In the end, the chief of the operation announced triumph over the militants in Wana⁷.

Launching the operation in Kalosha, Pakistani forces destroyed the hidden entrenchments and other depots of the militants in the locality. During the operations, numerous sorts of military paraphernalia were captured by the forces. Despite this, the major channel of communications of Al-Qaeda in Kalosha was also dismantled. After this military action, terrorists dispersed secretly from Kalosha. Yet, some of the local groups were still attacking the military in the areas such as Barmal, AngoorAdda, Laddha, Shawal etc. The military, therefore, established garrisons, which, later on, created an extreme level of rage among the people of Kalosha⁸. Apart from this, the influence of the foreign militants in Shakai Valley had increased. Not only the US but also Pakistan's intelligence reports were given to the Pakistan Army to initiate a full force strategy against the militants chiefly in opposition to Uzbeks, Chechens and other local inhabitants of the village where over 200 hundred foreigners were involved in insurgency-related activities. In 2004, forces formally expanded operation Al-Mizan in adjacent parts of South Waziristan. Militants' hideouts were targeted by air strikes in Madakhel and Dhog village, in which one of the most wanted members of Al-Qaeda

⁶David Witter, "Operation al Mizan Pdf - Google Search," accessed November 27, 2017, https://www.google.com/search?ei=gGQbWv3mFMSe_QbW3bD4DA&q=operation+al+mizan+pdf&oq=operation+almizan+&gs_l=psy-ab.1.3.35i39k1j0i13k1l2j0i22i30k1.2538.9041.0.13651.36.26.0.0.0.127.2110.13j10.24.0....0...1c.1.64.psy-ab..17.19.1933.6..0j46j0i67k1j0i20i264k1j0i20i263k1j0i131k1j0i3k1j0i46k1j0i10k1.161.m3R717Z9bIQ.

⁷M. Ilyas Khan, "Who Are These People," *The Herald*, April 2004, 60–68.

⁸SailabMahsud, "Caught in the Crossfire," *The Herald*, April 2004, 67–68.

Hamza Rabia was killed. He was the main operative member in the group, running the affairs of Al-Qaeda in the region⁹.

The operation came to an end in 2004 particularly in Kalosha. The government and the militants signed an agreement under the patronage of Syed Iftikhar Hussain Shah-Khyber Pakhtunkhwa information minister - and the other fifty members of the Jirga (Tribal Elders). The council also consisted of the members from the famous religious political party JUI (F). The fundamental objective of the agreement was to pacify the circumstance and to prevent the collateral harm on both sides in the area.

It is pertinent to mention here the role of clergy in the pacification process in traditional societies like Pakistan. The final negotiation between government and militants was held on 27th March 2004 in Waziristan. The negotiation process was attended by Mufti Naik Muhammad, Mufti Sharief Muhammad and thirty-three other competent religious personnel from Deoband Seminary group and tribal leaders from ZaliKhail tribe adjacent to Wana¹⁰. Since, traditionally, Jirga is held in public places, but for the sake of sanctity and to give due importance to the clergy, the agreement was signed in the religious seminary. The agreement required all the foreigners to formally register themselves with the government, non-interference of the Army in areas of borderland, the military would be confined to their barracks as militants would not attack on the forces in the area, and militants would refrain to attack government installations.¹¹

Arguably the agreement was entirely favouring the militants rather than the security forces, therefore, renowned journalist and expert of Pak-Afghan affairs Rahimullah Yousufzai presented his view in the following words:

*“This is very important in the tribal context because an army general [General Safdar Hussain] is going to Nek Mohammad Wazir’s place. Instead of the militants coming to the army, the army is going to their place, which means they recognize their strength and their influence. Then you go to a Madrassa, which was, in a way, one of the headquarters of the militants.”*¹²

The fallacy was stated that the army forces came after Naik Muhammad and he did not approach the forces to make an agreement. This presents the

⁹Rahimullah Yousafzai, “Whose Country Is It Anyway,” *The Herald*, February 2006, 27–32.

¹⁰“Aliens Asked to Surrender by 30th,” *Dawn* (Karachi, April 25, 2004).

¹¹“Aliens Asked to Surrender by 30th.”

¹²Rahimullah Yousafzai, “Interview with Naik Muhammad,” *Frontline*, October 3, 2006.

power of the militant in the area.¹³ After this agreement he was assassinated by US military through an air-strike in Waziristan. No doubt he portrayed himself as a powerful entity in the area but immediately after his death a trust deficit emerged and the agreement ended within the short period of six months.

Nevertheless, operation Al-Mizan could not achieve its settled objectives. Foreign militants joined hands with the local militants and started to increase their influence in the area by eliminating the traditional role of ‘Maliks’ and replaced them with a theocratic class. As, the operation was restricted to the battlefield the objectives could not be achieved. Furthermore, many religious political parties in Pakistan were entirely in support of the militants and glamorized them as great ‘Jihadests’ who are fighting against the infidel army in Afghanistan *vis-a-vis* in borderland area. Apart from this, the agreement also could not achieve the objective of reconciliation and peace in the region. This fact was acknowledged by the interior ministry while giving a briefing to General Pervez Musharraf on national security policy:

*“Talibanisation has not only unfolded potential threats to our security, but is also casting its dark shadows over Pak-Afghan borderland and now in the settled areas adjoining the tribal belt. The reality is that it is spreading.”*¹⁴

The hard fact cannot be overlooked that the increased influence of the militants in borderland had established the parallel government in a large part of the area. Militants were using the occupied areas as their unbeatable sanctuaries to ambush NATO and US forces in Afghanistan. Moreover, with the passage of time people were walking away from their tribal elders or ‘Maliks,’ inspired by the Taliban’s Ex-Chief Mullah Muhammad Omar. For miniaturizing the governmental authority, militants adopted very systematic approach. At initial stages they declared a ban on the use of multi-media equipment for example, TV, radio etc and later on they imposed the condition of beard in the regional residential areas and started killing the pro-government tribal leaders. However, despite of all these harsh attempts, militants were gaining support among the local population by introducing a judicial system, which was able to provide faster justice compared to the justice provided by the government.

¹³Iqbal Khattak, “I Did Not Surrender to the Military, Says Nek Mohammad,” *Friday Times* (Lahore, April 30, 2004).

¹⁴Iqbal Khattak, “I Did Not Surrender to the Military, Says Nek Mohammad.”

It would not be wrong to say that operation Al-Mezan was started with full sincerity. Number of Al-Qaeda members were arrested and killed but in the meantime the operation gave space for the local militant groups to build a stronghold in Pak-Afghan borderland. After 2007 the militants were in position to negotiate with the government on equal footing because at a local level they were controlling the political, social and economic system under their strict guidelines.

Operation Zalzala (Earthquake)

In September 2006, General (Ret) Jan Mohammad Orakzai, Governor of KPK, took some initiatives for negotiation with militants operating in borderland area. He entered into an agreement with Taliban in North Waziristan (Miranshah). The agreement consisted of the provision that tribal Malikis would not be targeted and kidnapped. Neither will they attack the Pakistani forces nor the Afghan forces so peace could be maintained.¹⁵ However, these talks met the same fate as those of previous agreements. The militants' activities were much more hostile in the region. Criminal activities like kidnapping, robberies, injuries and killings were continuing to enhance their area of influence. Khasadars, (Local Militia) were not in the position to counter the nefarious acts of militants. All these developments were indicative signs of their power in area, chiefly in North Waziristan.

It is an obvious phenomenon that instability in the region affects the adjacent areas too. The same thing occurred in South Waziristan where the peace talks were not successful and security forces started an operation with the code name "Zalzala" (Earthquake). The core purpose of the operation was to wipe out the militants from the local areas. South Waziristan was entirely occupied by the militants under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud. Before launching formal military operations, the government took initiatives for peace and it seemed to be successful when the Sararogha agreement was formally signed in 2005 with Bait Ullah-Mehsud. But this agreement came to end in August 2007 when tensions rose due to the trust deficit between the militants (Taliban) and Security forces in South Waziristan (Dawn, 2014).¹⁶

It is important to mention here the distinctive strategy adopted by security forces to counter Baith Ullah-Mehsud from his arch competitor Mulla Nazir. The government came into an agreement with Mullah Nazir to expel the foreign militants from the Waziristan agency and to regain the areas which were under the control of Baith Ullah forces. No doubt that the government

¹⁵ Muhammad Ilyas khan. "Descent into Anarchy." *The Herald*, Karachi, March 2006.

¹⁶ "Waziristan Operation Go Ahead." *Dawn* (Karachi, April 18, 2010).

was in cooperation with Mullah Nazir but media brought the military relations with Mullah Nazir into the limelight in front of the entire nation which, later on, fractured the military strategy in the area¹⁷. During the span of cooperation, Mullah Nazir forces extracted multiple benefits as a counter-balance force against TTP, seizing strategic hilltops and rooting out the foreigners.¹⁸ Apart from this, the whole year was full of chaos in term of militants' violence. The episode of Lal Mosque and assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto further worsened the law and order situation and the writ of the government was questioned. People were demanding forceful military operations to weed out the militants not only from the borderland but also from the settled areas. Media networks confirmed the reports of the intelligence apparatus that there were close nexuses between the Taliban and Lal Mosques' authorities. It was also confirmed that Baith Ullah-Mehsud was the mastermind behind Benazir Bhutto's assassination.¹⁹

In this operation, almost all the divisions of Pakistan's army participated. The ultra-modern technological electrical equipment was brought into use to prevent the occurrence of the Improvised Explosives Devices (IED)²⁰. Nonetheless, the discredited campaign against the military was at a peak. Militants were not only physically involved in the area to malign the Pakistan army but were powerfully using social media to attract the public and instil hatred in minds of the local populace against Pakistani forces²¹. Arguably, the forces were getting stronger and in a limited time cleared many areas which were previously in the control of militants, especially Spinkai, perceived to be the stronghold of TTP, was successfully taken back. But many local clerics issued the 'Fatwa' that Jihad against Pakistani soldiers is permissible because they come in the category of infidels who are fighting inside with the US in borderland area²².

There is no denial of the fact that the Zalazla operation was relatively more costly in terms of finances and damages than previous operations. People of South Waziristan faced acute troubles because of heavy shelling. Despite this, heavy displacement occurred during the operation. Two hundred

¹⁷Ismail Khan and Alamgir Bhattani, "442 Uzbeks among 58 Dead: Fierce Clashes in S. Waziristan," *Dawn* (Karachi, March 21, 2007).

¹⁸Rahimullah Yousafzai, "Eviction or Safe Passage," *Newsline* (Karachi, May 2007).

¹⁹Joby Warrick, "CIA Places Blame for Bhutto Assassination," *Washington Post* (Washington D.C., January 18, 2008).

²⁰Iqbal Khattak, "Army in Waziristan Better Equipped, More Relaxed," *Daily Times* (Lahore, May 21, 2008).

²¹Iqbal Khattak, "Pakistan: Mehsud Says Local Taliban to Begin Media War; Slams Reporter's Murder," *Daily Times* (Lahore, May 29, 2008).

²²Zaffarabbas, "Taliban Ousted, But Spinkai Is Now a Ghost Town," *Dawn* (Karachi, November 8, 2008).

thousand people migrated from South Waziristan to adjacent areas especially from Sarawakai, Splitol, Malai etc. Moreover, the distinctive feature of this operation was that it was closely observed by the high political, military and intelligence heads so as to make it more productive.²³

The dividends of the operation can be measured through the results, which were achieved by the security forces. Major militants' camps and other training spots were eliminated. Suicide bomb jackets were found and then disposed of by the security forces. The teenagers who were brainwashed were also exposed before the media.

Arguably, the operational activities were mostly successful in the sense of capturing the strategically important territorial parts in Waziristan but later on the forces decided to withdraw from the area, which provided space to the militants for revitalization. The suicide trainings in Spinkai Village were at its peak. One of the camps was run by Qari Hussain Mehsood who was renowned for recruiting suicide bombers.²⁴ On the other hand, tribal people expressed aggressive resentment for the national forces because of the execution of collective punishment policy on entire tribe. This approach caused irrevocable loss to the intelligence support for the military from the locals which later on adversely affected operational activities of the forces in the area²⁵.

Operation Sher-Dil (Lion's Heart)

This operation was initiated particularly in Bajur in August 7, 2008 against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda outfits. The concerned authorities were deeply worried about the permeating insurgency in the area. The then federal government with the consultation of provincial government and law enforcement agencies decided to launch the military operation against insurgents with clear objectives to defeat them. The FC commanded Major General Tariq Khan and 26th Infantry Brigade took part in the operation. It was decided that the spread of insurgency would be encountered with iron hand and writ of the government would be established. The militants' networks would be dismantled and immediate retaliatory response.

In the meantime, the militants' activities had multiplied the attacks on the apparatus of law enforcement agencies. In March 2007, a high profiled ISI

²³Zulfiqar Ali, "Over 4,000 Houses Destroyed in Waziristan Operation," *Dawn* (Karachi, November 8, 2008).

²⁴Amir Mir, "Story Behind Manawan Fidayee Attack," *The News* (Karachi, April 1, 2009).

²⁵Stephen Graham, "Ghost Village Haunts Pakistani Plans to Make Peace with Tribal Militants," *Associated Press* (New York, May 19, 2008).

official along with some tribal figures lost their lives in an unknown raid by the militants in Bajaur agency. The attack infuriated the officials and they struck back with full force and inflicted heavy loss to militants²⁶.

The tug of war between the militants and law enforcement agencies became bloodier with each passing day. A series of suicide attacks were carried out by the militants on military, intelligence, and police personnel. Many suicide attempts were made on Army Headquarters in Rawalpindi. In September 2007, suicide bombers hit a forty seat bus carrying ISI personnel in Rawalpindi. In this attack seventeen officials died and many were badly injured. The second bloodiest suicide attack was carried out in the Royal Artillery bazaar. The bazaar was used by the military as routes to reach the headquarters. In this attack, eight officials were killed.

In operation Sher-Dil, heavy artillery was used with the active support of tanks and jets. Because of heavy shelling the militants were backed secretly and crossed the Afghan border from Bajaur. The forces found enormous underground channels, which connected lots of houses secretly. Many houses were bulldozed by the military, which were used by the militants. As one of the Pakistan army member stated;

*“They have good weaponry and a better communication system than ours. . . . Their tactics are mind-boggling and they have defenses that would take us days to build. It does not look as though we are fighting a rag-tag militia; they are fighting like an organized force.”*²⁷

Overall the operation was successful in the context of confiscating the explosives, ammunitions, propaganda literature for brainwashing, radio frequencies, equipment etc. The stronghold of communication networks was soiled by the Army in Bajaur. This phenomenon ended in December 2008. An estimated one thousand militants and sixty three soldiers were martyred in the operation Sher-Dil²⁸.

There is no denial of the fact that larger parts of the agencies were cleared by the forces, but for maintaining peace it was important to form local militia. The fundamental motive behind forming these kinds of militia was to protect strategically important arteries of the area and to guard the tribal community from militants' attacks. Salar Zai tribe was the first, which formed the

²⁶Anwar Ullah Khan, “ISI Official, Three Others Killed in Bajaur Ambush,” *Dawn* (Karachi, March 28, 2007).

²⁷Ismail Khan, “Battle to Be Won or Lost in Bajaur,” *Dawn* (Karachi, September 21, 2008).

²⁸Anthony Lloyd, “Captured Battle Plan Shows Strength and Training of Taliban Forces,” *The Times* (London, November 11, 2008).

Laskaar against the militants like Dara Adam Khail tribe and Orakzai tribe. However, on 6th November, a bloody attack carried out on the Jirga caused the killing of twenty members. This was the first invincible revengeful act from the militants inside Bajaur to give them a message for their allegiance to the law enforcement agencies. But the military continued to support militia and dropped leaflets in the parts of Mohmmmand to counter the militants through Lashkars. The operation came to an end on 28th February 2009.

Operation Rah-E-Haq (Path Of Truth)

In late 2007, Therik-i-Nifaz-e Shariati-Muhammadi (TNSF) started to wreak havoc in the valley of Swat to control the district and impose its own version of sharia'h. TNSM's leader Mulana Sufi Muhammad started his activities with the collaboration of Taliban factions in the area and demanded strict and forceful implementation of laws based on self-explanatory Islamic principles. There was a complete ban on education for women, and closure of barber shops and music shops was the foremost agenda of the organization. Moreover, TNSM threatened people of the valley not to vaccinate children otherwise they will severely be penalized.²⁹ The government apparatus observed that religious propagation and increase in political stature of the organization was to become a hard-hitting threat for the national government and the legal authority of the state was at the lowest ebb in the area. Therefore, the decision for moving forward with the military operation was taken in Swat with the code name of Operation Rah-e-Haq. The aim of the operation was to contain the increasing nefarious activities of TNSM and to clear the area from Taliban forces which were going to control strategically important hilltops in the valley³⁰.

Basically, the Swat military operation consisted of three phases. In the first phase operation Rah-e-Haq was initiated in late November 2007. Initially, intensity of the operation was kept near to the ground and forces with the assistance of local population conducted numerous search operations and cordon of the areas to curb the militants. However, contrary to this, the role of TNSM was rapidly growing in the Swat valley. In July 2008, approximately thirty police personnel and the members of paramilitary forces were expelled from various check points in Mengorah and other areas of Swat by TNSM. The militants completely occupied the flood plain side of the Swat River, which is connected with Hindu Kush Mountains, while

²⁹SumirPuri, "Pakistan's War on Terrorism: Strategies for Combating Jihadist Armed Groups Since 9/11," *Routledge* (2012).

³⁰Sumir Puri, "Pakistan's War on Terrorism: Strategies for Combating Jihadist Armed Groups Since 9/11."

Pakistan's law enforcement agencies controlled roadside and forest hills. Thus, in a nutshell, Taliban insurgents were controlling the larger part of Swat valley and running the administration with their own local governors in ThesilKabal, Matta and Khawazakhela.³¹

On November 12 2007, 5,000 soldiers of twelfth Regular Army were sent to Swat for the assistance of paramilitary and police which were already fighting the insurgents in the valley. There is no denial of the fact that the Pakistan Army launched a number of operations to counter the militants' expansionism and their spread of reprehensible designs in the valley which was in their tight control. Nevertheless, on November 15, militants started a progression from Swat with the goal to occupy district Shangla. That day Alpuri -- the headquarter of Shangla - fell into the hands of militant forces. As the militants were equipped with lethal arms and ammunition and moving towards the town, the police force ran away from their check posts without fighting. Therefore, the military immediately turned the concentration of their operations from Swat to Shangla to regain the area from the insurgents and to impede their further expansion. By November 17, nearly 100 insurgents were killed in the battles with the forces. On November 25, senior Taliban leaders took the decision to leave Alpuri because of the presence of huge number of Pakistani infantry forces. The Taliban left Alpuri and took up positions on the peaks around the town. On November 26, the Pakistan Army succeeded not only to kill the top two commanders in the valley of Swat because of heavy artillery shelling but recovered numerous vital peaks from the Taliban and drove them back from district of Swat. On November 27, the Pakistan army secured Shangla.³²

The third phase of Rah-e-Haq was initiated to regain the control of the areas which were still in the control of Taliban forces. Matta, Khwazakhela, Charbagh and other sensitive areas were still under the command of Taliban and Pakistan forces were not able to enter into these areas. The Pakistani forces were largely concentrated to keep strong control over Imam Dheri, Kuza Banda, Bara Banda and Nigwalai. In the fierce battle militants retreated from the area and took shelter in nearby areas. The forces seized the hilltops and soon took over Kabal district from them. The Taliban were not in the position to further resist Pakistani forces therefore they vacated Swat and left all the police stations and government buildings which they had seized before. The forces completely dismantled the communications

³¹Rohan Gunaratna and Khuram Iqbal, *Pakistan: Terrorism Ground Zero* (London: Reaktion Books, 2011).

³²Gunaratna and Iqbal, *Pakistan*.

networks of the militants and destroyed the Radio Stations including the one run by Mulana Fazlullah.³³

The successes of the forces were not limited by this. On November 28, the headquarters of Mulana Fazlullah Imam Dheri and Alpuri was cleared of militants. Later on, militants were completely expelled even from the parts of Matta, Khwazakhela and Madyan. Charbagh 27 km away from Mingora was considered the stronghold of the militants was also cleared by the forces. However, the forces followed the militants with a bomb disposal squad to sweep the areas of mines and booby traps. On December 5, Swat, Matta and Khwazakhela were entirely in the hands of Pakistani forces but fighting still continued with militants in various parts of the valley.³⁴

Operation Rah-E-Rast (Path of Righteousness)

First Swat operation was coming to an end with the agreement between the government and Taliban forces to establish the Qazi courts and Shariat appellate bench of Supreme Court in Malakand Division. Reciprocally the Fazlullah group agreed to observe a ceasefire. But later on, Asif Ali Zardari the then president of Pakistan changed the agreement to allow the right of appeal to the Supreme Court of Pakistan. This step was strictly rejected by TNSM and once again they took up arms against the government. Moreover, NATO and Amnesty International sternly criticized the agreement with the plea that the agreement will provide space for regrouping the Taliban factions and human rights abuses will be increased in the region. Upcoming events proved true the concerns of the authorities.³⁵

Thus, fierce fighting started between the Taliban and law enforcement agencies over the control of Swat in May 2009. Therefore, this time around the government decided for the complete elimination of terrorist outfits with establishing peace in the region. The Pakistan army launched a full-fledged military operation in May 2009 with the code name of Operation Rah-e-Rast. In this operation the Pakistan Army and Pakistan Air force jointly strike the militant outfits. Further, according to UNHCR report approximately 2,00,000 people were flown from the region and supported Pakistan Army operation³⁶.

Mangora, which was considered to be the hub of militants, was targeted by Pakistani special commandos. Militants, which were three hundred in

³³(<https://web.archives.org>, 2017).

³⁴Gunaratna and Iqbal, *Pakistan*, 87.

³⁵Gulam Farroq, *Daily Times* (Lahore, 2009).

³⁶Gulam Farroq.

numbers, took positions in the deserted buildings which were captured. By May 23, 2009, large parts of the city were regained as well as control over the important intersections and squares by Pakistan Army. The then ISPR Major-General Athar Abbas on May 30th, announced the victory of the forces over the militants in Mangora but at the same time he stated that the military is committed to follow and eliminate the Taliban leadership from the area. Militants were attacking the forces from the outskirts of Mangora city yet the army compelled them to vacate these small pockets. It was estimated that in Mangora fighting 1,200 insurgents were killed and 90 soldiers were martyred.³⁷

After clearing Mangora, the forces expanded the operation and moved towards Malam Jabba and Qambar Bazar where the militants of TNSM were positioned. The military not only retaken these areas but also hit the militants in areas of Peochar and in the town of Bahrain in the north of Swat. However, on Jun 4, 2009, it was reported that TNSM leader Mula Sufi Muhammad has been arrested. But the report was wrong when it revealed that the forces actually arrested the close companions -- Mulana Alam and Ameer Izzat -- of Sufi Muhammad and he is hiding somewhere in outskirts of Swat.

On June 12, fierce fighting took place in the villages of Shatkas and Ghazi Gai after a bomb explosion at mosque in which 38 civilians were killed and nearly a hundred were badly wounded. Militants were surrounded by the Army and paramilitary forces, and the Pakistan Air Force also aided the ground force. Resultantly, militants bore severe losses and their networks were completely smashed. By July 15, the forces had captured the Chuprial and Kabal which were the last strong hubs of militants. After clearing these areas, Internally Displaced People (IDPs) were permitted to turn back to their homes.³⁸

Comparatively, this operation was more successful than the previous operation in Swat (Rah-i-Haq) as the gains were more solid. Muslim Khan and other key members of TNSM were captured and Taliban Leader Mula Fazlullah was hit by air strikes in which he was badly injured but not killed and escaped to Afghanistan. Hayat Ullah Hamayun the key member of Taliban Swat chapter was arrested from Orangi town Karachi. On August 22, it was announced that all the refugees can come back to villages in valley of Swat and other adjacent districts (<https://www.geo.tv/>, 2017).

³⁷“Militants’ Surrender,” *Pakistan News* (Lahore, August 22, 2009).

³⁸(<https://www.geo.tv/>, 2017).

Operation Rah-E-Nijaat (Path to Salvation)

Operation Zalzala in Waziristan could not provide the fruitful results it expected. Baitullah Mehsod the founder of TTP was expanding its influence in Waziristan. From 2005 to 2009 TTP was targeting every nook and corner of the country. The total numbers of attack recorded were 2148. The nature of these attacks was pertinent to religious, sectarian and political.³⁹ In the mid of 2009, the government and security vanguards decided for rock-hard military offensive against the local and foreign insurgents in South Waziristan.

The significant objective of operation Rah-e-Nijaat was to dismantle the TTP network in South Waziristan and to capture foreign conglomerates which are freely operating in the area. TTP became more influential when it gained the support of Alizai tribe (the clan of Baitullah Mehsod's tribe). However, Shaman khel and Bahlolai tribes were in opposition to TTP. COAS General Ashfaq Kiyani categorically stated that the military actions are all anti-foreigners and local terrorist outfits and not against veteran Mehsod tribe of Waziristan.⁴⁰ In 2009, the Pakistan Army with the support of Air Force initiated both surgical and non-surgical strikes in the area. The US also supported this operation and provided intelligence reports. On August 5, 2009 Baitullah Mehsud was targeted and killed in a drone attack in South Waziristan. After his death Hakeem Ullah Mehsod was enthroned to lead the TTP, but his days were numbered too. He was also killed in the same way as his predecessor on January 2010. Yet, the killings of the leaders could not stop TTP violence and it was gradually increasing. Five officials from the World Health Organization (WHO) were killed when a suicide bomber entered an office located in the capital city of Islamabad on October 5, 2010. In the next week that October, a suicide blast killed more than fifty civilians. The situation worsened when militants attacked dramatically the Military General Headquarters (GHQ). The incident completely shook the top brass of security apparatus and they sternly commenced ground operations on October 17, 2009, in Waziristan.

The major objective of the ground offensive was to capture the strongholds of TTP in Ladha, Sararogaha, and Makin. By striking these areas security high ups were aware of the backlash from militants. The command and control structure of TTP was much stronger in Sararogha compared to the other parts of agencies⁴¹. Therefore, the first step was taken by the forces to

³⁹*Pakistan Security Report 2008* (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, 2009).

⁴⁰Ifthikhar A. Khan, "Kayani Writes to Mehsuds, Seeks Tribe's Support," *Dawn* (Karachi, October 20, 2009).

⁴¹"Street Battles Rage in Uzbek Militants' Stronghold," *Dawn* (Karachi, November 2, 2009).

clear the roads and other major routes which connect Sararogha and other villages for instance Ahmadwam, Ragha etc.⁴²

Although, the military faced a backlash from the militants, an active preparedness saved them from heavy damage. However, an intense response by the security forces caused profound casualties in Alizai Mehsood tribe Kaniguram.⁴³ Apart from this, Army warned the Nazir Tribe and Mulla Gul Bahadar to stop their assistance and rescind their agreements with TTP. In a grand strategy, the army also encouraged the local Lashkars to hunt down the militants so as weed them out from the area. With the active support of the Lashkars, military empowered to control the most important areas which were before under the control of the militants such as Makin, Sararogha and Ladha.⁴⁴ Ultimately, TTP commanders decided to move to the adjacent areas of South Waziristan like Khyber and Orakzai from where they are able to retaliate the forces. By the end of 2010 many important members of TTP had crossed Afghanistan border and took shelter in Paktika.⁴⁵

As for the success of Rah-I-Nijat, the forces controlled the militants major line of communications, dismantled to the network at gross level and regained most of the villages for instance, Ladha, Makin, Sararogha from them in South Waziristan in a very short span of time. Besides, vast depots of lethal weapons were seized by the military by the end of 2010.⁴⁶ However, the strength of TTP remained intact as the militants escaped to the bordering areas of Afghanistan for refuge.

Contrary to this, the militants' strikes were in full swing which created general disappointment among the masses about the viability of the operation especially in the South Waziristan. Militants attacked a Rawalpindi mosque in which retired and in-service military personnel were praying were killed and injured. This act of violence infuriated the high ups. Furthermore, common populace of the Waziristan was also not happy because of any substantial political, economic and social change occurred in their lives by the end of 2009. IDPs who were settled in the adjacent districts

⁴²ISPR, "Five More Militants Killed in South Waziristan," *Dawn* (Karachi, December 10, 2009).

⁴³Zahid Hussain, "Laddah, Sararogha Cleared; Street Fighting in Making," *Dawn* (Karachi, November 18, 2009).

⁴⁴ISPR, "Fifteen Militants Killed in Waziristan Operation," *Dawn* (Peshawar, December 28, 2009).

⁴⁵"Pakistan Taliban to Increase Suicide Attacks," *Xinhua General News Service*, November 14, 2009.

⁴⁶"Four Militants Killed in Waziristan Operation," *Dawn* (Karachi, January 2, 2010).

such as Dera Ismail Khan and Tank for their protection were not satisfied from the operational activities and facilities provided by the government ⁴⁷.

Comparative analysis of 2008 and 2009 show the vast differences which were severely gloomy for the national stability and peace. The total numbers of militants' attacks in 2009 were augmented to 3816 in which 12632 people were killed and 12815 were badly wounded. A 32% increase in the ratio of the militants' attack across Pakistan was recorded. Similarly, there was a 37% increase in mortalities and a 25% increase in total number of injuries across the country right from 2008 afterwards. A 25% increase was also recorded in suicide bombings. In 2009, Pakistan's causality ratio of the civilians exceeded than Afghanistan's civilians.⁴⁸

Operation Zarb-E-Azab (Sharp & Cutting Strike)

On December 16, 2014 a horrific incident took place in Peshawar (Capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). A school run by Army (APS) was attacked by the militants and responsibility was claimed by the TTP. The whole nation was shaken as militants killed the innocent students inhumanely. Political and military leadership sat together in joint All Parties Conference and vowed to take stern action against the militant groups which have established their strong sanctuaries in one of the biggest ex-agency 'North Waziristan'. Full-fledged military offensive was started with the name of 'Zarb-e-Azab on June 15, 2015. In this operation 30,000 soldiers took part and the prime target was to regain the area from the militants which they have control not only in North Waziristan but the adjacent part. The second objective was to continue the operation until the last militant was killed in the area because the militants were using the North Waziristan as a base. They targeted the cities and other governmental and military installations and took refuge in borderland near to North Waziristan ⁴⁹. However, this time the long-term objectives were also settled so that long lasting results can be secured. It was decided that for countering the militants' Jihadi counter-narrative would be developed among the local populace through the local clergy and renowned religious scholars. Moreover, the Pak-Afghan border would also be managed because the militants were using the terrain for their operational activities. At the end, a strong nexus would be developed between the government authorities and local elders of North Waziristan so as to manage its affairs viably and no space would be provided in the future for the militants in the area.⁵⁰

⁴⁷“Four Militants Killed in Waziristan Operation.”

⁴⁸“Waziristan Operation Go Ahead,” *Dawn* (Karachi, April 18, 2010).

⁴⁹“Geo News,” *Aapas Ki Baat*, July 2014.

⁵⁰ “Geo News,” June 2014.

As it was a fully-fledged military operation in which collateral damage was inevitable. Security forces declared that the local populace must vacate the area so that innocent civilians' lives can be protected. Almost 80,302 families became IDPs and were registered with government authorities. The majority of the refugees' camps were settled in Bannu, Lakki Marwat, Karak, Dera Ismail Khan and Kohat in KP province. The Army was completely on board and pledged that after normalcy in North Waziristan they will rehabilitate the veteran peoples of Waziristan⁵¹.

In this operation, ground forces with the help of air forces targeted the hideouts in North Waziristan and completely destroyed the militants' networks in the area. Apart from this, drone strikes were also used with the active collaboration of the US in Dattakhel and Shawal, which was not possible for the ground army to overcome militants' strongholds here. Nevertheless, as long as the operational success is concerned, the operation Zarb-e-Azab broadly achieved the four objectives. First, TTP and other affiliated foreign conglomerates were struck blatantly and the entire infrastructure and lines of communications were grounded. Second, militants' hideouts and training camps were completely destroyed and sophisticated lethal weaponry were confiscated by the security forces. Third, the areas which were under the control of TTP were retaken and the army hoisted Pakistan's flag. And lastly, Pakistan-US partnership, which had been going into the lowest ebb due to divergence of interests, was recovered because of collaboration in the operation. The Pakistan army captured the hardest peak due to the US drone strikes which were before under the control of the militants.⁵²

Comparatively, the operation Zarb-e-Azab was more results oriented than the other previous operations. It would not be wrong to say that the operation was a game changer in the line of Pakistan's efforts in the war against militants and insurgents. After the operation, militants' strikes immediately declined to the great extent. Although concrete official figures are not available, a 30% decline was recorded in this year compared to 2013.⁵³

⁵¹“Geo News Bulletin,” November 25, 2016.

⁵² (<http://tribune.com.pk/story>), 2017

⁵³ Asad Rahim khan, “Zarb-e-Azab, One Year,” *The Express Tribune*, June 12, 2015.

Conclusion

Since 2001, the performance of the Army regarding the operations is varied. Many areas were cleared which were under the control of militants, but the Army could not sustain its success. Security experts point out the flaws in military operations, such as lack of proper training for counter-insurgency and dearth of sophisticated equipment.⁵⁴ Since Pakistani forces were not involved in counter-insurgency operations before 2001, security forces had limited operational experience against the militants. In operation Al-Mizan, the weaknesses of the military were revealed in terms of clearing and holding of territories. Nevertheless, improvement was seen later on especially in the operations of Sher Dil, Rah-e-Rast and Rah-e-Nijat. For improving the operational capabilities of the Pakistani forces, the US provided large amounts of financial aid and intelligence sharing.

However, the security vanguards approach was not population centric. Conventional orientation and hardware demands were Indo-centric and lack of awareness of the domestic threat from non-state-actors gave the military a tough time. Moreover, for controlling the domestic violence there is a need for strong military institutions, which were ignored by the successive civilian and military regimes. Even after 2001, in military aid only a tiny part was allocated to police department. Counter-insurgency literature has substantiated the fact that only the institution of the police can ensure the tranquillity in the locality.⁵⁵ Moreover, civil bureaucracy has also failed in the provision of relief to the people of war-torn areas, assistance to IDPs and getting support from the locals during military operations. Owing to this situation, the military was impelled to incline towards a scorched earth policy especially in South Waziristan, Bajur and Swat. The forceful tactical approach created even more resentment in the heart of the people of FATA against the forces and the state.

Apart from this, Islamabad's policy of 'strategic depth' was one of the fundamental factors, which became a source of strength for militants. The Pak-Afghan borderland area was a place where 'proxies' safe sanctuaries were maintained with the objectives to use them in Afghanistan, Kashmir and India. Pakistan's stance was cleared towards some of the militants' organizations which were enjoying the active support of the ISI and military establishment. This strategy undermined the capability of the forces and gave space to militants to strengthen their position on ground. However,

⁵⁴Shuja Nawaz, "FATA--A Most Dangerous Place," last modified January 7, 2009, accessed November 27, 2017, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/fata-most-dangerous-place>.

⁵⁵Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, "How Terrorist Groups End," Product Page, last modified 2008, accessed November 27, 2017, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG741-1.html>.

some of the militants' leaders were killed and captured by the forces which were the part of problem through intelligence sharing and drone strike by the US.⁵⁶

America's policy after 9/11 consisted of 'carrot and stick'. Immediately after the entrance of Pakistan into US-led war on terror, the US lift sanctions, and flow of military and non-military aid was started. However, with the passage of time conflicts of interest emerged on the surface. No doubt, hunting down the Al-Qaeda members and TTP's miscreants Pakistan and the US both were on the same page, but there was a divergent approach towards the Haqqani network and Mullah Omer's Taliban. Pakistan did not consider them a direct threat while by contrast the US and NATO forces were being attacked by these groups in Afghanistan which later on developed a divergent approach by the US and Pakistan.

Last but not least, for any military operational success the support of the people is necessary. From 2001 to 2009 the people's approach to the operations were varied. The majority of the people were not in favour of military operations but after the breaking of the peace deal in Swat and the capturing of Buner by the militants in the middle of 2009, people were actively mobilized and demanded a military operation. Apart from this, another failure lies on the shoulders of civil bureaucracy, which could not rehabilitate the people in conflict areas. IDPs were spread across the country especially in the urban areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This created resentment in the hearts of the people against the government and law enforcement agencies. The fact is that a fruitful result cannot be attained only by initiating military operations, nor until coordinated planning is implemented after the operations.

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⁵⁶ Aysha Saddiqa, "In the Line of Fire," *Herald*, December 2006.

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PAKISTAN WATER CRISIS AND BEHAVIORAL APPROACH OF DENIZENS TOWARDS ITS CONSERVATION ON THE BANK OF RIVER KABUL

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Abstract

Approximately two third of the Earth's surface is covered with the life-sustaining liquid, water. Studies depict that by the middle of the century, more than half of the humanity will reside in water-stressed areas, which also include Pakistan. Pakistan is among the list of those countries, which are confronting chronic water issue. Pakistan is water stressed country and the situation is going to be more critical in future. The degradation and over exploitation of water resources by human is not a new phenomenon. Water as common pool resource is commonly available for people either free or they pay small amount of money which do not attract the attention of the users to use carefully. The behavior of people is the key problem in over exploitation of resources of water. People either use the water resources carelessly, which do not attract their attention to conserve water for the reason of facing water problems in future. The study shows that Behavioral change is an effective way of tackling the water shortage and ensuring the efficient management of water resources. Behaviors of people for conservation of water were highly depend upon education level, age, past history of respondents water shortage problem, awareness, attitude of family, friends and surrounding of respondents.

Key words: Water Crisis, Water Conservation, Water Leakage, Consumer Behavior. Water Wastage.

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Introduction

The relentless problem of resource depletion is however of environmental concern. The issue of environmental degradation is a consequence of the population explosion multiplied with ever increasing consumption per person. Our world can be considered to be biophysically finite therefore a rise in global population in the long run can engender climatic changes, land erosion, quantitative increase in greenhouse gases, water depletion, exhaustion of fossil fuels etc. According to a study the humanities ecological footprint (the measure of consumption) is one and a half times the earth's capacity to sustainably supply the resources to meet the demands of individuals. This shortcoming between the restrained supply and uncurbed demands is met through the destruction of natural capital (the category includes water resources, atmosphere, fossil fuels, forests, wetlands, biodiversity etc.). From a psychological point of view, every person considers his own actions to be of extremely insignificant importance hence has no incentive to cut on his consumption by considerable units. However, restraining oneself could somehow lead to marginal improvement in the existing condition of a resource. Cutting short the preservation of a resource is truly a matter of one's own wills that is not backed with any reward. Although the ones who would often express strong condemnation over the unrestricted use of resources would reach a conclusion that raising voices for promoting the concept of conservation of resources is of no use. Consequently, all these struggles lead nowhere. The predicted aftermath of all these courses of action therefore will be a collective disaster.¹

Water is the basic necessity of life, so water quantity and quality both are essential for life. Especially, the clean drinking water is necessary for the preservation of life in general and human life in particular. But mismanaged water resource in the recent past has triggered the phenomena of natural catastrophes, such as climatic change, heat waves, droughts, devastating floods, shrinking rivers and rising oceans. Serious environmental damage, the industrial development, unnatural and uncontrollable urban growth and the devastation of forests are some of the factors that are causing the polar ice to melt abnormally. The third world countries cannot afford to sit back in chairs and study the phenomena for we are also faced with the problem of melting glaciers; that cause the torrential rains and floods killing thousands of people and rendering millions homeless. Moreover, in country like Pakistan due to lack of planning no new dams have been built in the recent past, partly due to lack of priorities and partly due to vested political agendas. In the developing country like Pakistan, due to lack of planning and control of the government agencies, the population (that has been tagged to

¹ Kysar, Douglas A. "Some Realism About Environmental Skepticism: The Implications of Bjorn Lomborg's *The Skeptical Environmentalist* for Environmental Law and Policy." *Ecology LQ* 30 (2003): 223.

be extremely ignorant) are polluting the existing lakes, canals, ponds and rivers by throwing the sewage line therein. This has not only brought the deterioration in the general health of the public but has negatively affected the aquatic life as well. The trout that is known as an icon fish of the clean icy waters has almost become extinct. The above mentioned phenomena in reference to Pakistan has constrained the successive governments to divert their resources on non-developmental expenditures, whereby billions of rupees and funds are diverted to the construction of destroyed infrastructure in the flood affected areas and rehabilitation of internally displaced people (IDP'S). Moreover in this matter major chunk of national GDP is spent on health sector. Thus draining the resources unnecessarily. However, the problem to be addressed is not only that of contamination but it is that of straining water resources as a consequence of overpopulation.

According to the general facts being highlighted, water typically serves to be a public good as it is being provided, often, free of cost and on the basis of equality. However because of these two major principles, it is being treated in a mismanaged and disorganized form. Because of an extreme careless attitude it is prone to the threat of getting finished. This dilemma is not a problem seen in the rural areas only but the educated lot and well off communities residing in the urban cities of Pakistan is habitual of practicing the same activity time and again. Education and awareness, both have gone in vain, while exhibiting an attitude truly of rational kind. Analyzing only one of the sources, the tap water, where liters and liters are being subjected to wastage on daily basis in a single household unit. Drinking and pure water obtained from the wells can be seen splashed on the floors for no apparent reason. Because of urbanization and population explosion, the sewage pipes have somehow mixed and had become interconnected with the fresh water supply because of which tons and tons become contaminated with the viral and bacterial particles. This water again gets wasted or if consumed leads to chronic ailments. However the same doesn't happen with the crystal looking, mineral containing and a seal packaged water acquired from the grocery stores. Only because the consumer pays for it, every drop that the bottle contains is consumed with great care. It is being assured that not even a milliliter of it goes to waste. It is not only handled properly but the remaining is saved for days even. This striking difference arises not because of the fact that mineral water is often consumed by the higher income groups or the educational lot but because that the customer is charged for every drop he consumes of it. Therefore it can be concluded that it's not the education or the awareness programs that lead to such drastic differences in attitudes, but it is the cost benefit analysis that serves to be the root cause of such behavioral changes.

This prestigious asset has been wasted profusely by all sectors on routine basis without any qualm. Water is wasted on daily basis which produces bad impact on future. Due to urbanization and socio economic development water supply reduces which has severely threatened the living conditions. According to UN Environmental Program, the current shortage affects 400 million people and this situation will worsen as the ratio will rise to 4 billion till 2050. Water is wasted in various ways like agriculture, industries, houses, public and private institutions (Public Places). Mostly, it is observed that people use water in thoughtless manner, as it seems abundant like an air. The true value of water cannot be realized until water shortage affects us directly. Whether it's the inefficient flooding of farm fields, industries and houses, people waste water in many ways. Agricultural wastage is in the form of extra irrigation of cultivated area, while industries extra usage of water during manufacturing process from initial stage up to final production. Houses are the places in which household utilizes water directly for needs, which leads to wastage of water such as doing the dishes, toilets, washing clothes, car wash, tap leakages, sewage line leakage, pipe line leakage, watering gardens, using sprinklers, fountains, bathing, shaving, using hot water, swimming pools, preparation of food and running water etc. One of the major sources of water wastage in the form of over washing and cleaning as well as in the form of leakages of taps and pipelines.

Methodology:

To study the behavioral approach of people towards water leakage and water wastage control, model was designed. The model given below was used for explaining behavior of people towards water leakage and wastage.

Model Specification

$$B_{PWLC} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 AF + \beta_2 FS + \beta_3 PH + \beta_4 Age + \beta_5 Aw + u_i$$

B_{PWLC} = Behavior of people towards water leakage control (Conservation of water)

AF = Attitude of family members towards water wastage/ leakage

FS = Attitude of friends and surrounding people towards water wastage/ leakage

PH = Past history of water shortage issue

Age = Age of the respondents

Aw = Awareness of respondents about water scarcity

Questionnaires Design and Construction of Variable

The data was collected through detailed questionnaire; our main target was to cover household in the study area. The current study was conducted to observe water leakage and wastage control. The universe of the study was those area present on bank of river Kabul in Pakistan in Khyber

Pakhtunkhwa. For this purpose 400 questionnaires were distributed among households in different part of the study area. A detailed questionnaire was design to conduct survey in study area. It consists of two different sections, section A was about the personal information of the respondents, section B of questionnaire was about the behavior of people towards water wastage and leakage control. Section "A" of the questionnaire consists of general information related to respondents of household, which include gender, age, level of education, monthly income of household, family size of household, economic and employment status of household were part of this section. Section "B" of the questionnaire is about the behavior of people towards water wastage and leakage control strategies. In this section respondents were asked about the importance of water for life, noticing of water leakage and water wastage at the time of consumption. Attitude of family members, and friends towards observation of water wastage and leakage. History of respondents water shortage, age of respondents, and awareness about water scarcity was the key information required for the survey purposes in the questionnaire.

Behavior of people towards water leakage is dependent variable in model. Behavior of people was measure through different variables which include personal observation of water leakage, during water consumption in case of washing, cleaning, and drinking. The respondents were asked to answer this information with Yes = 1 or No = 2. If they observe water leakage and wastage then what is their response towards that leakage and wastage control. When they respond to control leakage that was Yes = 1 and if No = 2. Further, it was also measured what is the response of family members of house towards water wastage and leakage control, have you ever discussed the current shortage and future scarcity problem of water. The respondents were given different options which were categorized with 1,2,3, and 4. The other variable was also related to the surrounding of respondent that was about attitude of friends towards water wastage control. The respondents were give different option i.e. 1,2,3 and 4. Similarly, behavioral aspect was also calculated from the past history of the respondents in case of water shortage. The question was asked about past history of water shortage in any case during washing, cleaning, and drinking, this question was to answer with Yes = 1 or No = 2. Age of respondents was also considered as an important variable for the measurement of behavior. Behavioral changes with aging of the respondents; this question was open without having any options. Proper knowledge regarding water scarcity, and awareness of people about water scarcity in the study area was treated as an independent variable.

Results Behavior of People Towards Water Conservation

This study was conducted in order to appraise the individual consumption pattern of water and its relation with conservation of water. Whether they cooperate to reduce water consumption or every individual wants to maximize their own utility by more consumption of water. For this researcher conducted survey in different parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through which river Kabul passes. Consumption of water in household is for washing, cleaning, bathing etc, thus households were considered in the survey in which different individuals were interviewed through a detailed questionnaire. Detailed demographic information of the respondents was integral part of survey to appraise the behavior of individuals, which was covered in section “A” of the questionnaire.

Table. 01 Household Behavior towards Water Wastage and Leakages

Perception of Respondents about Water	Agree (%)	Neutral (%)	Disagree (%)
Importance of water for life	89	11	zero
Do you think water as scarce resource	67.75	14.25	18
Wastage of water as problem of Pakistan	49	30.75	22.75
Water shortage problem face in past	36.25	43.25	20.52
Observe Water Wastage	25.75	20.25	54
Observe Water Leakage	49.25	33	17.75
Complaint for Repair of water Leakage	19	23.25	57.75
Responsibility Shifts after Complaint	72.25	16.25	11.51
Personal efforts to Repair Water Leakages	15.75	32.75	51.5

Source: Author Field Survey Results 2016

The main objective of the study was to assess the perception of respondents about water importance and its wastage. Therefore, it was necessary to know the perception of respondents about importance of water for human life. About 89 percent of the respondents were of the view that water is important component for their lives. This result shows that people in the study area are highly aware of water importance in daily life. Water as a common pool resource is essential part of universe, but due to over usage and exploitation of these resources there is continuous decline in the quality as well as quantity of resources. The respondents were asked about scarcity of water resources. 68 percent of the respondents of the respondents were agreed to the statement asked from them that water is a scarce resource in the study area. As matter of fact, the respondents were further asked about their view about water wastage as a problem of Pakistan. 49 percent of respondents considered water wastage as a main problem in Pakistan, which clearly

shows importance of study in an area. Water sources are continuously decreasing. Although, water crisis is present in this part of the world and respondents were asked about water shortage problem faced by them in their daily routine life. 36 percent of respondents who agreed that they faced water shortage problem in their daily routine. This result shows that rare number of people in the study area knows the real importance of water in case of future shortage. The attitude of individuals towards water can easily be judged from their perceptions. Therefore, it was necessary to reconsider this approach by asking about their personal observation. The respondents were asked whether they had ever noticed any form of water wastage in their daily routine life. 26 percent respondents were agreed that they have noticed water wastage; the low percentage of water wastage observation shows the careless behavior of the respondents towards water as a key component of their daily lives. The respondents were further asked about leakage of water at home. The respondents' behavior at home and public place can be judged from the information received through this question. Whether the respondents have ever noticed water leakage at home? Majority of the respondents replied with positive response that is 49 percent had observed water leakage problem at home, while some respondents replied that they had observed it sometimes. However, there were respondents who had never observed water leakage problem. Further the respondents were asked about the real action taken to repair water leakage problem at home. Some of the respondents replied that they took quick action for the repair of water leakages. While majority respondent's perception was that sometimes they show quick response, if water leakage is of high wastage. However, to small leakage they don't give that much importance at home. Similarly, there were respondents who never give importance to these leakages at home. The respondents were further asked about time to spare for water leakage repair. There were respondents who thought that they could spare five to ten minutes for repair of leakages, while some respondents could spare fifteen to twenty minutes. However, there were also respondents who could spare more than twenty minutes for the recovery and repair of water leakages. Further, the respondents were interviewed about the complaint (mean passing information to head of household or some department available for quick recovery of water wastage) for the repair and maintenance of water leakage. 19 percent of respondents were agreed that they complaint after observation of water leakages. It shows that majority of the respondents do not consider leakages as water wastage and they always want to be free riders. 19 percent of respondents were cooperative in nature. The respondents were further asked to suppose if they were in situation of water leakage problem, and after complaining to the concerned department about water

leakage, whether their responsibility ended with lodging of complaint? 72 percent of respondents replied positively that their responsibility ended.

Further the respondents were interviewed that how much time, money, and labor they could contribute to stop leakage. Therefore, the respondents were asked that besides complaint to the concerned authority, whether they make some personal efforts to stop leakages of water. 16 percent made some personal efforts in the form of monetary and non-monetary terms for the solution of leakage problems. 33percent respondents agreed with the view that they sometimes do efforts for the repair of leakage, while 51 percent have never made any effort both monetary and non-monetary for quick repair of water leakage to stop wastage. The respondents were asked that how could they conserve water. Who will be responsible for over consumption and wastage of water? There were four different options given in question and every individual has to select the most responsible amongst the options. Interestingly, nobody among the respondents considered self-responsible for water wastage and leakage control. 65 percent of respondents viewed that other members in our community were responsible for the over consumption and water wastage through leakage. 29 percent of respondents replied that there were organizations for water management, therefore, according to their perception. It is the sole responsibility of those organizations to take care of proper management and monitoring of water wastage and leakage of taps and pipelines.

Regression Analysis of People Behavior towards Water Leakage Control (Conservation)

The following table shows the result of multiple regression model used to estimate the effect of different determinants on the behavior of people towards water leakage control and conservation of water. Before estimation of model, different diagnostic tests were applied to the data to know the nature of data and whether it was free from econometrics problems or there exist problems in the data. The age and education showed significant relationship with the behavior of people towards water leakages control, while positive and insignificant association is shown with past history of individuals who faced water scarcity problem. The individuals surrounded by family and friends who are aware of water scarcity issue in study area and importance of water, their attitudes towards water leakage control were also positively significant.

The value of R square is 0.74 which shows that it is a good fit model. Independent variables i.e. age, education level, past history of water shortage, family members' attitude and friends' attitude towards leakage control are highly related to behavior of individuals in control of leakage. The F value shows overall significance of the model which is 8.474 with the significance value of which shows that overall model is highly significant. The model clearly shows that behaviors of people towards water leakage control were explained. All the variables were significant except past history

of water shortage problem faced by respondents and their attitude towards leakage observations. Age and education variables were significant, which show that behaviors of people towards leakage control changes with age and level of education.

Behavioral change towards water wastage and leakage control was estimated by analyzing different independent variables. All the indicators were significant at 0.05, which clearly shows the validity of model. Model strongly suggests that increase in age of respondents their concern about control of water wastage and leakage is high, behavioral change was easily observed with aging. Furthermore, it was also explained from this result that young people are less concern about water wastage and leakage as compared to elder people. Because with the aging people are more curious about water conservation, they had learnt from experience in their lives, besides this it also shows that aged people know the future prospect of water crisis, which shows that they are highly concerned about their upcoming generation problem. Educated class leads to conserve water more as compare to that of illiterate community in the society. High percentage of educated people in community means that they have more information about importance of water and water as a scarce resource. Therefore, the community in which percentage of educated people is high so conservation of water is high as compare to the community wherein the level of educated people are either less or not present. This clearly shows that people who face water shortage in past do not bring change in their behavior towards water conservation. This shows the people behaviors do not change with the crisis/shortage face by them in past, so their past history have no impact on the behaviors of individuals. Surrounding of people was mostly observed that it had positive effect on behavioral changes. Attitude of consumer towards water wastage and leakage control was significant, which means that those respondents whose family members are conscious about water as a scarce resource try to conserve water more frequently as compare to those households whose family members do not consider it as important issue. Therefore, consumers whose family and close circle discuss water shortage and related issues had always brought changes in their behaviors as compared to those respondents whose close circle and friends never discussed the water crisis in the study area.

Table.02. Estimates of Behavior of Public towards Water Leakage Control (Conservation)

Explanatory Variables	Coefficients	Standard Error	Significance Value
Age	0.156	0.065	0.017
Education	0.168	0.071	0.019
Past History	0.184	0.326	0.573
Attitude of Family Members	0.604	0.062	0.000
Attitude of Friends and surrounding	0.015	0.060	0.004
Constant	0.941	0.698	0.178
F-statistic	8.4749		
R-squared	0.742		
Adj R-squared	0.722		

Source: Author Estimation Survey Results 2016

The households were further asked about their favorite political party, which they wanted to vote in coming election, to rank water conservation problem in the manifesto for the election from most important to least important. The other points included provisions of health facilities for all citizens of the country at their door step, free education for all the citizens, development of infrastructure which included building of roads, bridges, fast communication networks, elimination of corruption, vocational training, vocational education, improvement in ethical values, economic growth, economic development, freedom of speech, equality before law, and justice for all. Interestingly, all the points were the main problems of our country. However, no single respondent considered water conservation as one of the most important problem of Pakistan to rank it on the top of their manifesto. There were only two respondents who thought that political parties should consider it as the second main issue of Pakistan. 07 considered it as the third important issue of Pakistan. Similarly, 14 considered it as fourth important issue of Pakistan. 21 considered it fifth most important issue of Pakistan. 27 considered it sixth important issue which should be placed in the manifesto of the political parties in the upcoming elections. 33 respondents considered the issue to be placed in political parties manifesto on seventh position. While 36 respondents were such that they thought that political parties needed to consider it to place the issue in their manifesto on eighth position. While 39 respondents thought that it should be placed on number ninth in the manifesto of their favorite political parties. 42 respondents were of the view to give it tenth position in the coming general election.




Figure. 01. Suggestion to political parties about water conservation as part of manifesto

Conclusion

A multiple regression model was designed for the measurement of different determinants to estimate the behavior of people towards water leakage control and water conservation. The results revealed that age and education showed significant relationship with the behavior of people towards water leakages control and conservation of water. Insignificant association is shown with past history of individuals, who faced water scarcity problem, which means that previous history of water shortage problem did not bring changes in the behavior of respondents. The individuals surrounded by family and friends, whose attitudes towards water leakage control were also positively significant. In short the model interprets that behavior of people for water leakage control and conservation depends upon the respondents’ education, age, past history, time, and attitude of families and friends surrounded by respondents. Water crisis in Pakistan can also be overcome through behavioral aspect of consumer. As already known that underground natural resources are not unlimited. Over and above exploitation of these resources may led the country into more serious position, therefore as need of the day individual as well as collective efforts are required to overcome the crisis. Government agencies and community level awareness regarding water shortage are need of the day.

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CAUSES OF MEAGER PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN PARLIAMENTARIANS IN KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA ASSEMBLY; AND THE WAY OUT

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Abstract

This paper aims to explore the causes of meager participation of women in Khyber Pakhtukhwa (KP) assembly. The study was conducted on the obstacle that was faced by these women parliamentarians in the KP assembly during the last three governments (2002-2008, 2008-2013, and 2013-2018) in the light of expert opinion of female political representatives, political activists and experts. Women as a constituent candidate, their role in the parliament and the problems they faced have been discussed. The paper is based on qualitative method. Total 20 MPAs, MNAs, and female rights activists were interviewed for qualitative analysis. The interviews were unstructured, allowing flexibility, liberty of conversation and flow of information. It was found that there are still many difficulties faced by these women parliamentarian in the KP assembly. The study concludes that ideological, economic and patriarchal mind-set are the main factors that hinders women participation in the assembly's business. The findings of the study can be used effectively to increase women participation by bringing awareness at local level and making appropriate policies at national level.

Keywords: Women, Politics, Women Participation, Provincial government, Quota, Caucus.

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Introduction

Politics is the most important organ of the state that regulates and enforces the law for the peace and prosperity of the society. Women comprise about half of the world's population, but they are not actively involved in politics. Politics include the process of decision making and power of an individual. Despite the tremendous progress and softening of the rigid stance and attitude of the society toward women's participation in politics, women in legislature and at other levels of politically active engagements are still facing manifold challenges and problems.¹

Discourses' regarding women suffrage rights in an Islamic country, like Pakistan, necessitates its discussion within its social, cultural, religious and political frameworks.² According to the 2017 census, women population is almost equal to male population of Pakistan, but gender discrimination is rampant everywhere in the country despite the lofty claims of gender equality. The constitution of Pakistan has assured equal political participation of women, as the Article 25 of the 1973 Constitution states, "All citizens are equal before the law and are entitled to enjoy equal protection before the law. There shall be no gender discrimination".³ In the same way, the Constitution has fully enunciated the role of women in the Local Government institution in these words, "local Government institutions composed of elected representatives of the areas concerned and in such institutions special representation will be given to peasants, workers and women".⁴ More emphasis has been given on the women participation "Steps shall be taken to ensure full participation of women in all spheres of national life".⁵

There are some potent long-term factors, ingrained in the very fabric of Pakistani society which is not helpful for the development of pro-women political behavior. Besides other invisible issue, financial, socio-cultural, political and ideological issues are the most obvious ones.⁶ Keeping in consideration the numerical strength of women, it is cheerless that because of social cum cultural components women confront hardship at the local, district, provincial and national level, these are not proportionate with their numbers. It is a common phenomenon in Pakistan that women with relatively stronger and deeper family background in politics have greater

¹Barbara Rogers, *The domestication of women: Discrimination in developing societies*. (Routledge, 2005).

²Asma Afzal Shami, "Political empowerment of women in Pakistan." *Pakistan Vision* 10, no. 1 (2009): 141-150.

³Article 25 of the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan.

⁴Article 32 of the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan.

⁵Article 34 of the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan.

⁶Farzana Bari, "Women's political participation: Issues and Challenges." In *United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women Expert Group Meeting: Enhancing Participation of Women in Development through an Enabling Environment for Achieving Gender Equality and the Advancement of Women*. Bangkok. 2005.

chances of success in politics as a profession. For example, Miss Fatima Jinnah was the sister of the founder of Pakistan; Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of Z.A. Bhutto; and Maryam Nawaz Sharif, daughter of the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.⁷

The conditions of Pakistani women concerning their political participation have relatively improved in the present day Pakistani society. Be that as it may, genuine political development of women is still an ideal that has not been materialized yet.⁸ Quota system of fixed seats has removed the fear of male dominance as in open competition chances are low for women victory. Mandate always fall short for women candidates in open, free competition. Turner (2003) has thoroughly analyzed the electoral politics of neighboring countries, Bangladesh, India and far eastern country Indonesia; in this regard he has discussed the quota allocation of these countries. According to Turner quota seats introduced new faces to the politics. He has greatly emphasized on quota and to him at least 30 percent quota is a must in every parliament.⁹

Gen. Musharraf tried to improve the women's political participation as his attitude was enlightened and pro-women. He expanded the strength of women seats to the transcending 60 in the NA and proportionately in the Provincial Assemblies. Commendably, he did not fix any date for the expiry of this number and he tried to accomplish the gender equality in his time.¹⁰

The whole of Pakistan, but especially the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, remained under the influence of ideological and political elements during 2010 elections that constrained women from political participation and casting vote. As a result, women empowerment was given a set back and deprivation of women was bound to follow. It stretches a clear practicing picture of patriarchal system in this modern era.¹¹ Patriarchy can be witnessed everywhere in the Pakhtun belt and it is man who determines the course and destiny of the family. Patriarchy is a familial, social, ideological and political system through which men subjugates

⁷Shami, "Political empowerment of women in Pakistan."

⁸ SairaBano, "Women in parliament in Pakistan: Problems and potential solutions." *Women's Studies Journal* 23, no. 1 (2009): 19.

⁹ BarryTurner, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). *The Statesman's Yearbook 2003: The Politics, Cultures and Economies of the World 2004*, 116-117.

¹⁰TahirMehdi, "Women in politics." *Daily Dawn*, 2015.May 25: 07.

¹¹Navid Iqbal Khan, "Tehreek-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Muhammadi in Malakand Division (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa): A Case Study of the Process of "State Inversion"." *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture* 31, no. 1 (2010): 131-158.

women in every conceivable way such as direct pressure, rituals and norms, law, division of labor and education.¹²

Pakhtunwali (Pakhtun Code of life) is the real ideology of every Pakhtun since eons even after they embraced Islam. Women were considered out of the ambit of public activities and enterprises. Taken as the embodiment of all social evils, Pakhtun culture is hesitant to give women any freedom of movement leaving aside political participation. It is held against the valor and dignity of man if women undertake any public enterprise and activity.¹³

A study states that the number of the members of provincial assembly of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was 124. Out of which 17% (22 seats) are reserved for women. Similarly, the general and women specific seats are allocated independently to each province, former FATA and ICT (Islamabad Capital Territory) in the lower house (National Assembly) of Pakistan. Currently the strength of the members of the lower house of Pakistan is 342. The allocation of women reserved seats is with end goal that 35 seats are reserved for Punjab, 14 seats for Sindh, 3 seats for Baluchistan and 8 seats for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province respectively.¹⁴ The allocation of insufficient seats for women, the rigging and manipulation and insecurity concerns have greatly reduced women active participation. There have never been elaborate arrangements for women training programs and awareness raising sessions nor any political education about the political party manifestoes and historical background.¹⁵

Usually the political parties of Pakistan shun of issuing tickets to female on open seats. This indicates a dominant inclination on the part of male to keep women out of public offices.¹⁶ Insufficient seats for women, the rigging, manipulation and security concerns have greatly reduced women's active participation. There has never been an elaborate arrangement for women training programs and awareness raising sessions nor any political education about the political party manifestoes and historical background.¹⁷

¹²Hester Eisenstein, *Contemporary feminist thought* (Twayne Publishers, 1984).

¹³ ArabNaz, and Chaudhry, Hafeez-ur-Rehamn, *Gender and Development: Socio-Cultural, Economic, Religious and Political Impediments in Women's Empowerment and Gender Development: A Case Study of Malakand Division KPK Pakistan* (2011). BIOINFO Sociology, Volume 1, Issue 1, 2011, pp. 15-24. Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2083016>

¹⁴CIDOB. "*Political system and State system of Pakistan*. Barcelona": International yearbook. (2012).

¹⁵RakhshandaNaz, 2013. "Political participation: 20% of assembly seats demanded for women." *The Express Tribune*, January 02: 1.

¹⁶Saleem "Women's political participation". *Daily Times*, August. (2013) 13: 04.

¹⁷ ArabNaz, and Waqar Ahmad. "Socio-cultural impediments to women political empowerment in Pakhtun society." *Academic Research International* 3, no. 1 (2012): 163.

Objectives of the Study

The main objective of this research paper is to find out the main reasons behind meager participation of women in the KP assembly as well as to find out the way out to increase their participation.

Research Method

This topic needs more detail and in-depth study to know the issues and challenges faced by women parliamentarian of KP assembly. Therefore, the researcher used qualitative method to investigate the causes of women meager participation. In order to make this research more realistic and cosmopolitans, the participants were selected on the basis of different characteristics, experiences and opinions, which were of direct interest. Thus totally 20 MPAs, MNAs, and female rights activists were interviewed for qualitative analysis. This study was conducted on the obstacles that these female parliamentarians faced in the working of the parliament in the last three governments (2002, 2008, and 2013) in the light of expert opinion of female political representatives, political activists and experts' opinion. In the given discussion women as a constituent candidate and the problems they faced in the working of the assembly has been discussed. The interviews were unstructured allowing flexibility, liberty of conversation and flow of information.

Analysis and Interpretation

The women interviewed ranged from 26-56 years of age, having different social background. Majority of the respondents were of political background. A few of them belonged to middle class. All of the respondents were familiar with the legislative and policy making process. En of the respondents were provincial assembly members between 2002-2013 and 2013-2018 while one was the member of National Assembly and the rest were political activists and NGOs heads. The interviews were based on the following point:

➤ The causes of meager participation of women in KP assembly, and way out to insure maximum female participation in the assembly business. Majority of the respondents were satisfied and greatly welcomed the entry of women in the parliament on reserved seats. The quota system for women in central legislature (NA and Senate) and in all the Provincial Assemblies of Pakistan was very encouraging. Most of the respondents were very much critical about the role of women of the 12th Parliament. According to an interviewee:

“Although the 12th Parliament witnessed enough number of women parliamentarians, but ironically, most of the elected women

*parliamentarians have never been tried either, and their role in this connection was not different from men”.*¹⁸

While discussing the positive aspects of women reserved seats an MP opined:

*“The most positive aspect of the 2002 general elections is observed nationally and internationally that as the results of these elections the myth that women are either not ready or unwilling to come to mainstream politics or not yet able to shoulder the responsibilities of electoral politics at constituency, provincial or national level is dismantled”.*¹⁹

When these respondents were asked about their performance, they answered that in province like KP, where men enjoy power of decision making in the assembly and still a patriarchal set up is there. It stalls the performance of women parliamentarians in the KP Assembly. This assembly had 22 women parliamentarians. These female brought many issue and debates to the assembly floor as compared to their male members. Out of 109 private members bills 72 were presented by female MPAs of KP assembly. In KP Assembly out of 208 resolutions 113 (59.4%) were introduced by women MPAs. Out of 11,056 questions raised on the working of the Executive Branch of the government 7,138 questions were raised by women MPAs.

One of the respondents said about the caucus role:

*“Women parliamentary caucus was formed with the aim to ensure that gender concern is adequately translated into legislation, policies and programs”.*²⁰

12th Parliament of Pakistan was the first Parliament which warmly welcomed the entry of women in the parliament on quota, but this process was not sufficient for active women political participation. Most of the respondents from NGOs critically evaluated that:

*“These parliamentarians remained silent at the Assembly floor on raising women’s issues pertaining to women’s empowerment. Since 2002, the Parliament witnessed enough number of women parliamentarians, but they too remained silent, like their counterparts on women issues”.*²¹

The then President of Pakistan General Pervaiz Musharraf, not only raised the strength of women quota in the NA, Senate, PAs, but also fixed

¹⁸Khursheed Bano, interview by author, April 3, 2018

¹⁹Rakhshanda Naz, interview by author, April 5, 2018.

²⁰ShawanaSha, interview by author, April 10, 2018.

²¹KhursheedBano, interview by author, April 13, 2018.

33% reserved seats for local government councils in all tiers. But unfortunately, these female could not perform their role as women legislators to highlight their sisterhood issues instead they were very much satisfied with the existing quota mechanism.

Although women are always undervalued, but they proved their political skills at the assembly floor, by remaining more active, more confident and more useful. They not only vigorously took part in the work of the legislature but also draw the attention of the house towards many issues by putting forward different bills. In fact they brought more business to the house as compared to their male MPAs.

Majority of the respondents were of the opinion that most of the decision are made outside the parliament (hujra, jumat or hotels). Women were not given any kind of authority to make decisions. Reserved seats are given to the female just for fill in the blanks. The respondents agreed that patriarchal nature of the assemblies (male dominated) is a great reason for low political participation. Only 8% women intervened and expressed their opinion in the parliament during 2010-2011, which was very nominal. The reason is that they don't have awareness and capacity building. They all agreed upon the statement:

*“In our assemblies, men dominate the political arena, men formulate the rule of the politics and for evaluation they define the standard. Women always follow their respective party's direction. So, the greatest challenge to women participation is its patriarchal nature”.*²²

Women legislators can talk on female issues, they cannot highlight general issues. These women are excluded from budget and decision making process. They said that financial and political status also influence female participation. These indirectly elected women are considered less important as compared to the popularly elected members of the assembly. In the words of an activist:

“The two-major obstacle for a woman to enter parliament are lack of constituency and lack of financial resources. They have no base from which to develop social contacts with the people or to build knowledge and experience about politics. Furthermore, they have no financial independence. This lack of constituency

²²NaseemHayat, interview by author, (March 19,2018)

*and financial dependence pose serious hurdle to their participation”.*²³

Another respondent said:

*“Every women politician, even if they are elected against reserved seats must have their own constituencies. There is no power without people power”.*²⁴

It was said that the influential political families are given preference and those female party workers and party loyal are ignored who work day and night for their parties. As stated by a parliamentarian:

*“The greatest challenge for these female parliamentarians is the lack of unity. Majority of the members are male and they dominate the scenario. While women MPs do what their parties want them to do. In contradictory issues, they give priority to their party decisions. There are very few times when they joined the caucus activities since they are pre- occupied with their parties’ agendas”.*²⁵

Findings

In a nutshell, politics in Pakistan has remained always obstacle to women political participation for being a multifaceted, notorious, disturbing, aggressive and reactionary.

The findings of this study are based on Data Analysis. The topic where the researcher wanted to pursue the opinion of the respondents were their views about the hindrance in female participation in the assembly at provincial and national level. All these aspects collectively measured the respondents’ perceptions about female participation. Following are the findings that emerged in the current study regarding female participation in legislature.

Mechanism of Political Parties

The mechanism of political parties and its environment do not favor women to participate actively in politics. As per the findings of this study, the respondents strongly agreed that the structures of the political parties and its poor mechanism discourage women’s active involvement in politics. The political parties of Pakistan have no definite policies for women; rather these delegate them and use them merely as supporters.

²³Saajida ZulfiqarKhan,interview by author,(March 21, 2018)

²⁴Shabina, interview interview by author, (March 27, 2018)

²⁵Miraj Humayun, interview by author, (March 19, 2018)

Socio-Economic Pattern

The two major obstacles for women to participate in legislative process were the absence of power base that results from the constituency politics and financial powers necessary for the development of social contact building political skills and gaining experience. They have no base from which to develop social contacts with the people or to build knowledge and experience about politics. They have no financial independence.

Socio-Cultural Pattern

A very important point that was highlighted, was that socio-cultural pattern affects women participation. Majority of the respondents strongly agreed that family responsibilities affect women's participation in politics.

Dominant Patriarchy System

According to respondents in KP provincial assembly, men enjoy power of decision making in the assembly and still dominant patriarchal set up do exist there. They agreed that men are powerful and decision maker in assemblies as well as in political parties and curtailing women's political progress.

Less Number Of Women Representations In The Parliament

The respondents were not satisfied with the insufficient number of women's representation in legislature. Majority of the respondents were of the opinion that women should not restrict themselves to domestic spheres. The representation of women is not sufficient according to their strength.

Peshawar-Based Women Parliamentarians & Political Leadership

According to an activist from Peshawar, the parliamentary performance of women parliamentarians in 2002-2007 government was much deplorable in the National Assembly. Instead of focusing on their task and to highlight them on the Assembly floor they were satisfied with the existing quota system for women and their strength in the legislative assemblies.

Women politicians and party workers are being ignored and instead influential leaders are rewarded for their contribution in party by nominating their female relatives who happen to be the mediocre. They show their concern about their male counterparts that they discourage female representatives for taking any kind of initiatives.

Status of Parliamentary Caucus

Majority of the respondents highlighted that caucus is weak forum of women representatives for the reason that it is voluntary organization; it has no constitutional status, is less in number, has funding issue, has ignorance and has party loyalties. The creation of caucus was wished by majority of MP. Yet after its creation, most of the MPs seemed circumspect towards its usefulness and many said that they had little interest in actively participating in the caucus.

Gender Discrimination within Politics

This study concludes that some very serious hurdles created to the female leadership were; gender inequality at social level; limited chance of women electability, lack of political skill and lack of necessary skills to build political alliances. Political parties feel often reluctant to nominate women to run for the election as well as to engage them in decision making processes. This mindset in political parties discourages political workers and thus slows down their upward political mobility.

Lack of Awareness and Political Skills

Female parliamentarians didn't know the ABC of legislative process. Majority of them are uneducated or unaware of their role. They are never appreciated on general seats. Political parties give general seats to men because of socio-cultural restrains of our society. The respondents were of the view that the low education rate of women parliamentarians in Peshawar affects women's participation in politics.

Conclusion

This study concludes that factors responsible for meager participation of women include restricted mobility, weak decision-making power, lack of political skills, meager financial resources family responsibilities and cultural as well as religious "norms" and practices. Generally in Pakistan, and particularly in Pakhtun society, women are influenced by norms and cultural values. In this regard, this research study primarily explored the extent of women political participation in provincial assembly of KP, and Pakistan. Pakhtun socio cultural setup is deeply influenced by male dominant patriarchal structure. The data reveals that illiteracy, gender sensitivity, lack of political skill, defective electoral laws, financial dependency, socio-economic and socio-cultural patterns of Pakhtun society, absence of conducive atmosphere at the legislative level are the main causes that hinders women participation in politics.

Future Direction

To accelerate women's effective political participation in state affairs, education, political awareness and socio-economic development are

the main determinants of women active engagements in politics. Training and awareness programs regarding women empowerment within politics should be arranged at local and union council level. In order to minimize the patriarchal perception at national level, budget allocation is needed for health, education, and also for politics, family and economic initiatives.

The political parties' manifestoes should be more pro-women. It should be made mandatory for political parties to give at least one third of party ticket to its female workers on general seats. Mandatory provisions shall be made in the selection criteria on reserved seats to keep balance in the ratio of women as party-workers and political-elites. To encourage more female candidates in political participation nomination of fees for women candidates should be reduced. Party support, activism, education and internal democratic environment of political parties in KP are the source of increasing women's political participation. Civic Societies should focus on the elimination of patriarchal setup by realizing women of their strength the government should made it mandatory through a law to be enacted that lay down penalties for parties if that fail to observe the 1/3 requirement within their candidates nominated by a party to contest political seats. The ruling party should give developmental funds to their female members to develop their own constituencies and at same they should be given adequate share in the key post and ministries. To encourage more women participation in legislature the issues, less number, funds issue, ignorance and party loyalties needs reforms. Women Caucus needs statutory status to increase its effectiveness in resolving gender issues.

Political Parties should keep into account the socio-cultural order, the ideological and historical background of the state to make this participation effective. In such state of affairs, women parliamentarians and political activists have to take two fold responsibilities, firstly, they need to make sure the women political empowerment as much as possible; second, if no growth is added to the existing conditions, they must maintain the status quo and do not allow back pedaling in the already assured achievements for women participation.

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